Civil war in Nicaragua 1981 1990. Nicaraguan revolution

Alexey ZHAROV

The modern Russian Federation has few friendly countries. At least out of respect for such dedication, you should know their national holidays. For example, on June 27, Nicaragua celebrates Contra Day. More precisely, the Day of Nicaraguan Resistance, Peace, Freedom, Unity and National Reconciliation.

“Nicaraguan Resistance” was the name of the largest coalition of contras who fought against the Sandinista government and, in general, defeated it. This holiday was established three years ago by the government of the same Sandinistas who returned to power six years earlier. The personal author of the law was Elida Galeano. Sister of the Legendary Comandante Franklin, hero of the war with the Sandinistas, chief of staff of the Nicaraguan Resistance. She is the chairman of the national Association named after her brother. In her youth she herself was an honored contra-comandante, with the affectionate nickname Chaparra. Loosely translated: “Comandante Baby.” And at the same time - a member of the Nicaraguan parliament... from the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). The law was approved by the President of Nicaragua and the Hefe of the FSLN Daniel Ortega, against whom Franklin fought to the death, and Baby brought him ammunition.

What is this? A model of national reconciliation and cooperation? No. Betrayal and corruption as a state-forming foundation and enzyme. The main spiritual (and not only) bonds of the regime. That's why it's worth taking a closer look. It’s not for nothing that modern Managua is the “blind sidekick” of modern Moscow.

Guard on fire

Nicaragua is a deeply family-oriented country. We can say that no laws apply in it except the Family Code. But four decades ago, the then ruling family violated this code. Anastasio Somoza Debayle- those who are now around fifty dollars from childhood should remember this name - they have gone crazy from long-term impunity. His regime was very reminiscent of what was described in “Three Fat Men” by Olesha. Even the security forces were called guards.

February 1934. Anastasio Samosa Sr. and Augusto Sandino. Soon, on February 21, 1934, Sandino would be killed

On January 10, 1978, unidentified persons shot Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. Not just any communist! However, the Communists, who were called the Socialist Party in Nicaragua, were not particularly pressed by the Somosites. The party was created in 1944, when Somoza Sr. was part of the anti-Hitler coalition, i.e. formally was an ally of the USSR. Accordingly, the regime was awarded the title of anti-fascist. He remained so in the eyes of Marxist-Leninist dialecticians almost until the very end. As in the joke, all the trains were derailed.

And not a Miskito Indian. The Chamorro family was second in status. The murdered man edited the only legal opposition newspaper in the country. It was impossible to do that. Besides, there was no practical sense in this. They killed Chamorros only to remind them who was boss. They say it was a personal project of the then 26-year-old dictator’s son, a failed Anastasio III. The head of combat training of the National Guardsmen decided to take on real government affairs. It turned out powerful, to say the least. A year and a half later, this state was gone.

The whole of 1978 passed in flames. But then the National Guard still stopped the advancing Sandinistas. By the way, the commander of “Operation Omega” was Anastasio III. Soviet international commentators were openly surprised: why did it take so long? Twenty years earlier in Cuba, the Batistaites fled much faster. They drew their own conclusions, in the spirit of Marxist economic determinism: “In the ranks of the National Guard, semi-literate peasant boys receive good nutrition and a beautiful uniform.” This, they say, is why they fight. You might think that Batista's guards walked around hungry and naked. No, this is different...

Leaders and bullets

Samosa's resistance was broken in July 1979. And the Sandinistas began to repeat everything after the Castroites. At first there was no talk of any communism. On the contrary: Sandino's national liberation behests, democracy, human rights (naive Jimmy Carter could be pleased). In general: “Freedom has come to us, freedom! Let us sing the praises of the leaders of the people!”

The regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle was reminiscent of the regime of “Three Fat Men”

At first there were five leaders. Sandinista Daniel Ortega- fighter-hefe. Sandinista Moises Morales- political organizer. A fellow traveler of Sandinism Sergio Ramirez- writer. Social liberal Alfonso Robelo- chemist. Violetta Barrios de Chamorro- right-wing liberal, and most importantly - the widow of Pedro Joaquin. There’s no way without her. There was a lot to decide as a family. The Somoza family was killed for lawlessness. In her place was the Ortega family. And at the first stage, a visa was required for the Chamorro family - like we recognize an equal partner.

The government junta was quickly reshuffled. The first to be kicked out was, of course, the idealist Robelo. Minister of Defense Bernardino Lariosa- a former National Guard officer who turned the front against the dictatorship and did a lot for the Sandinista victory - was generally sent to jail. And in general, the very next year the center of power moved to another junta - the leadership of the FSLN. There were purely specific people in charge there, also in the number of five. Daniel Ortega is in charge of everything. His brother Humberto Ortega- chief of the army. Gloomy Marxist fan Thomas Borge- chief of repressions. Glamorous killer bon vivant Lenin Serna(so “according to the passport”) - chief of special operations. Human Computer Bayardo Arce- Chief in terms of money.

In September 1980, the FSLN declared itself a Marxist party. Of course, leading and guiding. Everything became clear: the village - collectivization, the city - nationalization, the masters of culture - not a day without a line about their beloved genius. All together - patronymic in state security, which in Nicaragua was called DGSE, and was commanded by Lenin, whose last name was Serna. There are many more prisons, and there are an order of magnitude more prisoners than under Somoza.

The Soviet press of Gorbachev's times spoke politically correctly: “One of the variants of the command-administrative system has been formed in Nicaragua.”

As they say, there is no need to continue. But a continuation followed. In the fall of 1980, there was still opposition in Nicaragua. Its main structure was the union of entrepreneurs COSEP. In our opinion, it’s just madness—it’s the same as the Shokha RSPP against Putin. Its vice chairman Jorge Salazar owned a coffee plantation and a mountain resort where the Sandinistas hid during the guerrilla war. He wholeheartedly supported the victory of democracy in 1979. But Sandinista officials took the place of Somoza officials with the questions “who is signing up for the collective farm?” and “why not yet in Lenin’s room?” Salazar began organizing coffee farmers into political opposition. With an indispensable condition: don’t even think about weapons. Only peaceful protest according to the law.

November 17, 1980 is an important day in Nicaraguan history. Lenin Serna's men lured Salazar to an evening meeting, shot him, and also threw a bag of pistols into his car. Like, he resisted. By shooting Jorge Salazar with bullets, the Sandinistas removed the question of choosing methods of struggle.

Legion of Democratic Forces

By that time, the “Legion of September 15” had been operating for almost a year. The organization is small, only fifty people. But the serious one is former National Guardsmen. These had no illusions; they did not expect democracy from the FSLN, but immediately went underground for armed struggle. Based on the first rights nearby, in Guatemala. The money was received from the national pride of Nicaragua - the world boxing champion Alexis Arguello. Well, they also racketeered someone, not without this. Let the rich fork out for the anti-Sandinista revolution.

Ex-Vice President of Guatemala Mario Sandoval Alarcon, boss of the World Anti-Communist League and patron of the Nicaraguan legionnaires, had no objections.

September 15 is Independence Day of Nicaragua, the name of the Legion was given in honor of this day. Commanded by officers of the National Guard Enrique Bermudez And Chino Lau. They launched sporadic terrorist attacks and contacted emigrant politicians. They, as a rule, answered: no, this is impossible, now there is democracy. But from November 17, 1980, they became significantly silent: well, as you know... So, if you ask “who gave the initial impetus to the contras?” - the answer from “Borge and Serna” will not be absurd.

“After the ouster of Somoza, we waited for the fulfillment of our dream of democracy. Instead, we got the Soviet totalitarian regime, dictatorship, oppression, exploitation by the Soviet Union and Cuba” - this was not said by Robelo (he was always waiting for something to no avail). These are the words of a much more serious and tough person.

Adolfo Calero. Manager of Coca-Cola. A distant relative and implacable opponent of Somoza. Active oppositionist associated with the Sandinistas. He took up the task of organizing the Contras.

On August 11, 1982, the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN) were founded in Miami. They were led by Adolfo Calero, Enrique Bermudez and Aristides Sanchez. The ideological and political mix is ​​characteristic. Calero was a typical neocon Reaganite democrat and anti-Somos. Bermudez was a libertarian, a lover of Ayn Rand's books, and a Somoza officer who strongly disliked Somoza. Sanchez is more of a Somoza than Somoza himself. And nothing, we worked together. They were called Triángulo de Hierro - “Iron Triangle”.

Responsibilities were distributed as follows. Calero set policy, raised money, kept in touch with Reagan and led special operations. In the final plan, they had an interesting intellectual duel with Serna; the opponents were worthy of each other. It was Calero who was the main Nicaraguan figure in the Iran-Contra theme. And, by the way, everyone noted: he didn’t put a single cent of the money he received for the fight into his pocket. He was generally of little interest in personal comfort. He valued something else - Jamboree (, for example.

Bermudez, as a military pro, commanded the Contra troops. Called Comandante 3-80. If Calero was Lenin Serna's nightmare, then Bermudez was Humberto Ortega's nightmare. Sanchez, called the “chief strategist of the contras,” shuttled between the FDN headquarters in Miami and the field camps of Bermudez’s fighters created in Honduras. By the way, the State Department and the CIA could not stand this somos player. The feeling was mutual - in terms of anti-Americanism, hatred of “Pindos” and craving for a special path of high spirituality, Sanchez would put thirty Dugins and Kiselyovs in his belt.

In general, “Che Guevara of anti-communism” Stefano Delle Chiaie() there was someone to talk to.

Comandante of the labor family

When people say “contras,” they usually mean FDN. This organization was not only the largest, but also the most active in the movement. It was she who held the main - northern - front of the eight-year civil war in Nicaragua. Where did the fighters come from?

Gloomy Marxist fan Thomas Borge was in charge of repression in Nicaragua / AFP PHOTO / Files / Nicolas GARCIA

The personification of the contra militant - Israel Galeano, aka Comandante Franklin. In the year the Sandinistas arrived, the peasant youth was 19 years old. He understood almost immediately what kind of miracle happiness had happened. In 1979 he joined the MILPAS militia, in 1980 he moved to Honduras, and in 1981, already an experienced fighter, he joined the FDN. He commanded the Jorge Salazar Regional Unit No. 2. Of all, the Comandante was the most effective, occupying the second position in the Contra armed forces after Commander-in-Chief Bermudez. It was his fighters who put Ortega’s army on their ears most of all.

At the same time, Comandante Franklin knew how not only to fight. Israel Galeano could explain why and what he was fighting for. For freedom and democracy? Yes, sure. But secondly. Firstly, for the homeland and its tradition of peasant culture. So spiritual bonds are different.

Next is another interesting point. The abbreviation MILPAS was mentioned above. Galeano and thousands of other contras started in this organization. Its leaders are the Valdvia brothers - Comandante Ocelot And Comandante Dimas- were prominent contra commanders. In general, by the end of the war, more than half of the FDN commanders came from MILPAS. Initially, this abbreviation stood for: MILicias Populares Anti-Somocistas - People's Anti-Somos Militia. And since 1980: MILicias Populares Anti-Sandinistas. But still MILPAS.

Like this. The best fighters came not so much from the Somos guard (although from there, of course, too), but from the peasant militia, which had broken away from the FSLN under Somos. Moreover, Ortega broke away due to insufficient radicalism! Peasants defended their families and homes from the arbitrariness of the authorities. “Somosistas” or “sanidinistas” is the second question. The populism of the people's will opposed any state with arms in hand: “Cops are not kents to a man.”

Naturally, the MISURASATA and MISURA-KISAN militias stood in the same position, only in an ethnically toughened version. They were created by Miskito Indians from the Caribbean coast. In 1987, shortly before the end of the war, they united into the YATAMA party. Translated from the local dialect: “Sons of Mother Earth.” The Miskito tribal authority became the head of YATAMA Brooklyn Rivera. Ideologist of Indian identity and communal democracy. (The Sandinistas, of course, consider him a tyrant cacique, the bearer of patriarchal obscurantism and other pre-Columbian horrors.)

There are fewer and fewer Indians in Nicaragua; they are very suspicious of mestizos and creoles and wholeheartedly advise any government authority to stay away from their places of residence. The Sandinistas, inspired by the provisions of the “Communist Manifesto” on centralization and a general plan, began to introduce state regulations for turtle fishing. Economic wisdom met with such a response that Borge was puzzled by the relocation of the Miskito from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific. He described the result in his 1985 Nicaraguan story Alexander Prokhanov: “The infantry were drowned in swamps, carrying artillery, and detachments of rebel Miskitos escaped in light canoes.”

Who left whom

There were simply ultra-left contras. First of all - Eden Pastora. Until 1979, when it came to the FSLN, it was Pastor who was remembered first. Naturally, he bore the honorable nickname Comandante Cero. Zero Hour Commander. On August 22, 1978, Pastora carried out “Operation Pig Sty” in Managua - with a team of Sandinista desperadoes he captured the National Palace with all the parliamentarians and several relatives of Somoza. And he left with a victory. Like Basayev from Budennovsk. With the difference that it was not the maternity hospital that was taking over. Somoza was forced to comply with Pastora's demands and release a group of FSLN leaders led by Tomas Borge, who in the future would become Pastora's political opponent.

On August 22, 1978, Eden Pastora carried out “Operation Pig Sty” in Managua - he captured the National Palace with all the parliamentarians and several relatives of Somoza. And left with a victory

Naturally, such a hero was held in high esteem during the first period of Sandinista rule. Replaced Humberto Ortega in the Ministry of Defense. But, bad luck, he took the slogans of Sandinism seriously. Replacing the Somoza clan with the Ortega clan did not seem to him a solution to the problems of the revolution. The peasants for whom he fought did not live any better.

On July 7, 1981, Eden Pastora organized the opposition Sandinista Revolutionary Front (FRF) and published his political manifesto, and in 1982 he established the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE) in San Jose to fight “traitors to the Sandino cause” and opened a front against the Sandinista regime from the south, from Costa Rica. “I didn’t leave the FSLN,” said Eden Pastora, “they left me. Those who betrayed our ideals for the sake of Marxism-Leninism... We are against the imperialism of Moscow and Washington. I propose a third type of government - without Soviet tanks and American dollars." “We were not contras, but dissidents—we were waging a political struggle, not a war,” he later recalled.

“Just think, a r-r-revolutionary,” Soviet international affairs officers giggled strainedly. In fact, Comandante Cero was taken more than seriously. On May 30, 1984, they tried to blow him up at a press conference. It didn’t work out, they only wounded him. But seven others died. It subsequently turned out that the DGSE order was carried out by Argentine Montoneros. Although before this they thought for a long time about the CIA - Pastora broke the game, categorically refusing to unite with the FDN. He could not sit at the same table with Bermudez, even against a common enemy. National Guardsmen killed his father years ago.

It happened the other way around: the most frenzied communists went into opposition to the FSLN because of Ortega’s opportunism. They were called “Marxist-Leninist People’s Action.” The Sandinistas crushed these quickly so that they would not get in the way. The Marxists-Leninists did not go into opposition. They preferred to group with “unarmed opposition.” Simply put, under the Chamorro family.

Social Democrats and left liberals were also unarmed. But they were in opposition. The one who collected them Alfonso Robelo. After Sandinista youth (such as Nashi or NOD members) destroyed his home, the former member of the government junta fled to Costa Rica. There, on the basis of left-wing convictions, he became friends with Pastora and introduced his Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) into the ARDA of Comandante Cero.

But Pastora did not know how to listen to anyone. Robelo waved his hand at him and reoriented from south to north - towards Calero-Bermudez-Sanchez. MDN joined the main contra coalition, the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) of 1987. The presence of a respectable social liberal was quite appropriate for the Iron Triangle. But he still could not influence decisions - the MDN did not have combat forces. So when Robelo decided to leave PH, Calero not-so-politely said, “It won’t be a problem.”

How the State Department saved Ortega

It must be said that militarily the Sandinista regime held firm. 10-20 thousand contras - mostly peasants, persistent, but untrained, among whom there were fighters of eleven years of age, could not stand on equal terms with the 75 thousand regular army, well-trained police and high-class intelligence services. Moreover, unlike the Sandinistas, the Contras did not have a unified command and were not as disciplined.

For all the talk about the Tsar's maintenance of the contras, they also had serious problems with money and weapons. The very fact of the Iran-Contra affair says a lot: the US Congress did not authorize supplies to the Nicaraguan opposition. Even at the highest Reagan level, it was necessary to look for intricate workarounds. It got to the point that American sympathizers bought a helicopter together and gave it to the contras.

On the other hand, the FSLN government completely officially received military support from the states of the Soviet bloc. And not only weapons, equipment, fuel, etc. Back in May 1980, deputy head of the PGU KGB of the USSR Yakov Medyanik at the Berlin meeting he mobilized his East German, Cuban, Bulgarian and Czechoslovak colleagues for the patronage of Lenin Serna.

As a result, the contras were unable to seize any large foothold on Nicaraguan territory. It did not merge with the branched underground - capable students sat in the DGSE Yakov Medyanik, Erich Mielke, Renan Montero and Mircho Spasov A. The Savimbi fighters in Angola or the Mujahideen in Afghanistan did better.

But the Sandinistas, in principle, could not win. The war in Nicaragua was one of the showpiece battles of the global Cold War. It was a match of prestige and principle. The entire world socialist system cracked and collapsed. It is no coincidence that the general offensive of the Contras unfolded from 1987 to 1988 - at the turning point of Soviet perestroika.

“I made the decision to fight to the death. Most of my people do too,” Israel Galeano told reporters hoarsely. The Sandinistas heard this. They also heard new news from Moscow. They began to think.

Already in February 1988, none other than the fanatical dogmatist Borge signed an agreement with the Indian leader Rivera. The Miskito received guarantees of autonomy and preferential rights in their traditional territory. Negotiations between the government and the RN began in March. The FSLN delegation was headed by Humberto Ortega, the contra delegation by Adolfo Calero. To everyone's surprise, they liked each other. “They showed cordiality and flexibility,” Ortega later recalled. By the way, in 2012, he sent a telegram of condolences to the Colero family when he passed away.

We agreed so. The fire stops, the contras are legalized (first, of course, the relatively harmless MDN Robelo, but then everyone else), the emigrants return, and real elections are held at the beginning of 1990. It's funny that the Sandinistas went about this quite calmly, since they were confident in the love of, if not the whole people, then 84 percent of them.

Just in case, Comandante Franklin warned: if they try to draw numbers, it won’t be enough. The Contras believed that they had won the war and would not be allowed to steal the victory. However, there were also those who began the countdown of capitulation and treason from the peace negotiations. Bermudez was categorically against a conspiracy with the Sandinista enemy: only war until victory. Enter Managua like the Sandinistas once did and throw them out like they did Somoza! When the CPSU gave up on the FSLN, it was quite possible. Sanchez led in approximately the same spirit. But the insidious State Department supported Calero. And saved Ortega from Najibullah's fate.

Robin Hoods die, Chubais rise

The elections took place on February 25, 1990. The Sandinista regime fell like a rotten banana from the branch. But the contras did not turn out to be popular with voters. And none, even Calero, even Pastor. Dona Violetta became the beneficiary of the struggle of the peasant Israel. The former seigneurial Chamorro family returned to power. Surrounded by a conglomerate of unarmed parties from conservatives to communists.

Enrique Bermudez - lieutenant colonel of the National Guard at Samos, irreconcilable contra

On April 25, Barrios de Chamorro was inaugurated as President of Nicaragua. On June 27, a ceremony took place to disarm the contras returning to peaceful life. Comandante Franklin solemnly handed over the machine gun to Dona Violetta.

Two years later, Israel Galeano died in a car accident. He died, remaining in the people's memory as the Nicaraguan Robin Hood. Bermudez had been shot the year before. The handwriting of the DGSE was striking: as with Jorge Salazar, they called for a meeting and were met with bullets. But the daughter of Comandante 3-80 is not sure about this version: “Many people benefited from the death of my father: the Sandinistas, the Chamorro government, the United States.”

Sandinistas - understandable. States too: “Dad knew too much.” What about Chamorro? Alas, this is understandable. Bermudez was the driving force behind the Recontras movement, fighters who refused to lay down their arms until the Sandinista “version of the command system” was burned out to the end. And Dona Violetta was already resolving issues with the Ortega family.

Humberto Ortega Jr. spent almost the entire Chamorro legislature in the army command. DGSE was reorganized and renamed DID (from “directorate” to “department”). Bloody Lenin Serna mixed tequila with whiskey and washed it down with vodka in another office of the military inspector general. Economist SFNO Bayardo Arce carried out such privatization schemes that Chubais would nervously smoke on the sidelines. In Russia, at least, one generation of owners nationalized, but another generation still privatized. In Nicaragua, both were produced not just by one team, but by one person. Both with a good tabash for your friends and for yourself. When Humberto Ortega finally deigned to leave his government position in 1995, he said: “I’m not such a fool as to leave on a bicycle.”

The rebels were quickly suppressed through joint efforts. Without Bermudez it turned out to be not so difficult. And in 1993, Aristides Sanchez also died, whom the Chamorro government managed to accuse of organizing mass riots and almost brought him to trial.

Alfonso Robelo went as ambassador to Costa Rica, then became involved in Latin American cultural heritage. Eden Pastora even ran for president under the slogan “No to Soviet tanks and American dollars!” However, he lost - Nicaraguans did not vote for those who fought. After this, he fell into a severe depression: “The first thing a revolutionary loses is his wife. The last one is your life. And between a woman and life we ​​lose freedom and happiness.” There were still financial problems, I had to sell the house... In general, Comandante Cero moved closer to the same Costa Rica and took up fishing.

1994-1995 he, however, he participated in the Zapatista uprising. Subcomandante Marcos asked Pastore to write an expert report for the President of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo. Pastors urged not to use force. His appeal had an effect and contributed to peace negotiations between the government and the rebels.

In November 2006, he again ran for president and again collected an insignificant number of votes - 0.3 percent. Shortly thereafter, he announced his reconciliation with the Sandinistas. Since President-elect Daniel Ortega had by then admitted the mistakes of the previous government, Pastore managed to do this without damaging his reputation.

“There is only one leader: Daniel Ortega. He continues the revolutionary path towards freedom and democracy. Only he can guarantee social programs. If not him, the anti-Sandinistas will destroy everything. We already saw them two decades ago - the privatization of four hundred enterprises, the dismantling of railways just to eradicate Sandinism, more than half a million forced migrants to work in Costa Rica,” he said.

In the Sandinista government, Pastora became involved in the development of the San Juan River basin. He started such work in this basin that Costa Rica accused him of causing severe environmental damage. On December 17, 2013, at the request of the Costa Rican government, Eden Pastora was put on the Interpol wanted list.

Adolfo Calero lived for a long time. But he assessed what was happening realistically and did not strive for the impossible. The pro-Soviet regime was demolished, local communism was broken, they did not allow a second Cuba to be made - and that was enough for him. He was little involved in politics, more in the practice of law. He lived in his house, which was confiscated by the Sandinistas and solemnly returned. Member of the commission of legislative initiatives of the Liberal Constitutional Party. He died at the age of 80, with a notary and a doctor. By the way, a few weeks after his main enemy - Tomas Borge.

Mayor and Sultan

The part mentioned above is a separate song. The post-Sandinista democratization of Nicaragua was expressed mainly in the fact that instead of the dictatorship of one family, pluralism for three was established.

The name of the head of the third family is Arnoldo Aleman. The son of a lawyer-planter, Somos minister. Under the Sandinistas, he was imprisoned twice. He did not take up arms, did not deal with the contras, but opposed the FSLN as a member of the COSEP leadership. After the defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990, he became mayor of Managua. And when Doña Violetta’s presidential term ended, he was promoted to head of state. With an ultra-liberal program. And he won. The bespectacled, cheerful fellow named Gordo (Fat Man) looked very handsome.

Terry Gilliam has a film with Robin Williams and Uma Thurman - “The Adventures of Baron Munchausen.” And it has an important storyline: Turkish hordes are besieging a European city. Fires, blood, death. And the mayor and the Sultan maintain a secret connection in order to endlessly prolong the war, ensuring power and cuts. Aleman and Ortega entered into such a relationship. Only, unlike the movies, they didn’t really hide it. Aleman’s five-year rule is called a “two-party dictatorship.” When an honest liberal Eduardo Montealegre brought to trial, he called it an attempt at reprisal “on the part of the liberal-Sandinista elite.” The term surprised no one.

And yet, in the dashing Nicaraguan nineties, elections, at least, were held on time, without fraud and without second terms, not to mention third ones. In 2002, Enrique Bolaños, promoted by Aleman, won to command from behind the old successor. But the old man immediately, as soon as he was inaugurated, imprisoned the patron for 20 years. Fortunately, there was a reason - Arnoldo Aleman is among the top 10 most corrupt politicians in the world.

A few years later, Aleman was even released from house arrest. By that time, Daniel Ortega was again president of Nicaragua.

Contra contra

What could the real contras think about all this? It was easiest for the Indians. The Miskito received their territories, chose YATAMA, and restored their order. This did not result in an idyll - hurricanes, rats, unsanitary conditions, bandit rampage... For some time they helped out a little from Managua. Barrios de Chamorro was considerate to the Miskito because she did not want to send troops to drown in the swamps.

Aleman and his liberals were tougher. His party suspended YATAMA. Riots broke out in Puerto Cabezas. And then Chief Rivera formed an alliance against the government... with Chief Ortega. Here are the light canoes for you. No wonder the chief Miskito field commander Osorno Coleman (Comandante Blas) accused Rivera of treason.

Back in 1993, a group of field commanders, dissatisfied with the ongoing lawlessness, created the Nicaraguan Resistance Party (PRN). Formally, it was headed by the writer Fabio Gadea from MDN Alfonso Robelo. Enter Elida Galeano, Comandante Baby, sister of the revered Franklin. But in reality, the PRN was controlled by tough brigadiers from the FDN and MILPAS - Julio Blandon (Comandante Kaliman), Benito Bravo (Comandante Mac), Encarnacion Valdvia (Comandante Ocelot), Roberto Ferrey, an operative from the Calero apparatus.

According to the behests of Jorge Salazar, under the banner of Israel Galeano - to the victory of the Nicaraguan democratic forces. But the main priority was still somewhat different. The PRN was created to lobby for the social welfare of the demobilized contras. Snatch from the government what it promised and kept (as is customary with all governments).

The PRN achieved little in the elections. At best, there is one deputy in parliament, several in municipalities. The party had to enter into alliances with the liberals... They supported Aleman, then Bolaños. They wasted their reputation. And the benefits provided for the contras were still squeezed out a teaspoon per year. The Sandinistas have suffered incomparably more since their defeat.

It's September 2006. The next elections were coming up in November. The liberal bloc nominated Eduardo Montealegre, an extremely decent person. And the leader of the PRN Julio Blandon signed an inter-party agreement... with the FSLN. The Contra Party moved to vote for Daniel Ortega. The election headquarters of which is headed by none other than Lenin Serna. This is where the skills of the Sandinista NKVD came in handy.

Elida Galeano - "Comandante Baby", sister of Israel Galeano

Blandon and Bravo undertook to explain such a brilliant turn (Ferrey, it must be said, remained silent). They say the liberals are not fulfilling their promises. Either Chamorro, Aleman, or Bolaños. Who said Montealegre would be better? Ortega did the same thing: he said it and did it. And in general, we contra fighters have always been opponents of liberal policies. A strong social accent is needed. Like Ortega. In addition, Comandante Kaliman added, the United States must pay Nicaragua 17 billion dollars. For participating behind the scenes in the civil war, for example, he was armed using the Iran-Contra scheme.
The PRN twice acted in alliance with the FSLN - in the elections of 2006 and 2011. Both times the Sandinistas won. The second time Fabio Gadea was nominated against Ortega. Not taking a somersault.

Here's what's important to consider. Ortega can mimic as well as Putin with candles. Even better - unlike Putin, he publicly repented for the past. The FSLN is no longer a Marxist party. Not on your nelly. Only traditional values, Catholic spiritual bonds. For this, after all, you also need a party state apparatus, a whip and a boss - to monitor the morality of the population. And if so, it doesn’t matter under what balalaika.

Before the 2011 elections, Daniel Ortega called on the Nicaraguan people to “forgive the Somostas.” And Anastasio Somoza Portocarrero (Anastasio III) highly appreciated this “state gesture”, expressing his readiness to embrace Ortega in a “Christian embrace” and actually calling on Nicaraguans to vote for the leader of the FSLN.

“Ortega has reconsidered the position and led the new Sandinistas who want to leave behind past mistakes and move forward to a new Sandinismo and a new Nicaragua... I would vote for a person who guarantees work, legality, morality... I am not a Sandinista, but for peace, progress and Ortega’s experience is useful for freedom,” said the dictator’s son.

Contras again - fight

June 13, 2012. Ortega was again elected president, the parliamentary majority was for the FSLN. The National Assembly passes another law - declaring June 27 the Day of Nicaraguan Resistance, Peace, Freedom, Unity and National Reconciliation. “The lawmakers' decision recognizes the service of the Nicaraguan men and women who fought in the civil war of the 1980s and were demobilized on June 27, 1990.” Adolfo Calero did not live to see the first celebrations for only ten days.

Eden Pastora made peace with Daniel Ortega, who even created a special ministry for him - the Ministry of Development of the San Juan River Basin

This is how the contras got their national holiday. Ortega is calculated using support accounts. Budget money was also spent on benefits for Blandon’s associates - their loyalty is worth it. Even land plots are allocated (what cost three liberal presidents to do this without Ortega?). The result is clear: Francisco Rivera Aguerre (Comandante Cat) accused Benito Bravo (Comandante Mac) of appropriating these plots and speculating on them. Scandal, abuse, lawsuits. In between, Comandante Cat said: what else can we expect from those who conspired with Ortega?

The law on Contra Day was introduced by Comandante Malyshka: chairman of the Israel Galeano Association of Nicaraguan Resistance, deputy from the FSLN. What would his brother say about Elis? Unknown. After all, a sister, and family for Nicaraguans is sacred. But we know what Comandante Franklin’s like-minded people say: Ortega’s sugary panegyrics to “patriots from the National Guard” and “our hardworking peasants” have long been sore; It was impossible to negotiate in 1988. Treason came from there.

“You” – who is this?

Three years have passed since Ortega was elected president from the FSN bloc with the PRN. And news began to come from Nicaragua, half-forgotten since the 1980s. Shooting, arson, fighting. And a video on YouTube: “I, Comandante Yahob, declare: the dictatorship will be overthrown! Rise up, Nicaraguans!” There is a video sequence - terrible pictures of the rural life of millions, Ortega going crazy on the podium, the poverty of huts and roads, party mansions...

Yahob is killed, Black Pablo appears. Black Pablo is killed, Cascabel appears. Cascabel is killed, Sheriff, Cobra, Sargento, Black Hand appear... New commanders with new fighters rise up. As before, almost all of them are peasants.

Last July, the FSLN celebrated the 35th anniversary of its first rise to power. In the northern department of Matagalpa, returning buses were met with fire. Five were killed, nineteen were wounded. The fighters leave without smoke, the four arrested find themselves out of business. A page appears on Facebook and is immediately blocked. But many manage to read: “We have no reason to fear the oppressors. We showed how to work. Freedom or death! Glory to the FDN!” They are called “Armed Forces of National Salvation - Army of the People.”

Roberto Ferrei offers mediation on behalf of PRN. But will they listen to him? The time for words seems to have passed. A quarter of a century is enough. The mistakes of 1990 will not be repeated. Lustration of the master's families is the very minimum of the upcoming transformations in Nicaragua. “We will end dictatorship and oppression” are the only words the new contras use. The rest is business.

...The red and black symbols of the “Bandera battalions” () are prohibited in the current Russian Federation, worse than the blue and yellow ones. But here’s what’s interesting: the banners of the Nicaraguan FSLN and the Angolan MPLA are painted in red and black. Meanwhile, there are no countries in the world now that are more similar to Russia than Angola and Nicaragua (not even Zimbabwe). A very significant coincidence. It can't be accidental.

• Nikolai von Kreitor. THE HIDDEN WAR AND THE AMERICAN CONTRAS STRATEGY
• REAGAN WAS THE EXECUTIONER OF MY PEOPLE. Miguel D'Escato
• Reporting from Nicaragua again in the spirit of the Cold War

Nikolai von Kreitor

THE HIDDEN WAR AND THE AMERICAN CONTRAS STRATEGY

One of the main provisions of the Reagan Doctrine, adopted in the early 80s, was the use of tactics of waging indirect wars using puppet gangs (War by Proxy, Contra strategy). This strategy was most fully applied in Nicaragua, a country that for a number of years was under attack by the United States by the forces of bandit units (the Contras) who were entirely financed, armed and trained by the United States.

To examine the American strategy of indirect warfare (the so-called "contra" strategy) in the light of existing positive international law, it is necessary to turn to the decision of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which has the force of precedent. In 1986, the court condemned acts of international terrorism elevated to the rank of US foreign policy by the so-called Reagan Doctrine.
In the court case Nicaragua v. United States, the International Court of Justice ruled that the United States committed acts of aggression in violation of international law. In particular, the court decision states:

"(3) Finds that the United States, by training, supplying, financing, equipping and arming the Contra forces, and by encouraging, supporting and organizing military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua on the territory of that country, acted towards the Republic of Nicaragua in clear violation of the rules of general international rights prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of another state.

(4) Decides that the United States of America, by the acts of armed attacks on Puerto Sandino on September 13 and October 14, 1983, and further by the acts of intervention referred to in paragraph 3 of this judgment, including the use of military force, acted against the Republic of Nicaragua in clear violation of the rules general international law prohibiting the use of force against another state.”(1)

The International Court of Justice in The Hague emphasized the principle of non-intervention in international law, which “prohibits countries or groups of countries from interfering in the internal affairs of other states.”(2)

“The element and composition of violence is especially clear in the case of intervention through the use of force - in its open form, through the direct use of military force, or in its hidden form, by supporting subversive and terrorist acts on the territory of another state. ..In modern international law there is no general rule of intervention in support of internal opposition in a state.”(3)

Here, by the way, it would be good to remember that during the session of the First International Roussel Tribunal, investigating American war crimes in Vietnam, the famous English philosopher Lord Bertram Roussel, who, together with Jean Paul Sartre, is a co-chairman of the tribunal, said that “the United States views Vietnam in the same way How Hitler viewed Spain." If Roussel were still alive, he might add that today the US views Yugoslavia in the same way that Hitler viewed Spain.

In his famous address to the Second International Roussel Tribunal, which deals with crimes against peace and humanity, as well as US war crimes in Latin America, Lord Roussel stated:

“Modern forms of international aggression consist in establishing

puppet regimes that slavishly serve the interests of a foreign state. The main characteristic of these puppet regimes is their function as guarantors of foreign investment (or foreign geopolitical expansionism). These puppet governments brutally deal with all their political opponents who dare to challenge the quisling behavior of these same puppets...

The United States uses the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and millions of dollars to buy, kill or overthrow governments that resist American imperialism."(4)

The establishment of puppet regimes, which from a historical perspective is a traditional and well-tested American method of destroying the sovereignty of countries and enslaving peoples, must be considered an act of international aggression. This form of aggression has been called "hidden war" (5), which often manifests itself in the form of internal feuds or civil wars, but is invariably orchestrated behind the scenes by the American puppet master. The goal of the “hidden war” and US coercive power policy is to “destroy an existing sovereign state or turn it into an obedient puppet.”(6)

The verdict of the Reagan Doctrine by the International Tribunal in The Hague in no way influenced the terrorist guidelines of US foreign policy. Striving for world domination and guided by the imperialist ideology of international legal nihilism and revisionism, the United States, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, began to pursue indirect war tactics in Europe: in Bosnia and Kosovo.

From the testimony collected by the International Tribunal for the Investigation of American War Crimes in Yugoslavia, chaired by former US Attorney General Ramsay Clarke, it clearly follows that the CIA created, fully armed and financed gangs of Albanian terrorists (the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA) in Yugoslavia . In order to finance the KLA gangs, the CIA established a well-organized criminal structure for drug smuggling and drug trafficking in Europe.

Reading the testimony given to the International Tribunal about the organization of gangs by the United States on the territory of Yugoslavia, a parallel with the Chechen gangs involuntarily suggests itself. After all, already in 1995, information appeared that some of Dudayev’s militant bandits were trained in CIA training camps in Pakistan and Turkey. Now, I think, it can no longer be a secret to anyone that Chechen terrorist fighters are essentially the equivalent of the Contras in Nicaragua in the recent past and the KLA in Kosovo in the present.

Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeev stated absolutely correctly that the United States is seeking to “establish its full control over the North Caucasus,” which is why a conflict is being created with Chechen gangs, which are essentially pawns in the geopolitical machinations of the United States.

Marshal Igor Sergeev further noted that the military conflict in Chechnya is a form of indirect US military aggression against Russia. Russian troops, fighting against Chechen gangs, are repelling attacks by American expansionists aimed at establishing American hegemony in the Caucasus.

FOOTNOTES
(1) Nicaragua v United States of America; also Michael Reisman and Chris Antonius The Laws of War (Vintage Books, New York, 1994) p.p. 17-18
(2) ibid., p. 98 (paragraph 205)
(3) ibid, p. 98 (para. 205), p. 99 (para. 209), also Antonio Cassese Violence, War and the Rule of Law in the International Community in David Held (ed) Political Theory Today (Stanford University Press , Stanford, 1991) p. 269
(4) Massage of Betram Russell to the Tribunal in Against the Crime of Silence. Proceedings of the International War Crimes Tribunal (Clarion Books, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1970) p. 38
(5) Harry Magdoff The Age of Imperialism (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969), also International Security-The Military Aspect (Report of Panel II of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (Doubleday & Co, New York, 1958) ) page 24
(6) Antonio Cassese ibid., p. 267; Tom Farer Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law (American Journal of International Law, 79, 1985), p. 408

"Contras"

and their deeds

REAGAN WAS THE EXECUTIONER OF MY PEOPLE

Miguel D'Escato

Note: Miguel D'Escato is a Catholic priest in Managua, Nicaragua. He was Nicaragua's foreign minister in the Sandinista government in the 1980s, at a time when the United States was arming and supporting death squads of counter-revolutionary rebels (the Contras). Ronald Reagan then said about them: “They are our brothers, these freedom fighters, and we have an obligation to offer them our help. Their morals are equal to those of our Founding Fathers.” The following text is taken from an interview with M. D'Escato broadcast on June 8 on Democracy Now national radio and television.

First of all, let me start by saying that Reagan is, of course, now dead. And I, for my part, would like to say only good words about him. I cannot be indifferent to the feelings of many Americans mourning President Reagan. But while I pray to God in his infinite mercy to forgive him for being the executioner of my people and being responsible for the death of some 50,000 Nicaraguans, we cannot and must not ever forget the crimes he committed in the name of what he pretended to call “freedom and democracy”.

Reagan, perhaps more than any other American president, convinced many in the world that the United States was a fraud, a big lie. Not only is it an undemocratic country, in fact it is the greatest enemy of the right of nations to self-determination. Reagan was known as a “great communicator,” and I believe that is true, but only if you believe that being a great communicator means being a good liar. He most certainly was. He could proclaim the biggest lies without even blinking an eye. Listening to him talk about how we allegedly persecuted Jews and burned synagogues that didn't exist, I truly believed that the devil had entered Reagan's soul. And I sincerely believe that the devil of “Decree of Fate” entered into the soul of Reagan then, as well as into the soul of Bush now.

Of course, when I say this, I am well aware that for the people who developed and are implementing the “Project for a New American Century,” this is a great loss. As a result of the reign of Reagan and his spiritual successor George W. Bush, the world today is much less reliable and secure than ever before. Reagan was, in fact, an international brigand. He became President of the United States shortly after the dictator Somoza, imposed on Nicaragua by the United States, who ruled the country for virtually half a century, was overthrown by Nicaraguan independence fighters of their homeland under the leadership of the Sandinista Liberation Front.

For Reagan, this meant that Nicaragua had to be reconquered. He blamed President Carter for the loss of Nicaragua, as if Nicaragua had ever belonged to anyone other than the Nicaraguan people. This was the beginning of a war that Reagan fabricated, orchestrated, financed and directed: the Contra Wars. A war about which he continuously lied to the people, causing the people of the United States to remain the most ignorant people in the entire world. When I say ignorant, I don't say unintelligent. But the American people are the most ignorant people in the world about what the United States is doing abroad.

He lied to the people, just as Bush lies to them today and makes them believe that the United States is above any law, human or divine. We filed a case against Reagan's USA and his government in the World Court. I was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time in Nicaragua and was responsible for this. And the US government was handed the most severe sentence, the harshest condemnation in the history of world justice. Despite the fact that the USA back in the early 1920s. announced to the world that one of the proofs of their moral superiority over other countries is that they respect international law and obey the decisions of the World Court, when the United States was brought to the World Court in Nicaragua and was convicted, they still have not complied with the verdict for damages , caused by Nicaragua.

By now they owe Nicaragua between 20,000 and 30,000 million dollars. At the time we left the government, the damage caused by the Reagan war amounted to more than 17 billion dollars, according to very moderate estimates by specialists from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, Howard , Oxford and Paris Universities. This is basically the team that was assembled to assess the damage. The US was ordered to pay for this damage. Bush never even wanted to talk to me about it. I said: “Okay, let's set up a meeting to discuss the issue of your execution of the court verdict.” He replied to me in two separate letters that he had nothing to talk about.

So Reagan did damage to Nicaragua that is hard to imagine for the people listening to me now. The consequences of this criminal and bloody interference in the affairs of my country will be felt for 50 years or even longer.

Reporting from Nicaragua again in the spirit of the Cold War

April 5, 2005
While the Bush administration is engaged in what the New York Times calls a "concentrated effort" to prevent the leftist Sandinsta party from returning to power in Nicaragua, the US media is returning to the type of lies about Nicaragua that characterized Washington's war against the country in the 1980s. X. The April 5th NYT article on the anti-Sandinista media campaign is a good example of this one-sided and distorting approach.

This article, written by Ginger Thomson, depicts US attempts to overthrow the Sandinista government under the pretext of a "worldwide struggle against communism" - although Nicaragua under the Sandinistas had a mixed economy, numerous opposition parties and a very active opposition press. She refers to Daniel Ortega as a "revolutionary ruler" even though he was elected president in 1994 in elections that were deemed "free, fair and truly competitive" by international observers.

Referring to the Sandinista government of the 1980s and the US-organized contras as hostile “armies,” Thomson writes: “the armies fought until both sides agreed to elections in 1990, which Mr. Ortega lost.” This leaves out the 1984 elections and creates the false impression that the 1990 elections were forced by the contras, when the then constitution provided for elections every 6 years. (This statement also hints that the Contras fought against the Nicaraguan army, while they mostly attacked civilians and civilian objects.)

Although the article focuses on US attitudes towards Ortega, Ortega himself is never quoted, the article saying that he "did not agree to repeated offers of interviews." Despite the reference to “numerous conversations with supporters of Mr. Ortega,” none of them received the floor either. (A supporter of Ortega's Sandinista rival is quoted at the end, explaining why he has no chance of being re-elected).

However, the article constantly quotes anonymous “high-ranking State Department officials” with unsubstantiated accusations against Ortega and the Sandinistas (for example, “the Sandinista party, which Daniel Ortega represents, is not a democratic party,” the Sandinistas use their influence to “blackmail” the country, etc.)

Presumably, New York Times guidelines reject the use of anonymous sources. “We do not cover for those who use anonymity as a cover for personal or partisan attacks,” the newspaper said in a February 25 statement. "If negative opinions are worth publishing, they may be paraphrased or described after in-depth discussion between author and publisher." When anonymous attackers attack an official enemy, this rule does not seem to apply.

In the late 70s and early 80s, when a crisis of military dictatorships emerged in South America and the struggle for democracy intensified, a movement against conservative dictatorial regimes also developed in Central America. But here it acquired the character of a new revolutionary upsurge, which led to the victory of the Nicaraguan revolution and the development of insurgent armed actions of revolutionary forces in other countries (El Salvador, Guatemala). In Central America, in the previous decades, the traditional foundations of society have undergone fewer changes than in the leading group of Latin American countries. The social and political structure of society was less mature here, and authoritarian forms of power were more deeply entrenched (with the exception of Costa Rica). Local dictatorships had more traditional features. The small, weak states of Central America early became the target of US expansion and were heavily dependent on ties with the North American power. Washington attached particular importance to protecting its strategic interests in the subregion. It is not surprising that the struggle in Central America took on a particularly fierce and persistent revolutionary character.

In the events of the late 70s and 80s in Central America, two stages of the struggle for transformation coincided, as if superimposed on one another. The first of these is the stage of the struggle to transform the traditional foundations of society, which by the mid-70s in the rest of Latin America was largely left behind, but here only now, belatedly, has reached its culmination. The second is the stage of the struggle for the democratization of society, which swept Latin America in the late 70s and 80s. The combination of both stages led to a combination of confrontation between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution and at the same time supporters of democracy and authoritarianism, to the contradictory interaction of the revolutionary processes themselves with general democratic ones. The path to general democratic changes here was paved by the revolutionary upsurge.

Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua

The main event of the revolutionary upsurge in Central America was the victory of the revolution in Nicaragua 1 . It was the result of the aggravation of the contradictions of dependent capitalist development, aggravated by the existence of the long-term dictatorship of the Somoza family (1936–1979).

1 Area 130 thousand km, population 3.9 million people (1992).

In the 60s and the first half of the 70s, Nicaragua was characterized by high rates of economic development. In the 1960s, GDP grew annually by an average of 7%, and industry by more than 10%. Urban population 1960–1979 increased from 38.4 to 56.6%. But this development has led to deepening economic imbalances. Nicaragua's external debt increased from 41 million dollars (1960) to 1.2 billion (1979). The growth of production occurred mainly on the basis of export industries and transnational capital. A monopolistic group represented by the Somoza clan, associated with TNCs and controlling up to 1/3 of the national property, was formed and strengthened. The Somoza clan occupied essentially a monopoly position in the economy and political life of the country. Small and medium-sized capital (large local capital outside the Somoza clan was practically absent) found itself in a disadvantageous position. The share of handicraft production remained high. In agriculture, agro-export latifundism with pre-capitalist remnants and the presence of large masses of landless and land-poor populations prevailed. Many Nicaraguans lived in poverty and lawlessness. Illiteracy was high (42.5% in 1971). In the second half of the 1970s, economic growth rates stalled and crisis symptoms emerged. In 1978–1979 unemployment reached 40% EAN.

A dictatorial regime reigned in Nicaragua, relying on the National Guard (armed forces), a repressive police apparatus, and US military assistance. Since 1967, the country was ruled by Anastasio Somoza, the second son of the founder of the dynasty of dictators, Anastasio Somoza, the father, who was killed in 1956. Manifestations of opposition were brutally suppressed. The Nicaraguan government actively supported US interventionist actions in the region (in Guatemala in 1954, in Cuba in 1961, in the Dominican Republic in 1965).

The dictatorship infringed on the interests and rights of the vast majority of the population, including the bulk of entrepreneurs. This increased the regime's isolation. But the national bourgeoisie, due to its weak economic and socio-political positions, was not capable of a successful independent struggle against the dictatorship. The main force in the anti-dictatorship struggle was the hired workers of cities and villages, who made up a significant part of the economically active population, and radical youth. True, the low level of political consciousness, downtroddenness, illiteracy or semi-literacy of the majority of the population, the narrowness of the intellectual stratum, and severe repressions made it difficult to form a mass revolutionary organization.

The goal of a group of youth led by Carlos Fonseca (1936–1976), who were influenced by Marxism, was to create such an organization and carry out a revolution. In 1961, this group founded the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), named after A. Sandino, the leader of the guerrilla war against American intervention in 1927–1933. At first it was a narrow, secretive organization. The Sandinistas intended to create guerrilla centers and, through their armed actions, together with propaganda and organizational work among the population, to involve the working people of the city and countryside in the fight against the dictatorship. The FSLN program, developed in 1969, envisaged the overthrow of the dictatorship, the establishment of people's power, and the elimination of exploitation and poverty.

The FSLN had to go through a long path of struggle and hardship, to experience defeats and losses. In November 1976, front leader Carlos Fonseca 1 was killed in battle. But in the end, the Sandinistas managed to develop a guerrilla movement, strengthen ties with the population and turn into a real force.

In January 1978, the murder by government agents of the leader of the liberal opposition, editor of the newspaper La Prensa, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, served as the reason for the explosion of general discontent with the dictatorship, which marked the beginning of the revolution. Mass protests grew on January 23 into a general political strike that lasted until February 7. The strike spread throughout the country and in some places escalated into barricade battles involving the Sandinistas. The government suppressed the strike, but the Sandinista armed struggle and popular protests continued. In April 1978, the Broad Opposition Front (BOPF) was created, uniting various opposition political parties, trade unions, and business organizations. He declared his goal to be the overthrow of the dictatorship and the creation of a democratic government 2 .

1. Of the founders of the FSLN, only Tomas Norge, who became the Minister of the Interior of the revolutionary government of Nicaragua, lived to see victory.

2. The communist party, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (NSN), also joined the SHF. The leadership of the NSGI was oriented toward an alliance with the moderate opposition to the dictatorship and for a long time was prejudiced against the Sandinistas as left-wing extremists. Subsequently, the NSP supported the revolution, but in the mid-80s it went into opposition to the Sandinista government, accusing the FSLN of monopolizing power and curtailing democracy. Another faction of communists, the Communist Party (CPI), occupied leftist positions and also found itself in opposition to the Sandinistas in the 80s. Both of these parties were of little influence, but had some trade unions under their control. Many members of the NSP and its supporters joined the ranks of the FSLN even before the revolution.

On August 22, 1978, a Sandinista detachment seized the National Palace in Managua and obtained from the authorities the announcement of the FSLN program and the release of a large group of front leaders and activists. This daring action became the signal for a new general political strike, which began on August 25 and by September 9 developed into a popular uprising supported by Sandinista units. The rebels captured the cities of Leon, Esteli, Chinandega and others. Only after stubborn battles did the National Guard, using their military superiority, break the resistance of the rebels by September 21. The Sandinistas retreated into the mountains and forests, again turning to guerrilla warfare. But the Somoza regime was already clearly isolated. In the following months, the entire opposition, including the liberal wing, united around the FSLN, which gained general recognition as the main anti-dictatorial force. The FSLN received the support of the Broad Opposition Front and growing solidarity assistance from democratic forces and some governments of Latin American republics (Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela).

On June 4, 1979, Sandinista troops launched a general offensive, which merged with a simultaneous general political strike and an uprising of the urban population. On June 16, in the territory of neighboring Costa Rica in the city of San Jose, the Sandinistas, together with other opposition forces, created the Governing Council of the Government of National Revival. The United States tried to organize intervention in events in Nicaragua on behalf of the OAS in order to prevent the Sandinistas from coming to power. But the vast majority of OAS members opposed this. During 45 days of fighting, Somoza's National Guard was defeated. The dictator himself fled to Paraguay, where in 1980 he was killed by agents of Nicaraguan revolutionaries. On July 19, 1979, the Sandinistas occupied Managua. The revolution has won. Power passed to the Government of National Revival.

The guiding force of the victorious revolution was the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), which turned into a mass political organization and was inspired by revolutionary democratic and socialist ideals. The leadership of the FSLN was collegial. It consisted of 9 persons. The military defeat of the dictatorship opened the way for the rapid formation of a new, revolutionary government. Its highest bodies were the Government of National Revival and the State Council, created in May 1980, a consultative and legislative body consisting of representatives from various parties, trade unions, mass organizations, and the church. The government was headed by a collegial Governing Council of 5 people. In addition to the Sandinistas, the government and the State Council initially included other participants in the anti-dictatorship struggle, including from the moderate, liberal opposition. Municipal councils (juntas) subordinate to the government became local authorities. The new authorities announced their intention to build a democratic, pluralistic society in Nicaragua.

The Sandinista People's Army was created on the basis of the Sandinista combat units. A people's militia emerged. The support of the FSLN among the masses was the Sandinista trade union center of workers (more than 100 thousand people), the Association of Rural Workers (over 40 thousand), women's and youth organizations. The Sandinista Defense Committees played a major role, mobilizing the population to maintain order and defend the revolution.

The revolutionary government declared a course towards creating a mixed economy - with the coexistence of the state, cooperative, private sectors and mixed forms of ownership. Immediately after the victory of the revolution, by decree of July 20, 1979, the property of the Somoza clan was expropriated and on this basis the public sector was created. The banking system, transport, energy, and foreign trade were nationalized. 35–40% of GDP and 40% of trade and services are concentrated in the hands of the state. State enterprises produced more than 2/3 of manufacturing products. The expropriation of the land holdings of the Somoza clan, and then the lands of other latifundists, led to a reduction in the area of ​​large private land holdings (over 350 hectares) from 41.3% of the land to 12% in 1983. The land was transferred to state, cooperative and individual farms. In 1983, 23% of the land belonged to the public sector, 7% to production cooperatives. In subsequent years, agricultural transformations continued. Total for 1979–1988 868 thousand hectares were distributed into collective or individual ownership of 112 thousand peasant families.

Much has been done to develop social legislation. improving conditions and wages, housing construction. eliminating illiteracy, which decreased from more than 40% to 13%, reducing unemployment (from 40 to 18% in 1983).

In the first years, success was achieved in the restoration and development of the economy. After the recession of 1978–1979 GDP in 1980 increased by 10.7%, in 1981. – by another 7.1%. Then production growth stalled under the influence of the global economic crisis of the early 1980s, but in 1983 GDP increased by 5.3%. Inflation decreased from 80 % in 1979 to 24% in 1981

In the first years after the overthrow of the dictatorship, Nicaragua's cooperation with the countries of Western Europe and Latin America expanded, which provided the republic with significant economic assistance. In September 1979, Nicaragua joined the Non-Aligned Movement. The principle of non-alignment was declared the fundamental principle of the republic's foreign policy. Since 1979, relations were established with the USSR, Cuba and other socialist states, which also provided increasing economic assistance.

However, the transformations were carried out contradictorily. No effective forms of cooperation with private entrepreneurs were found. The public sector has grown enormously. Excessive centralization of management, swelling of the administrative apparatus, weak discipline in state enterprises and their low profitability had a negative impact. Unjustified expenditures on social measures and an emphasis on redistribution policies led to a rapid increase in the budget deficit and external debt. The discontent of the peasantry was caused by the fact that an insignificant share of expropriated lands was transferred to individual ownership, and the creation of giant agricultural complexes and production cooperatives was forced. Expropriations and socialization affected some peasant farms. The ill-conceived forced resettlement of Indians, who occupied the vast, sparsely populated and poorly developed eastern and northern territories of the republic, to new settlements pushed them away from the revolution. All this complicated the subsequent development of the Nicaraguan revolution.

The undeclared war against Nicaragua and the aggravation of the situation in the republic

Already in 1980, business organizations and moderate parties began to move into opposition to the Sandinistas, whose representatives in 1980–1981. left the government and the State Council, where almost only the Sandinistas remained. In 1981, Daniel Ortega (b. 1945), a member of the National Leadership of the FSLN, became the leader (“coordinator”) of the government. His brother Humberto Ortega, also a member of the FSLN leadership, was appointed minister of defense and commander of the Sandinista army.

Former Somoza guards and other opponents of the revolution, nicknamed “contras” (from the word “counter-revolutionaries”), fled the country and began to concentrate in special camps in the border areas of neighboring Honduras and parts of Costa Rica. The US government, like other Central American governments, was concerned about developments in Nicaragua and provided arms and material assistance to the Contras to use against the Sandinista regime. Washington began to put economic pressure on the revolutionary republic. Since 1981, the contras began to invade Nicaraguan territory, carry out sabotage, terrorist acts, destroying economic and strategic facilities, and engage in battles with unit 1. In total, the Indian tribes in Nicaragua numbered more than 100 thousand people, divisions of the people's militia and the Sandinista army. They attracted the Indians and part of the peasants to their side and created support bases within the country. These invasions turned into an undeclared war against revolutionary Nicaragua. In 1983–1986 military actions took on a particularly wide scale. In 1982, there were 78 armed clashes, in 1983 – 600, and in 1985 – more than 1600. The number of contras reached 15–20 thousand people. The war was accompanied by an increase in human casualties and caused great economic and material damage to the country.

US intervention in the conflict increased. Washington officially allocated up to $100 million annually for military and material assistance to the contras. In addition, the United States provided additional support to the contras through unofficial channels. In 1986–1987 in connection with the sensational exposure of Washington's illegal sale of weapons to Iran, which was at war with Iraq, it turned out that the proceeds were used to provide secret weapons assistance to the Nicaraguan contras worth $30 million. Since 1984, the United States began to mine the territorial waters of Nicaragua in order to block access to the ports of the revolutionary republic for ships of other countries. In May 1985, Washington imposed an embargo on all US trade and economic relations with Nicaragua. There was a threat of direct intervention by the armed forces of the United States and neighboring states in Nicaragua.

The Nicaraguan government has sharply increased defense spending. The country was placed under martial law and universal conscription was introduced. The size of the regular Sandinista army increased to almost 100 thousand people. Up to 40% of the male population was armed and in one form or another mobilized for armed defense of the revolutionary government. Military assistance to the republic was provided by the USSR and Cuba.

To maintain the support of the rural population, the Sandinistas, since 1984, have expanded the transfer of land to private ownership of peasants. The forced relocation of Indians stopped. In 1987 they were granted autonomy. True, these measures were late and had only a partial effect.

To ward off accusations of dictatorship, the Sandinista leadership made the transition to constitutionally constituted authorities. On November 4, 1984, general elections were held in Nicaragua. Despite the call of the counter-revolutionary forces to boycott them, moderate opposition parties took part in them. In total, 2/3 of registered voters voted, of which 67.9% supported the Sandinistas 1 .

1 The parties of the left opposition to the Sandinistas - NSP and CP in total received 2.6% of the votes.

The head of the Sandinista government, Daniel Ortega, was elected president of the republic, and assumed new duties on January 10, 1985. The FSLN received 61 out of 96 seats in the opened National Assembly (parliament). The election results confirmed the predominant positions of the FSLN. But at the same time, almost half of registered voters either did not participate in the elections or voted for opposition parties. The National Assembly adopted a new constitution, which came into force on January 9, 1987, and consolidated the results of the revolution. According to the constitution, the head of state and executive power was the president of the republic, elected by universal suffrage for a term of 6 years. The National Assembly became the highest legislative body. The Constitution confirmed the principles of a mixed economy and political pluralism, which presupposed freedom of activity for opposition parties (with the exception of armed opposition forces).

However, martial law contributed to the further strengthening of the centralization of government, the nationalization of the economy, its depletion, the curtailment of democratic freedoms and the activities of the opposition, although moderate opposition parties were represented in parliament. Relations between the government and the church and entrepreneurs have worsened. The state administration has grown enormously, with its inherent bureaucratization of management, growing privileges, and the penetration of corruption into its ranks. Command-bureaucratic management methods also extended to mass organizations controlled by the FSLN and turned into its support.

The governments of the United States and most countries in Latin America and Western Europe accused the leadership of Nicaragua of violating democratic freedoms and human rights and militarizing power. Even the Socialist International and its member parties, which had previously aligned themselves with the Nicaraguan revolution, began to criticize the Sandinista regime, although they condemned the US interventionist policy and the undeclared war against Nicaragua. Following the United States, many Western European and Latin American countries have reduced ties with Nicaragua. The main role in helping Nicaragua passed to the USSR, Cuba and other socialist countries, which sent specialists and supplied weapons, raw materials, machinery, and equipment on preferential terms on credit, and partially free of charge.

The situation in Nicaragua was rapidly deteriorating. In military operations for 1981–1988. more than 50 thousand people died, the total damage until 1990 reached 17 billion dollars. External debt increased from 1.2 billion dollars in 1979 to 11 billion in 1990, many times exceeding the republic’s GDP. Export revenues covered only a third of import costs. National production has been falling steadily since 1984, having decreased by 1/3 by 1989 compared to the pre-revolutionary level. Inflation turned into hyperinflation: from 32% in 1984 it rose to 1161% in 1987 and 34000% in 1988, indicating a complete breakdown of the economy. The purchasing power of the population has greatly decreased, and wages have ceased to be the main source of livelihood. Discipline and labor productivity have fallen. Employment has decreased. Unemployment affected more than half the population. The black market and the shadow economy have grown.

In 1988–1989 The government took a number of emergency measures to stabilize the economy and finances, reduce administration and government spending. Thanks to this, in 1989 it was possible to reduce inflation by 20 times - to 1500%, the budget deficit by 8 times, and government spending by half. The decline in production slowed down, and there was an increase in agricultural production (by 4%) and exports. But the situation remained extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the republic held out and managed to inflict a heavy defeat on the contras, whose activity quickly declined after 1986.

The revolutionary war in El Salvador and the growing conflict situation in Central America. The victory of the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979 stimulated the revolutionary movement in El Salvador, where in the 60s and 70s a right-wing authoritarian, essentially military, regime dominated, covered by constitutional attributes and personifying the power of a bloc of the military elite with an industrial-financial and landowning oligarchy. With a very high population density (over 200 people per 1 km 2) in this smallest area (21.4 thousand km 2), but the second most populous (4.4 million people in 1986) republic of the Central American isthmus also the agrarian question was acute. Almost half of the economically active population was employed in agriculture. One thousand landowners (0.5% of farms) owned more than a third of the land, and half of the farms owned only 4% of the land. From 1960 to 1975, the number of landless families in the village increased from 30 thousand to 167 thousand. With a narrow domestic market, production for export grew.

The situation in the country caused discontent among different sections of society. Since 1971, El Salvador had a National Union of Opposition (NUO) with the participation of moderate reformist forces, the leading of which was the influential Christian Democratic Party (CDP), led by Napoleon Duarte, as well as leftists, including the Communist Party of El Salvador. The united center-left opposition hoped to achieve success through participation in elections and peaceful mass actions. In 1972, in the presidential elections, NSO candidate N. Duarte beat the official challenger. In 1977, the NSO again came out on top. But both times the authorities falsified the election results and responded to opposition protests with repression.

Some of the left, including communists who left the Communist Party due to disagreement with its line, chose already in 1970 to switch to armed partisan struggle, having lost faith in legal methods. Several partisan military-political organizations emerged. The earliest and largest of them was the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces, named after the founder of the Communist Party of El Salvador and comrade-in-arms Sandino, who died in 1932.

In 1977–1979 The Communist Party also moved to the position of recognizing the need for armed struggle in combination with other forms of legal and illegal work among the masses. The consolidation of the revolutionary left forces of El Salvador on this basis was accelerated by the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. The forces of the reformist opposition, more influential and organized in El Salvador than in Nicaragua, also revived.

On October 15, 1979, a group of young officers led by Colonel A. Mahano overthrew the reactionary government of General Romero (1977–1979). The military junta that came to power announced its intention to carry out reforms and democratize the country. Among the participants in the coup were both real supporters of serious changes, as well as moderate and even right-wing forces, who hoped with a preventive coup and promises of reforms to isolate the left and prevent the Nicaraguan version. Left parties and organizations failed to develop a single, definite approach to the new government, or to join forces with its center-left wing. The opportunity for this was missed. Meanwhile, the right gradually succeeded in ousting the left and center-left from the government. A. Mahano and his supporters were removed from posts in the army and government. In 1980, the center-right bloc of the military and the Christian Democratic Party came to power. The head of government was the leader of the Christian Democratic Party Napoleon Duarte.

The government of N. Duarte intended to carry out agrarian reform and other social measures, to establish a democratic regime in order to ensure the progress of the country and at the same time weaken the social base of the revolutionary opposition. These plans were supported by Washington. State control over banks was established, 200 latifundia with an area of ​​224 thousand hectares were nationalized and transferred to peasant cooperatives, and a decree was issued on the transfer of ownership of the plots they cultivate to tenants. However, the development of reforms stalled due to fierce resistance from conservative forces and opposition from the military. In an atmosphere of deep class and political polarization of society, the government became increasingly dependent on right-wing forces and the army. Secret paramilitary far-right terrorist groups, “death squads,” have killed left-wing leaders and activists. In March 1980, the Archbishop of the capital San Salvador, Oscar Arnulfo Romero, was killed, who spoke out against the growth of violence in the country, against the exploitation and oppression of the people by those in power, for the pacification and democratization of El Salvador and the solution of pressing social problems.

The offensive of the right accelerated the consolidation of the left forces in response. In April 1980, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF) was created - an association of political, social, and trade unions. leftist peasant and student organizations. including leftist currents of social democratic and Christian democratic orientation. In parallel with the RDF, in October 1980, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) was formed - a military-political organization that united the Communist Party, the F. Marti People's Liberation Forces and other armed revolutionary groups. Cooperation was established between the RDF and the FMLN. The FMLN set as its main task the development of a revolutionary armed struggle. The front program provided for a revolutionary transformation of power, deep agrarian reform, limitation of foreign capital, nationalization of the property of the propertied elite, and social measures in favor of the working people.

On January 10, 1981, armed units of the FMLN launched a general offensive against government forces in several areas of the country. After stubborn fighting, the offensive was repulsed, but it marked the beginning of a protracted and fierce civil war, during which the FMLN forces grew stronger, their numbers grew, the zones they controlled expanded, and their influence among the population expanded. The rebels combined the actions of regular units, mobile partisan formations and groups, as well as detachments of people's militia from the civilian population. Military actions were supplemented by the work of front activists in mass popular organizations.

Unlike Nicaragua in the late 1970s, Salvadoran revolutionaries failed to isolate the right-wing forces. Here reformist circles became more active in the political arena. They, however, were unable to ensure the success of the reformist project and prevent a split in society and a civil war. But their actions contributed to the fact that the revolutionaries were opposed by a bloc of right-wing and moderate reformist forces, which attracted part of the wavering, intermediate strata of the population to their side. This predetermined a deep split in society and the protracted and violent nature of the civil war. In addition, the outbreak of the war in El Salvador coincided with the coming to power in Washington of the Reagan government, which provided extensive military and economic assistance to the Salvadoran government, which especially complicated the struggle of the Salvadoran revolutionaries. In 1980, US aid to the Salvadoran government amounted to 65 million dollars, in 1981 - 140 million, in 1986 - more than half a billion, and in total for 1981-1988 - 3.5 billion dollars. To El Salvador American military advisers and instructors were sent, and a large amount of modern weapons arrived. The size of the Salvadoran army increased from 15 thousand people in 1981 to 56 thousand in 1985. These forces were opposed by 7 thousand fighters of regular formations of the FMLN. In addition, there were up to 40 thousand people among the civilian population in the underground and partisan groups and organizations of the FMLN. US assistance allowed the Salvadoran regime to survive, but both sides were unable to achieve a military victory over each other.

Attempts were made to strengthen the prestige of the Salvadoran regime by giving it the appearance of a representative democracy. In March 1982, general elections were held, after which the military-civilian junta was replaced by a constitutional coalition government in which right-wing parties gained predominance." After the 1984 elections, the leader of the centrist Christian Democratic Party N. Duarte (1984– 1989), who received more than 43% of the votes in the first round, and 54% in the second round. N. Duarte again tried to continue the reforms. But in the conditions of the civil war, these attempts were not very successful, the army retained its role as a decisive factor in power, the terror of the “death squads” continued, and right-wing nationalist parties strengthened. The civil war in El Salvador dragged on for many years, bringing great troubles and hardships to the country and population. 75 thousand people died, about a million emigrated, hundreds of thousands fled from combat zones.

Since the late 70s, the guerrilla movement against the reactionary military-authoritarian regime in Guatemala has intensified. In the first half of the 80s, it assumed significant proportions. Radical leftist revolutionary organizations and the Guatemalan Labor Party (GLP) - communists - took part in the armed struggle. In 1981, the National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala (URG) was created, within which cooperation between all armed revolutionary organizations was established. Indian peasants, students, and workers took part in the fighting. The number of rebel groups reached 3.5 thousand people (with an army of almost 50 thousand in the country). Attempts at guerrilla actions were also made in Honduras, but they did not become noticeably widespread here.

Revolutionary events also spread to the Caribbean, where on March 13, 1979, the revolution won in the small island country of Grenada (area 344 km 2, population 110 thousand people). A group of revolutionaries led by Maurice Bishop, supported by the population, seized power. Transformations began on the island. The leading position in the economy was taken by the public sector, and production cooperation in agriculture was developed. The implementation of economic development plans began, a modern airport was built, which was supposed to stimulate the influx of foreign tourists. GDP growth increased from 2.1% in 1979 to 5.5% in 1982. Unemployment fell over the same years from 49% EAN to 14%. Widespread social events were carried out, illiteracy was eliminated.

Grenada joined the Non-Aligned Movement, developed relations with Western European countries, and established close cooperation with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The ruling party of Grenada (New Jewel Movement) joined the Socialist International. The revolutionary transformations in Grenada, together with events in Central America, Grenada's course towards rapprochement with Cuba and the USSR worried the governments of neighboring Caribbean island states and Washington, whose relations with Grenada became complicated.

The United States expanded military assistance not only to opponents of the Nicaraguan revolution and the Salvadoran regime, but also to other Central American governments, seeking to strengthen them and work with them to resist the revolutionary forces in the isthmus. Total U.S. military and economic assistance to the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, 1981–1986. amounted to 4.5 billion dollars. The number of armed forces of these three countries increased from 43.5 thousand people in 1981 to 149 thousand in 1985.

The government of President Ronald Reagan in the USA (1981–1989) saw in the events in Central America and Grenada a manifestation of the global confrontation between the Western “free world”, led by the USA, and the expansion of international communism represented by the USSR and Cuba, which were joined by Sandinista Nicaragua and Grenada. The Soviet Union and Cuba, for their part, saw in the Central American events the development of one of the centers of confrontation between the world revolutionary forces and the forces of reaction and imperialism. This led to a dangerous escalation of the regional conflict.

At first, the Reagan government relied primarily on forceful methods to eliminate the emerging revolutionary centers. It turned out to be easier to deal with tiny Grenada, against which the United States prepared direct military intervention. To give it the appearance of a collective action, Washington secured support and symbolic participation in the intervention from the governments of several neighboring Caribbean countries on behalf of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. As a pretext for intervention, the United States used the split that arose in the revolutionary leadership of Grenada in October 1983, its removal from power by the extremist wing, and then the murder of the leader of the Grenada revolution, Maurice Bishop. On October 25, 1983, with the support of US naval and air forces, 1,900 US Marines and 300 soldiers sent by the governments of Jamaica, Barbados and several other Caribbean countries landed on the island. Grenadian revolutionaries and Cuban builders working on the island resisted, but could not hold out for long. At the beginning of November, the occupation troops in Grenada reached 6 thousand people. Under the occupation, a government pleasing to the United States was installed in power, and revolutionary transformations were cancelled. Subsequently, a legally constitutional regime was restored on the island. The economic and social situation in Grenada was difficult in subsequent years. By 1986, unemployment had risen again to 40% of the EAN. After the suppression of the Grenada Revolution in the Caribbean, the position of the United States and local conservative forces strengthened, and economic and military-political cooperation between a number of Caribbean countries and the United States increased.

The "Grenada Option" was much more difficult to undertake in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and the Reagan government did not dare to do so, although it increased military intervention in Central America and an undeclared war against Nicaragua with the help of the Contras. The actions taken by the United States complicated the development of the revolutionary struggle in Central America, localized it, but could not lead to the defeat of the revolutionary forces. It became obvious that the conflict in the subregion could not be resolved militarily.

The search for a peaceful settlement

The interventionist policy of the United States in Central America caused not only opposition from socialist states and protests from leftist forces in different countries, but also the concern of many governments of Latin American republics, who feared the escalation of the conflict and the threat from the United States to the sovereignty of the countries of the region, although the revolutionary regime of Nicaragua did not inspire their sympathy. Washington's course was condemned by the Non-Aligned Movement, the Socialist International, and the Vatican. The countries of Western Europe, except Great Britain and Germany, as well as Japan, dissociated themselves from supporting US interventionist actions in Central America.

Mexico initiated the search for a peaceful settlement in its neighboring subregion in 1981. In August 1981, a joint statement by Mexican President López Portillo and French President François Mitterrand recognized the RDF and FMLN in El Salvador as a representative political force. A call was made for a negotiated solution to the conflict situation in Central America. In February 1982, López Portillo, visiting Nicaragua, declared that US military intervention in Central America would be a huge historical mistake. He put forward a plan for a peaceful resolution of the conflict situation in the subregion based on the US renunciation of the use of force, the reduction of weapons in Central American countries and the conclusion of non-aggression pacts between them.

Venezuela soon joined Mexico's efforts, followed by Colombia and Panama. In January 1983, the foreign ministers of these countries held a meeting on the Panama island of Contadora, creating the Contadora Group consisting of 4 member states of the meeting. They called on the Central American countries to dialogue and search for a mutually acceptable peaceful solution to the conflict based on non-intervention, offering their assistance. In September 1984, the Contadora Group presented its draft Act of Peace and Cooperation in Central America. This was a plan to resolve the conflict through political means. The act provided for the liquidation of foreign military bases in the subregion, the expulsion of foreign military advisers, and the cessation of supplies of weapons and other assistance to anti-government groups. However, the countries of Central America, without directly rejecting the proposed Act, but expressing new amendments to it, never signed it.

In September 1985, Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay formed the Contadora Support Group, joining the efforts of the Contadora Group. The Contadora initiative and its broad international support (from most Latin American countries, many European countries, socialist countries, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Socialist International, the UN) played an important role in the fact that the Reagan government never decided on a direct military invasion of Nicaragua. In addition, in the United States itself there was significant opposition to plans to escalate US military intervention, especially among Democrats.

The coming to power of civilian constitutional governments in Guatemala and Honduras in January 1986 created a more favorable environment for the search for agreement. In May 1986, a meeting of the heads of five Central American republics - Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica - was held in the city of Esquipulas in Guatemala. It spoke out for a peaceful settlement in the subregion, but disagreements between Nicaragua and the other republics did not allow concrete solutions to be reached.

A new initiative was taken by the President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias (1986–1990), who came to power in May 1986, nominated for this post by the country's leading National Liberation Party (social democratic orientation). In February 1987, he proposed a Peace Plan that provided for a ceasefire and amnesty in the countries of the subregion, democratization, the cessation of military assistance from other countries to any armed groups in Central America, and a ban on the use of the territory of the states of the subregion to support rebel groups. The Arias plan formed the basis of the agreement signed at the second meeting in Esquipulas (Guatemala) of the presidents of Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador on August 7, 1987. This was the first real step towards a peaceful political settlement, which had an international resonance. O. Arias was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1987.

By the end of the 1980s, the defeat of the Contras became clear. The desire for a peaceful solution in the subregion has intensified. The authorities of this republic became increasingly burdened by the presence of contra camps on the territory of Honduras. The governments of El Salvador and Guatemala hoped to use the agreement to end the insurgency in their countries. The general trend towards a decline in tension in the international arena, towards an end to confrontation and the development of cooperation between the USSR and the USA and other states, towards disarmament, and towards a political solution to regional conflicts on a compromise basis, taking into account the interests of all countries, also had an impact. The Nicaraguan government has shown a willingness to compromise. Under these conditions, the US government also began to be inclined to abandon interventionist plans and bet on the Contras. It hoped that increasing pressure on Nicaragua to expand the position of Sandinista opponents in the political life of the republic, in an environment of economic devastation and growing discontent, would lead to the loss of power by the Sandinistas without direct intervention. Despite the reality of such a prospect, the Sandinista leadership of Nicaragua made significant concessions to its opponents inside and outside the country in order to achieve an end to the ruinous undeclared war, switch efforts to peaceful development, and strengthen the international position of the republic.

At a meeting of the presidents of five countries in Costa del Sol El Salvador in February 1989, D. Ortega promised to carry out the broadest democratization, hold early general elections, no later than February 1990 (according to the constitution, they were scheduled for November 1990), provide complete freedom and equal rights for all opposition parties in the election campaign under the control of the Supreme Electoral Council with the participation of opposition representatives and observers from the UN and OAS. For their part, the remaining participants in the meeting pledged, together with Nicaragua, to develop and implement before the elections a joint plan for the demobilization and repatriation of the Contras, and to achieve the cessation of military assistance to them. The meeting called on all rebel forces in the subregion, including in El Salvador, to engage in constitutional political processes. An agreement was reached to create a Central American Parliament and a joint commission for environment and development. The meeting called on the international community to support the economic recovery and integration of Central American countries.

The Nicaraguan government fulfilled its obligations, although the contras did not disarm as planned. An election campaign unfolded in the country under the supervision of thousands of representatives from different countries, from the UN and the OAS. The FSLN and its presidential candidate for the next term, D. Ortega, proposed a program of peace, restoration and development of the country based on reconciliation and cooperation between different layers and groups of the population. The Sandinistas declared their readiness to return to their originally stated goals: political pluralism (a democratic constitutional regime with a multi-party system), a mixed market economy with recognition of the important role of the private sector, non-alignment and a peaceful foreign policy. This created certain preconditions for the rapprochement of the Sandinistas with supporters of democratic socialism and social democracy.

In the general elections, the Sandinistas were opposed by a single, albeit motley, bloc - the National Union of Opposition (UNO), consisting of 14 parties, from contra supporters to communists (UP and CP). Influential positions in the bloc were occupied by Liberal reformist parties and movements. She was a presidential candidate from the NSO. nominated by Violetta Barrios de Chamorro, the widow of the liberal figure P.H. Chamorro, who was killed by agents of the Somoza dictatorship in 1978. After the victory of the revolution in 1979–1980. she was part of the leadership of the republic, then went over to the opposition. The NSO accused the Sandinistas of betraying the original goals of the revolution, monopolizing power and suppressing democracy, the collapse of the economy and corruption. V. Chamorro promised to fully restore democracy and the rule of law, disarm the contras, sharply reduce the armed forces, establish peace on Nicaraguan soil, reduce government spending, overcome inflation as soon as possible, revive the economy, and return the land to those from whom it was taken in violation of the law.

General elections took place on February 25, 1990. 86.3% of voters participated. The NSO won, receiving 54.7% of the vote and an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly (51 out of 92). 40.8% of election participants voted for the FSLN, and it acquired 39 seats in parliament. The Sandinistas received the greatest support among employees and workers in the public sector, students, and the military. The opposition was supported by entrepreneurs; small owners, a significant part of private sector workers, people who have lost their jobs, peasants. The Sandinistas retained their role as an influential mass political force, which the other parties could only successfully resist in the elections together. The FSLN confirmed its promise to respect the election results and stated that it would defend the gains of the revolution within the framework of the law. On April 25, 1990, Daniel Ortega transferred presidential powers to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro.

After almost 11 years in power, the FSLN went into opposition, but retained its most influential position in the country. The army remained Sandinista, the police, the administration of state institutions and enterprises, the largest trade union center, and a number of other mass organizations also remained a stronghold of the Sandinistas. This made the power of the new government rather ephemeral. The pacification and normalization of the situation in the republic was impossible without the participation of the FSLN, which was understood by V. Chamorro and her entourage. Back in March, an agreement was reached between V. Chamorro and the leadership of the FSLN on strengthening peace and the democratic process in the republic on the basis of mutual understanding, taking into account the reforms carried out. Defense and law enforcement forces pledged to obey the new president. V. Chamorro, having become president, took on the functions of Minister of Defense, but left the Sandinista Humberto Ortega as commander-in-chief of the army, despite the dissatisfaction of the contras and the conservative wing of the NSO. This was to ensure the cooperation of the new government with the Sandinista army and national harmony.

In May 1990, at the insistence of V. Chamorro and the Sandinistas, the disarmament of the contras finally began, ending on June 29 with their complete demobilization. In total, 22 thousand people were disarmed, who found employment, received the right to acquire land plots and political activity. The Nicaraguan army was reduced from 96 thousand to 28 thousand people by the end of 1990. Normal trade and economic ties were restored with the United States and other Western countries that provided financial assistance to Nicaragua.

The new government tried to encourage private enterprise. Claiming to recognize mainly the results of agrarian reform, it expanded the transfer of land into individual ownership of peasant families at the expense of the state and cooperative sectors. The government intended to return part of the lands that, according to the new authorities, were expropriated illegally to their former owners.

From the very first days, the government of V. Chamorro began to implement its plan to eliminate the budget deficit and hyperinflation and stabilize the economy by sharply reducing government spending. To this end, it tried to carry out mass layoffs of employees of state institutions and enterprises, and carry out widespread privatization of state property. Subsidies for transport were cancelled, and utility prices were increased several times.

The economic policy of the authorities was perceived by the Sandinistas as an attack on the gains of the revolution and met with their sharp opposition. Public sector workers in May and July 1990 twice undertook mass strikes involving up to 100 thousand people against the government's socio-economic policy and planned layoffs, to ensure the rights and stable employment of government workers and employees and to increase wages following rising prices. Ministries and other government institutions, public transport, communications, and banks, which were occupied by strikers, did not work. The streets of the capital and other cities were covered with barricades. The strikes took on the character of a political confrontation between the Sandinistas and the NSO government bloc. Small owners, entrepreneurs, and private sector workers spoke out against the strikers. The right wing of the NSO accused the government of V. Chamorro of inaction. Armed clashes between the Sandinistas and their opponents took place on the streets, accompanied by casualties. The republic found itself in a state of split and on the brink of civil war. The army and police, controlled by the Sandinistas, refused to move against the strikers. In the end, V. Chamorro agreed to increase the salaries of government workers and employees and promised that there would be no mass layoffs and that henceforth all conflicts would be resolved through dialogue.

The strikes of May–July 1990 and the satisfaction of the demands of public sector workers further complicated the economic situation. The government's plan to stabilize the economy has failed. Hyperinflation revived again, amounting to 13,500% in 1990. The trade deficit exceeded $400 million. Production in 1990 fell by another 5%. Full and partial unemployment reached 50% of the labor force, and 80% of the population remained in poverty. Hopes for obtaining new loans and credits from the United States and other countries did not materialize, because the situation in Nicaragua scared off foreign creditors.

V. Chamorro and her government have made efforts to establish dialogue and cooperation with the FSLN in search of a joint solution to the problems of the republic. In October 1990, the government, workers' and entrepreneurs' organizations signed an agreement on mutual cooperation in normalizing the social and economic situation in the country. It envisaged a combination of the fight against inflation and budget deficits, a policy of recovery and revitalization of the economy with the preservation of the social gains of workers (collective labor agreement, the right to strike) and the rejection of mass layoffs in the public sector. It was assumed that the minimum wage would be increased due to rising prices. Having begun partial privatization, the government refused to return to the previous owners all the property expropriated by the Sandinistas, preferring to give them compensation or shares in the privatized enterprises. Tens of thousands of peasant families who received land under the Sandinista regime retained their plots. In March 1991, a freeze on rapidly rising prices was announced. Defense expenditures by 1993 were cut 5 times compared to 1989 (from 182 to 36 million dollars). The government achieved a deferment and preferential terms for the payment of external debt and the write-off of part of the debts. At the end of 1992, 80% of Nicaragua's three billion debt to Russia was written off. The republic began to receive more foreign aid, loans and credits (in total for 1990–1993, more than $2 billion).

With the help of such measures, it was possible to improve the state of finances and practically put an end to inflation (2% in 1992). In 1992, the further decline in production finally stopped, which, however, remained at a very low level. Gross domestic product per capita for this year amounted to only $347 - 2.5 times less than in 1987. According to this indicator, Nicaragua was in last place in Latin America, behind even Haiti. Agriculture was experiencing a deep crisis, suffering from military operations, social instability and the fall in world prices for traditional agricultural products in Nicaragua. Export revenue in 1992 was 5.5 times less than in pre-revolutionary 1977.

Social problems remained extremely acute. In 1992, 54% of the economically active population was unemployed. 80% of Nicaraguans lived in poverty. The desperate plight of the dispossessed masses fueled left- and right-wing extremist sentiments. In addition, the government was unable to quickly fulfill its promise to provide land to former contras and demobilized fighters of the Sandinista People's Army, tens of thousands of whom were left without a livelihood. Some of them again began to take up arms and attack agricultural farms and cooperatives, banks, private houses, police posts, block roads, rob residents, and engage in armed clashes with military units sent to pacify them.

The development of cooperation between the FSLN and the government turned out to be the only way to prevent the country from splitting into two irreconcilable camps. But the compromise was not easy and met with opposition from the right and left. Some Sandinistas expressed dissatisfaction with the “conciliatory” course of the leadership of the FSLN and the strengthening of social democratic tendencies in the party, seeing this as a departure from revolutionary positions. On the other hand, the parties of the ruling coalition, including the bulk of parliamentarians from the FNL led by the Chairman of the National Assembly of Nicaragua Alfredo Cesar, demanded that the government take a hard line against the Sandinistas, the removal of Humberto Ortega from the post of commander of the Sandinista People's Army, and the purge of the Sandinistas from the armed forces , police, administration, return to all previous owners the property taken from them during the years of the revolution. V. Chamorro refused to agree to this.

The escalation of the conflict between the Sandinistas and their opponents from the FNL in the National Assembly led to the fact that in September 1992, all 39 Sandinista deputies, and after them the 8 deputies who broke away from the FNL faction and supporters of V. Chamorro, left the parliament hall. A. Cesar and the remaining deputies from the NSO continued to sit as the highest legislative body of the republic, despite the lack of a quorum (47 out of 92 deputies left) and the protest of the Supreme Court. In December, by order of President V. Chamorro, the unauthorized session of the parliamentary minority was closed. On January 9, 1993, a new session of the National Assembly opened with the participation of the Sandinistas and the V. Chamorro faction. The government of V. Chamorro included three Sandinista ministers. The NSO refused to participate in parliamentary meetings and moved into open opposition to the center-left government. Members of the NSO announced the self-dissolution of the coalition and the creation of an Opposition Political Alliance in its place. However, the situation in Nicaragua remained tense, and subsequently relations between the Sandinistas and V. Chamorro’s supporters became complicated again. Among the Sandinistas themselves, disagreements between the moderate and more radical wings intensified.

If in Nicaragua the undeclared war ended in 1990 with the disarmament of the contras, then in El Salvador the civil war continued due to the intransigence of the parties. Attempts by the Christian Democratic government of N. Duarte in 1984 to enter into negotiations with the rebels were thwarted by the reactionary army leadership. In the general elections in March 1989 in El Salvador, A. Cristiani, the leader of the right-wing party Nationalist Republican Union (UNR), won and became president in June, receiving more than 50% of the votes cast. Christian Democrats gained 37% of the vote. Most leftist forces boycotted the elections, in which half of the registered voters participated during the war. The new president tried to distance himself from the extremist wing of the right, speaking out for constitutional freedoms and in support of decisions taken by the meetings of Central American presidents in favor of negotiations with the rebels. In September and October 1989, preliminary meetings were held between representatives of both sides, but in November, in response to another terrorist attack by the right, the FMLN launched large-scale fierce battles throughout the country and in the capital itself, in order to put pressure on the authorities and encourage them to do more. compliance. The fighting led to heavy casualties among the population.

In April 1990, negotiations resumed, dragging on for a long time. The government demanded that the rebels lay down their arms and “engage in the democratic process.” The FMLN agreed to this only on the condition that the government army was cleansed of reactionary elements, the military guilty of violating human rights were punished, the punitive units were eliminated, and a number of other measures were taken to democratize the republic. In 1991, during negotiations mediated by the UN, it was painfully difficult, but nevertheless, a search for compromise solutions began to emerge on both sides.

Finally, on January 16, 1992, a peace agreement was signed in Mexico City, ending nearly 12 years of civil war that claimed 75,000 lives. The fighting stopped. Within 9 months the rebels had to disarm. They were guaranteed all civil and political rights. The FMLN transformed itself into a legal political party. The armed forces of El Salvador were to be reduced from 63 thousand people by half within two years and came under the control of civilian authorities. Repressive police services and special punitive units of the army were liquidated. Paramilitary civilian organizations were disbanded. The creation of a national civilian police force was envisaged, with the participation of former FMLN fighters. The new national security doctrine was supposed to ensure the army's non-interference in politics and limit its functions to protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic. The electoral and judicial systems have been democratized. The government pledged to carry out agrarian reform and provide land to peasants and former FMLN fighters. A special UN mission was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of the terms of the agreement.

The agreement thus provided for demilitarization and deep democratic changes in El Salvador on the basis of broad national consensus and meant the defeat of right-wing extremist forces. This was the most important result of the civil war of 1980–1992.

On December 17, 1992, in the capital of El Salvador, in the presence of UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali, a solemn ceremony of national reconciliation took place, stating the completion of the implementation of the basic provisions for peace. Having received legal status as a political party, the FMLN defined itself as a "revolutionary and democratic" party that intends to peacefully fight for democratic change and social justice, with the ultimate goal of building socialism. In March 1994, general elections were held, which were won by the ruling Nationalist Republican Union.

In Guatemala in the early 1990s, the guerrilla struggle that had been going on since 1960 was still smoldering, but never developed into a large-scale movement. Nevertheless, as a result of the punitive activities of the army and paramilitary organizations, armed clashes, terrorist actions, and the actions of repressive services, over 30 years in a country with a population of 9 million, more than 150 thousand people died, tens of thousands more went missing, 1 million. citizens became refugees. 440 settlements were wiped off the face of the earth. The civilian government's control over the all-powerful military was rather ephemeral.

In April 1991, negotiations began to end the armed struggle between rebel organizations and the government. However, they proceeded sluggishly and dragged on for a long time without tangible progress due to the tough position of the army leadership, which demanded the unilateral disarmament of the rebels, while they insisted on guarantees of their legal activities, measures to democratize the country, the real subordination of the armed forces to civilian authorities and the punishment of those responsible in crimes against human rights.

With the unraveling of the main knot of the Central American conflict in Nicaragua, the process of normalizing the situation in the subregion has advanced significantly. Frequent meetings of the presidents of the Central American republics became a characteristic feature. Since 1990, Panama has also participated in them. The meeting of presidents in June 1990 in Antigua (Guatemala) stated that violence in the subregion was becoming a thing of the past and the tasks of economic development and integration were coming to the fore. In Antigua, the presidents signed a Development Plan for Central America, which provided for joint efforts in the field of scientific and technological progress, infrastructure development, solving the problem of external debt, and coordinating foreign trade. The meeting spoke in favor of reducing the armed forces of the participating countries, in support of constitutional forms of government and human rights. In December 1990, plans for free trade agreements for Central American countries with the United States and Mexico were discussed. As part of these plans, in January 1991, the presidents of the five Central American republics and Mexico decided on their economic integration and the creation of a joint free trade zone by the end of 1996. The corresponding agreement was signed in August 1992. This was associated with hopes for accelerated modernization and the achievement by the countries of the subregion of a worthy place in the world economic complex in cooperation with Mexico, and in the future with the United States.

At a meeting in Tegucigalpa in December 1991, the presidents of the Central American republics expressed the conviction that in order to transform Central America into a stable zone of peace, freedom, democracy and development, it is necessary to eliminate social inequality and resolve acute social problems that have given rise to a conflict situation in the subregion. At this meeting, it was decided to create a Central American Integration System (CASI) consisting of 6 isthmus countries (with Panama). In June 1992, CASI coordinating bodies were created with the participation of the ministers of foreign affairs and economic departments, an action program was adopted to liberalize intrazonal trade, introduce a common external customs tariff, and also to implement joint development projects. The implementation of the agreements reached began in 1993.

On October 28, 1991, the first session of the Central American Parliament inaugurated in the capital of Guatemala. It was attended by 68 deputies from the main parliamentary parties of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. Nicaragua and Costa Rica, which signed the treaty on the Central American Parliament, were slow to participate in its work.

The three republics of the “northern triangle” on the isthmus—Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador—were more actively seeking comprehensive, including political, integration. In October 1992, the presidents of the three republics put forward the idea of ​​a political union and the creation of a Central American Federation. In February 1993, they decided to begin the elimination of mutual customs barriers, the implementation of a common customs policy and the integration of financial systems as early as the next month. Nicaragua showed some interest in the plans of the three republics, although it was hampered by complex internal problems. Costa Rica supported only the idea of ​​economic integration. Panama was generally skeptical about the idea of ​​“unity in poverty” of the small isthmus states, agreeing to their integration only as an intermediate stage to joint cooperation with the United States and Mexico. Nevertheless, despite some differences and different paces, the processes of integration of the isthmus countries with each other and the development of their integration ties with Mexico and the United States have taken on real shape.

New conditions in the subregion contributed to an increase in the influx of foreign capital here (in 1990 - 2.1 billion dollars, in 1991 - 2.7 billion). The economic situation began to improve, with annual GDP growth on average for Central American countries in 1990–1992. amounted to 2–4%, intrazonal trade increased.



The main prerequisites for the revolution in Nicaragua were the backwardness syndrome (the costs of a dependent agro-export economic model) and the anti-people policy of the Somoza clan, which ruled the country since 1936.1 The revolutionary struggle in the form of guerrilla actions began in Nicaragua in the late 50s. In 1961, disparate groups created a single political organization - the Sandinista National Liberation Front (SFNL). The worldview of A.S. was important for the revolutionary struggle. Sandino, who performed in the 20s. for national sovereignty, democracy and unity of action of all patriots. The FSLN program contained demands for the overthrow of Somoza, the creation of a democratic government, socio-economic reforms, and the dissolution of the dictator's National Guard. The first years of the partisan struggle showed that the revolutionary enthusiasm of young patriots, not supported by the support of the masses, could not lead to success in the fight against a well-armed and trained enemy. The struggle against dictatorship dragged on for fifteen years. The terror of Somoza's repressive apparatus against the rebels caused a strengthening of the opposition - the middle strata, the clergy, and a significant part of the national bourgeoisie. In December 1974, the bourgeois-democratic

Nicaragua is an exporter of cotton and coffee. Of the 2.5 million population, 47% worked in agriculture, 1/3 of them were deprived of land at all, and 2/3 owned extremely small plots. The best lands belonged to the Somoza family, latifundists and foreign companies. Industry was poorly developed. Mining: gold, silver, lead-zinc ores), 70% of manufacturing output and 80% of investments came from the United States. According to the constitution, foreign entrepreneurs had equal rights with national ones. 1/3 of the national wealth (according to other estimates 1/2) belonged to the Somoza clan. Corruption, blackmail and extortion were practiced by Somoza and his circle in relation to national and foreign entrepreneurs. Up to 70% of the population was illiterate. The small opposition was subjected to merciless persecution. The catastrophic earthquake of 1972 (6 thousand people died and 20 thousand were injured) seriously damaged the economy, and the situation of the people worsened.

The opposition created the Democratic Liberation Union of 7 opposition parties and 2 trade union centers. The leader of this organization was the editor of the newspaper La Prensa P.H. Chamorro.

In the fall of 1977, a new stage of the anti-dictatorship movement began, the struggle acquired an offensive character, the zone of active operations of the FSLN detachments covered 2/3 of the country's territory. After the murder in January 1978 of P.H. Chamorro dissatisfaction with the dictatorship became almost universal, and in the spring a Broad Opposition Front was created. In March 1979, the governing body of the revolution was organized, called the United National Leadership of the FSLN, consisting of 9 people (T. Borge, brothers D. and U. Ortega, X. Ruiz, X. Wheelock, B. Arce, etc.). At the end of May, the final operation “Final” began to eliminate the dictatorial regime. A few days later, the entire country was engulfed in a general strike. In parallel with the hostilities, the creation of the Provisional Government of National Revival took place. On July 19, 1979, FSLN units defeated the Somoza National Guard. This date became the birthday of the new Nicaragua. The Sandinistas entered the capital of Managua, the dictator fled the country and was soon killed. The difficult and heroic armed struggle of the entire people determined the truly popular character of the revolution.

The main task of the government after the victory of the revolution was national revival (80% of the economy suffered from military operations). The bourgeoisie was forced to enter into an alliance with the Sandinistas, since it had no other choice yet. The Government of National Revival introduced state control over private banks, foreign trade, and foreign investment; nationalized natural resources; created the Saidinist People's Army and Militia; established diplomatic relations with socialist countries. The property of the Somoza family was expropriated and included in the public sector. Under the agrarian reform, state farms, cooperatives and peasants received land. The process of forming a mixed economy was underway. Social activities have improved the living standards of Nicaraguans. The Constitution enshrined the democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, political pluralism, and a foreign policy based on the principles of non-alignment.

At the same time, difficulties arose in the process of national revival. High social spending depleted the budget and led to an increase in external debt. The peasants were dissatisfied with the fact that an extremely small part of the land was transferred for individual use; the main land fund was concentrated in cooperatives and state farms. Private business circles were unable to establish a constructive dialogue with the Sandinistas and went into opposition. The United States exerted economic pressure and in 1985 announced an embargo on trade with Nicaragua. Opponents of the revolution, who emigrated from the country to neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica, with material and military assistance from the United States (up to $100 million annually), intensified their counter-revolutionary activities against the Sandinista government. The Contras invaded the territory of Nicaragua, committing sabotage and terrorist attacks on economic and military targets, engaging in battles with units of the Sandinista army. This meant an undeclared war that threatened to escalate into open intervention by the United States and neighboring states in Nicaragua. Under these conditions, the USSR, Cuba and other socialist countries provided Nicaragua with economic and military assistance, sent specialists, allocated loans, and supplied weapons.

In 1984, general elections were held in Nicaragua and the Sandipistas won; one of the leaders of the FSLN, Daniel Ortega, became president. However, the socio-economic situation in the country was rapidly deteriorating. Thousands of people died in hostilities against the Contras, economic damage exceeded GDP many times over, and external debt increased almost tenfold. Hyperinflation and unemployment sharply reduced the living standards of the population. In the mid-80s. The Contra's military operations became particularly stubborn, and martial law was introduced in the country. The republic was allowed to survive only by emergency economic measures of the government.

The Central Nicaraguan Revolution caused a wide resonance - American in the countries of Central America, especially where the conflict was an armed guerrilla struggle against anti-people regimes - in El Salvador and Guatemala. In El Salvador by 1980, a confrontation between the left revolutionary forces and reformist circles and the right camp, which included the army, had developed. In 1980, the left created a military-political organization called the National Liberation Front named after Farabundo Martí (founder of the Communist Party of El Salvador, an associate of Sandino) - FMLN. In January 1981, armed units of the FMLN launched an offensive against government troops, and a stubborn, protracted civil war began, which lasted 12 years, claimed 75 thousand lives and caused mass migration of the population. Bourgeois reformist circles led by Napoleon Duarte tried to carry out socio-economic reforms, but the conditions of the civil war became a serious deterrent that slowed down the transformation. The Duarte government's attempt to start a dialogue with the rebels failed due to opposition from right-wing forces and the army.

In Guatemala, communists and radical leftists also waged guerrilla warfare against the regular army of the military regime. In 1979, a coup d'état took place on the small island of Grenada in the Caribbean Sea and revolutionary changes began; M. Bishop's government set a course for rapprochement with the USSR and Cuba. This development of events in the region seriously worried the United States and other Central American countries: the armed struggle of the partisans of El Salvador and Guatemala, the revolutions in Nicaragua and Grenada were considered as one of the manifestations of the expansion of international communism. The United States increased military assistance to the Nicaraguan contras, the regimes of El Salvador and Guatemala, and intervened against Grenada, where they overthrew the revolutionary government (1983). The course of the Central American conflict has become more complicated. At the same time, the US actions received condemnation from the world community. It became clear that a military solution to the conflict was futile. The search for a peaceful settlement began.

Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama formed the Contadora Group in 1983 (named after the Panamanian island where they met) and proposed a settlement plan that included cutting off aid to anti-government groups and eliminating foreign military bases. The next step was taken in 1987 by Costa Rican President O. Arias, who put forward a Peace Plan, which contained such important provisions as a ceasefire by all warring parties, refusal of military assistance from third countries, amnesty and democratization. Nicaraguan President D. Ortega showed a willingness to compromise, promising to implement democratization, in particular to hold early elections. In 1990, the multi-party bloc National Union of Opposition, led by Violetta Barrios de Chamorro, the widow of P.H., won the general presidential elections in Nicaragua. Chamorro. The FSLN went into opposition. Realizing the desire of the Nicaraguans for national harmony, V. Chamorro achieved the disarmament of the contras, their amnesty and employment. This ended the undeclared war in Nicaragua. The settlement of the situation in El Salvador, where the civil war continued due to the intransigence of the parties, took longer. Only in 1992 was a peace agreement signed. Under UN control, the rebels disarmed, the army was reduced, repressive and punitive services were disbanded, and the FMLN was legalized as a political party. Prospects for peaceful cooperation in the region have emerged.