Tank battle near hay in 1941. Battle of the hay

The details of this battle were kept silent for many years. Information about military exploits, the source of which is the defense archive, searches by the names of participants in those battles lead researchers to the discovery of new details of the dramatic battle. Having studied the difficult and heroic everyday life of the first months of the war, it becomes clear why so little information has been preserved about the dead Red Army soldiers of the first military conscription.

Summer 1941. On the eve of the battle.

It was difficult for Soviet historiographers to admit that with the obvious superiority of our troops in terms of the number of armored vehicles, one of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War not only ended in the defeat of the Red Army, but also turned into a complete defeat in areas associated with the central section of the Western Front. This battle went down in history as the Lepel counterattack, or the Battle of Senno.
This story completely refutes the myth that in the summer of 1941 the Red Army did not offer any significant resistance to the enemy and surrendered city after city. It did, but taking into account the circumstances that actually existed.
Nearby there were settlements that were also involved in the events described. For example, the history of the surnames of the village of Turovo, which is adjacent to Senno and shared its sad fate, has preserved a lot of evidence of that tragedy.

Tank "fist" of the Red Army

From the Red Army side, the 5th Mechanized Corps took part in the battle under the command of Major General I.P. Alekseenko. He was a military commissar with extensive experience who had fought during the Civil War. Actually, in those distant years he became a commander. Alekseenko took part in the Soviet-Polish war, suppressed resistance in Ukraine, and then took part in the fighting at Khalkhin Gol. The 5th Corps included the 13th and 17th tank divisions, as well as a detachment of the 109th motorized division. The actions of the corps were supported by two artillery regiments - the 467th and 587th.
An important role was assigned to the 7th Mechanized Corps under the command of Major General V.I. Vinogradov. It included the 14th and 18th tank divisions.
All these forces were part of the 20th Army, which a few days before the offensive was led by Lieutenant General P. A. Kurochkin. Sites for searching for ancestors who fought for the Fatherland allow you to get information about many bloody battles in a few clicks, but it is hardly possible to experience everything that the Red Army soldiers had to endure in the summer of '41.

Sometimes naming the numbers of divisions and armies does not make much sense. People don't always realize what it is. In total, the 20th Army has 130 thousand personnel. In addition to the aforementioned mechanized corps, it included the 69th Rifle Corps, consisting of the 153rd, 229th and 233rd rifle divisions. The 20th Army had at its disposal no less than 1,000 tanks, 1,500 guns and mortars. The situation with aviation was much worse. The task of air support was solved by the 23rd Mixed Air Division, which at the time of the start of the fighting had only 124 aircraft, 26 of which were in disrepair.
A thousand tanks for one direction is a very serious force. Germany began the war with a total of 3,332 tanks, not counting flamethrowers and assault guns, as well as 350 tanks in reserve divisions.
It was in the Senno area that an incredible concentration of Red Army forces was observed. Despite all the difficulties of that period and obvious gaps in documentation, the military archive of the names of the Second World War still has in its funds enough evidence of the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers in that battle.

Scene

According to the 1939 census, Senno had 4,300 inhabitants. There was a flax factory, a zootechnic school, a hotel, a hospital, and a cinema. It was a significant regional center of the Vitebsk region. Almost a quarter of the entire population was represented by the Jewish community. After the occupation in 1941, most of its representatives were killed by the Nazis. The history of the surnames of the village of Tukhinka, also located nearby, could provide a lot of valuable information about those terrible events.

Progress of the battle

Initially, the balance of forces was in favor of the Red Army, since the 7th and 17th tank divisions of the Wehrmacht did not have significant technical resources. However, a little later - on July 9, 1941 - the Wehrmacht threw the 12th Panzer Division into battle. As a result, in certain sectors of the front the Germans managed to create a numerical superiority in armored vehicles.

There was no interaction between the Red Army units. Each unit performed its task independently. We are not even talking about coordinating the actions of different types of troops; The headquarters of the tank divisions did not know about the actions of their own tank regiments. And as a result, a possible large-scale offensive turned into a series of local battles. Only part of the information ended up in the defense archive; searches by last name are unlikely to provide accurate information about every soldier and commander who died in those days.

The tank division (14th) launched an offensive on July 6, but was unable to complete its task. The offensive stopped at the level of the Chernogostnitsa River. Attempts to take the enemy's defensive line continued on July 7, but, having lost approximately 50% of tanks and personnel, the division was unable to achieve anything.
Then the Germans began their offensive. They took Senno, but in the middle of the day units of the 18th Tank Division of the Red Army approached and recaptured the village. However, our troops did not receive any support and were subsequently forced to retreat. The history of the surnames of the village of Osinovka, located not far from Senno, is kept in the memory of the residents to this day - little has survived in those parts after the arrival of the invaders.
Units of the 5th Mechanized Corps caused great damage to the enemy. They managed to use tanks approximately as they should be according to military doctrines; On July 6, the corps advanced a small distance, but on the 7th, they began to attack the stretched out units of the enemy’s 17th Panzer Division. The situation for the Red Army was not hopeless, but the next day the 7th Corps left Senno. This gave the Wehrmacht the opportunity to regroup and strike at the flank and rear of the 5th Mechanized Corps, which is why its advanced units were surrounded.
The offensive attempt by our troops was finally stopped on July 9. The remnants of the 5th mechanized corps retreated to Orsha, where they tried to take up defensive positions; The 17th Panzer Division was able to save only a few vehicles, which escaped from the “cauldron” by July 20. The situation at the front was uncertain. Alas, sites for searching for ancestors who participated in the Great Patriotic War are unlikely to provide comprehensive information about that period of the war.

Results of the battle

Monument to tank crews of the Red Army in Senno.

The Soviet side suffered huge losses. The Germans managed to destroy more than 800 Red Army tanks (mainly due to the use of aviation). Covering the actions of the Wehrmacht ground forces, the 8th Air Corps of V. von Richthofen worked effectively and encountered virtually no resistance from Soviet fighters. There are no exact data on the losses of the parties. In terms of the number of tanks involved in the battle, the operation is completely comparable to the legendary battle of Prokhorovka.

The attempt at a counteroffensive showed the complete inability of the Red Army command to wage war according to new standards. There was a shortage of radio stations in the units, and division commanders were guided by the experience of the civil war. All this led to the most dire consequences. In total, the Wehrmacht lost 50 tanks and about 450 personnel, although it is possible that the losses were greater. But even if the Wehrmacht lost one and a half thousand people and 150 tanks, this cannot be compared with the losses of the Red Army; The 18th Panzer lost all of its 220 tanks, the 14th only retained 14 vehicles, and the 13th had only 5 tanks out of 393. This is confirmed by the military archive of the names of the Great Patriotic War, which contains a huge amount of material about losses in the Great Patriotic War. Domestic. At the same time, reports were sent to headquarters and headquarters with much more modest indicators. They became one of the reasons for the impossibility of establishing the true scale of the battle and its consequences for holding the enemy along the entire central sector of the front.

The reason for the defeat of the Red Army is complex. Websites for searching for ancestors who gave their lives for their homeland contain large amounts of information, but, as mentioned above, that period of the war is not covered in too much detail. The main factor in the defeat was the inability to use large armored formations in modern warfare. First of all, this was manifested in the almost complete absence of radio communications.
The lack of adequate general offensive planning also had an impact. It seems that there was no master plan for the operation at all. This is typical for the Red Army of 1941–1943. Of course, we must not forget about the lack of aviation in adequate quantities. For those who are interested in the details of that battle, you can personally visit the defense archive, a search by name in which will reveal some heroic details of the battle.
And a few more words about the reasons for the defeat. Communication between battalions and regiments was carried out by sending messengers. By the time the messenger got from the forward units to the howitzer battery, the situation in the places of active interaction of forces had already changed, so there was little point in sending messengers.

And yet, the battle of Senno, like a number of other military operations at the beginning of the war, showed that despite incredible difficulties, soldiers and officers demonstrated miracles of heroism and courage. At present, the military archive of the names of the Second World War will not be able to give a clear answer to the question about the fate of the majority of participants in the battle. It is interesting that German sources also do not provide an opportunity to objectively assess the situation. There is an opinion that Soviet tanks, mainly of the 5th Mechanized Corps, nevertheless inflicted serious damage on the enemy. Finding themselves in the rear, they crushed the enemy infantry and artillery for about a day; this stopped only when the fuel was exhausted and all the ammunition was used up.

The main theme of the site is presented.

When using materials from the site, a direct link to the source is required.

Counterattack in the Senno, Lepel area

The rapid development of hostilities confronted the armies of the second strategic echelon with the need to come into direct contact with the advancing German troops as early as July 3. Developing an offensive in the Lepel direction, the Germans already on the evening of July 2, with powerful artillery fire, forced the border detachment guarding the crossings in the Berezino area (west of Lepel) to withdraw. Lepel himself was covered by a combined detachment of cadets from the mortar school, the Vilna Infantry School and the 103rd Anti-Tank Division. Bridges in Lepel were blown up. However, as often happened, the blown-up bridges did not cause a long delay for the Germans. On July 3, German motorized infantry crossed the Berezina southwest of Lepel, and by the end of the day the city was abandoned by Soviet troops. The 7th and 20th tank divisions of the 3rd tank group reached the Lepel area. From Lepel, German tanks headed towards Polotsk and Vitebsk.

This area has long been called “Smolensk Gate”. Indeed, here the channel of the Dnieper bends at Orsha and seems to allow hordes of invaders coming from the west to the east, to Smolensk. The bend of the Western Dvina also opens the way for movement to the east without crossing it. Such a “corridor” advantageous for the offensive was, of course, one of the most likely directions of advance of the German troops. To protect it, the 20th Army of Lieutenant General F.N. was advanced from the Oryol Military District. Remezova. Soon he was replaced by 40-year-old Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin. Pavel Alekseevich was a former cavalryman who graduated from the Academy. M.V. Frunze. In September 1939, he was chief of staff of the army cavalry group of the Ukrainian Front.

The Smolensk Gate, as the most dangerous direction, should have received the best formations for its defense, and it received them. The 7th Mechanized Corps of Major General V.I. was sent here. Vinogradov from the Moscow Military District. The very phrase “Moscow Military District” speaks volumes. It would not be a big mistake to call the 7th Mechanized Corps a “court” formation. Parts of this mechanized corps took part in parades on Red Square, and the son of Stalin himself, Yakov Dzhugashvili, served in it. The corps consisted of the 14th and 18th tank divisions, the 1st motorized division, the 9th motorcycle regiment and a number of combat support units.

The status of a “court” unit was not only an honor, but also imposed certain obligations. Parts of Vinogradov’s corps received the order to go “to war” on June 24, on the third day of the war. Strictly speaking, the 7th Mechanized Corps, according to pre-war plans, was intended for use in the Moscow direction, in Belarus. Even in the “Considerations...” of September 1940 it was stated that the reserve of the Western Front should have “a mechanized corps, consisting of 2 tanks and 1 motorized rifle. divisions (from the Moscow Military District) - in the Lida, Baranovichi region."

Initially, Vyazma was chosen as the concentration area. Soon he went further west. At the same time, it became known that the mechanized corps would become subordinate to the 20th Army. The advance of the 7th Mechanized Corps from the Moscow region to the Rudnya area, precisely to the area where the Dnieper bends and changes the direction of its flow from western to southern, took place in a combined march. Tracked vehicles followed in trains along the railway, and all wheeled vehicles walked under their own power along dirt roads and along the Moscow-Minsk highway. The loading of the 1st motorized division took place at the Moscow-Belorusskaya station, the 14th tank division at the Nara station, and the 18th tank division at Kaluga. The corps headquarters moved in one of the echelons by rail and unloaded in Smolensk, then proceeded under its own power. It cannot be said that the concentration of the 7th Mechanized Corps was perfect. Division headquarters had to look for their units. In addition, German aviation was active in railway stations and unloading areas.

Initially, the 7th Mechanized Corps did not have a single tank of the new types (T-34 and KV). Before the war, the western districts received them first. However, already in the concentration area, General Vinogradov’s mechanized corps received 44 KV tanks and 29 T-34 tanks. The gift was certainly valuable. However, in harsh reality, the mechanized corps was not ready to operate the new equipment. In particular, it did not include Voroshilovets tractors at all, capable of pulling out a damaged or stuck T-34 or KV. In fact, to evacuate older types of tanks, the tank divisions of Vinogradov’s corps had only half of the required Cominterns. New armored vehicles could only be evacuated by other tanks of the same type, with the risk of getting two disabled vehicles at once.

New vehicles were not evenly distributed in the 7th Mechanized Corps. The 14th Tank Division received the fattest piece - 24 KV and all 29 T-34s. This was the strongest formation of Vinogradov's corps, fully armed with BT tanks. T-26s were represented by only 13 flamethrower vehicles. The 18th Tank Division and the 1st Motorized Division received 10 KV each. Moreover, the 18th Tank Division received 10 KV-2 monsters with a 152 mm gun. This division was equipped with T-26 tanks, originally intended to support infantry. According to the unwritten “tradition” of the summer of 1941, part of the tanks of the 7th Mechanized Corps was stolen to support the infantry and guard headquarters. A certain number of them (91 tanks) were withdrawn from the 7th Mechanized Corps to strengthen the defense of the city of Vitebsk, guard and defend the command post of the 20th Army, as well as strengthen the 153rd Infantry Division (36 T-26 tanks) and the 69th SD (5 T-26 tanks). Hand on heart, the T-26 had a place there.

After the concentration was completed, on June 28, 1941, the 7th Mechanized Corps received from the commander of the 20th Army the task “in the event of a breakthrough of enemy tanks along the highway to Smolensk, destroy the latter, pressing them to the Dnieper River. Be ready to strike in the event of a tank breakthrough from Vitebsk.” By the same order, the 153rd Rifle Division defended Vitebsk, the 69th Rifle Corps - the line Vitebsk, Orsha (both points exclusively), the 61st Rifle Corps - the line Orsha, Mogilev. The 1st motorized division, advanced to the Borisov area (along the same Minsk-Smolensk highway), was supposed to prevent the Germans from crossing the Berezina. The 9th motorcycle regiment of the 7th mechanized corps and the reconnaissance battalions of the divisions conducted reconnaissance in various directions (to Lepel, to Senno, to Borisov). In fact, the 7th Mechanized Corps received the role of the “fire brigade” of the 20th Army. He was supposed to launch counterattacks from the depths against the enemy who had broken through the line of rifle corps. Several days spent in the designated area made it possible to scout out possible advance routes for counterattacks. Of course, the matter was not limited to the highway to Moscow and Vitebsk. Five likely courses of action were identified and 13 routes were explored, ranging from 25 to 50 km. Bridges were built and strengthened along these routes and other activities were carried out.

It cannot be said that the plan for the defense of the Smolensk Gate, prepared by the command of the front and the 20th Army, guaranteed success. However, this was a standard solution, repeatedly used later on both sides of the front. For example, in much the same way as the 7th Mechanized Corps in July 1941 near Vitebsk, it was planned to use the 2nd Tank Army G.S. Homeland in July 1943 on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge. In the same way, possible directions were determined, advance routes were scouted, and counterattacks were planned. Then, as you know, the Soviet defense held out, although with much greater density of rifle formations and more artillery. The obvious drawback of this strategy was the degeneration of the counterattacks into “Prokhorovka,” that is, into a grueling and bloody head-on collision with German tank formations. With a small number of new tanks in the 7th Mechanized Corps and problems with the 45-mm shells of the T-26 and BT tanks, the prospects for such a battle were vague, even taking into account the equipment of the 3rd Tank Group with Czechoslovak vehicles. However, the development of events according to the Prokhorovka version was not predetermined from the beginning. If only because the Germans would have broken through the sparse defense of the rifle units quickly enough. Accordingly, an enemy tank division or motorized corps would have time to be drawn into the depths of the Soviet defense, exposing its flanks to a counterattack.

In general, Army Commander 20 Kurochkin and the then command of the Western Front cannot be denied the reasonableness and consistency of defense planning. Moreover, the plan began to be implemented in the first days of July 1941. The 1st Motorized Division was the first to enter the battle and held back the German advance near Borisov and along the highway to Moscow. By July 4, the division had already been driven from its positions on the Berezina, which the plan required to hold. In fact, it operated separately from the 7th Mechanized Corps and reported directly to the headquarters of the 20th Army. Nevertheless, it completed the local task of containing the enemy on the approach to the main line of defense.

The outcome of the defensive battle for the Smolensk Gate was not yet obvious. It would not be easy for the 3rd Panzer Group to break down the Soviet defenses separated from the infantry divisions. An important direction from the point of view of defense of the Western Front received fairly dense cover. Thus, the right-flank 69th Rifle Corps received a strip 49 km wide for defense, and the 61st left-flank - 51 km. Accordingly, in corps that had a single-echelon formation, rifle divisions received defense lines with a length of 12 to 22 km. On the one hand, this exceeded pre-war standards by an average of 1.5 times or more. On the other hand, in general, for the Soviet-German front in July 1941, this was a relatively high density. Most importantly, the 7th Mechanized Corps would most likely have fought the enemy alongside rifle units, which would have to some extent compensated for the lack of its own infantry.

However, all these plans for the defense of the Smolensk Gate were not destined to be tested in battle. On July 4, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. arrived on the Western Front as commander, retaining his main responsibilities. Tymoshenko. As mentioned above, Tymoshenko only formally took office on July 4. His appointment took place on July 2. Hastily appointed to replace the arrested Pavlov, General Eremenko became the new deputy commander. Tymoshenko immediately took the bull by the horns and radically changed the strategy of the troops entrusted to him. Previously, the main idea was to hold the defense line with infantry and counterattack with mechanized corps from the depths. Tymoshenko decided to use mechanized corps to defeat the German mobile formations in front of the defense line of the armies of the internal districts that was being built. In other words, the new command of the Western Front decided to launch a counterattack against the enemy approaching from the west. The goals and objectives of the front troops were outlined in Directive No. 16, which was issued late in the evening of July 4. Its main idea can be defined as the “shield and sword” strategy. The “shield” in this pair was supposed to be the defense along the Western Dvina River and the Beshenkovichi, Senno, Orsha, Zhlobin line. The “sword” became the 5th and 7th mechanized corps, targeting the enemy’s Lepel group. Its forces were then estimated at two tank and one or two motorized divisions. Hiding behind a “shield”, it was supposed to wave a “sword” in front of him, crushing the enemy as he approached the main line of defense. Also, Tymoshenko’s directive specifically stipulated that the 5th and 7th mechanized corps should be used “in cooperation with aviation.” In addition, it was planned to reinforce the mechanized corps with separate units of the 69th Rifle Corps, mounted on vehicles and artillery.

Comparing Directive No. 16 with the previous action plan is controversial. On the one hand, Tymoshenko’s decision looks quite reasonable from the point of view of assessing the enemy. Indeed, it was tempting to defeat the enemy’s mobile formations that had rushed forward on the approach to the main line of defense. On the other hand, throwing mechanized corps into battle ahead of the main defense positions, in isolation from their own infantry, was certainly risky. Individual detachments of rifle units mounted on vehicles could not radically change the balance of forces with the Germans in infantry, or more precisely motorized infantry. Cover and support from aircraft forced to fly long ranges also did not bode well. Tymoshenko’s decision could be justified by fear for the upcoming “general assault” of the defense of the “Smolensk Gate” with the Germans using infantry brought up from the perimeter of the encirclement near Minsk. The plan to attack the enemy's mobile formations was fully consistent with the common sense idea of ​​hitting the enemy piecemeal. By knocking out or bleeding the German mechanized formations, one could hope to hold back the enemy infantry strike during the “general assault” of the 20th Army’s defense. If you try to formulate Tymoshenko’s idea in one phrase, it will sound something like this: “A duel of mobile formations in the empty space between infantry corps.”

It should be noted that the Soviet command in this case correctly assessed the most dangerous direction. Deputy front commander General Eremenko recalled: “In this situation, the front commander determined that the main threat to the front troops was the 3rd Panzer Group of Gotha, advancing from the Lepel, Polotsk area in the direction of Vitebsk and to the north.” This was rare foresight for 1941. When creating the 4th Panzer Army on July 3, Günter von Kluge directly said that he expected “faster success” precisely in the offensive zone of the 3rd Panzer Group of Hoth. In addition to Hoth's previous merits, the reason for Kluge's optimism was the Smolensk Gate as such - the 3rd Panzer Group did not need to cross the Dnieper. Neither Goth nor Kluge knew then about the surprise being prepared for them.

Although front-line Directive No. 16 did not specify specific dates for the mechanized corps to launch a counteroffensive, the commander of the 20th Army interpreted this silence in favor of the “as quickly as possible” version. Perhaps the tight deadlines for preparing a counterattack were outlined by Tymoshenko personally, in an oral conversation. As a result, Army Commander-20 Kurochkin named 6.00 on July 5 in his order as the time for launching a counteroffensive. Considering that Directive No. 16 was sent at 23.15 on July 4, this gave only a few hours to advance to their original positions.

To defeat the enemy who had broken through in the Lepel area, the headquarters of the 20th Army developed the following operation plan. The 7th Mechanized Corps was ordered to advance from the Vitebsk area in the direction of Beshenkovichi - Lepel. By the end of the first day of the offensive, he was supposed to reach the area north of Lepel, and then strike the flank and rear of the enemy’s Polotsk group. Accordingly, the 5th Mechanized Corps was tasked with striking in the direction of Senno-Lepel. By the end of the first day of the operation, it was planned to capture the area southeast of Lepel, and then develop a strike to the west, on Glenbock and Dokshitsa. The general idea of ​​the counterattack was quite simple and obvious. Two mechanized corps attacked in converging directions towards Lepel. Next, the 7th Mechanized Corps turned from Lepel to the north to the rear of the German troops storming the Polotsk UR. Such a turn to the north required the protection of a flank facing the enemy approaching from the west. The task of securing the flank was assigned to the 5th Mechanized Corps. After reaching Lepel, he had to develop an offensive further to the west, thereby actively covering the actions of his neighbor.

The 1st Motorized Division, already drawn into the fighting, was ordered to hold the line along the Bobr River and, by special order, go on the offensive in the direction of Borisov. Here, supporting the operation of two mechanized corps from the south, the Kreiser division was supposed to capture the crossing across the river. Berezina. At first glance, this task may seem overwhelming. Indeed, the “proletarka” had just been shot down from its positions on the Berezina and suffered significant losses. The command, of course, was aware that the 1st Motorized Division was already pretty battered by the fighting in the Borisov direction. Therefore, to galvanize the Kreiser formation, he was given the 115th Tank Regiment from the 57th Tank Division, which had just arrived from Ukraine. However, the 1st Motorized Division already had tanks, including heavy KVs. She successfully lost them in counterattacks. Nevertheless, the “proletarian” still had a certain chance of success. The German 18th Panzer Division, which broke through Borisov, moved further to Orsha. Theoretically, there was a chance to break through to the crossing at Borisov behind this formation, allowing it to pass further to the east.

The 69th Rifle Corps (153, 229 and 233rd Rifle Divisions) was entrusted with firmly holding the Vitebsk-Stayki line with the creation of a strong anti-tank defense. At the same time, he had to be ready to advance in separate units with artillery behind the 7th Mechanized Corps.

The 61st Rifle Corps (73rd, 18th divisions) was ordered to firmly hold the line of the station. Staiki, Shklov and be ready to also move to the west in separate units with artillery, but following the 5th mechanized corps and the 1st motorized division. In a word, the rifle corps were given the task of consolidating the success of the mechanized corps.

The phrase in Directive No. 16 about “interaction with aviation” did not remain an empty phrase. The mechanized corps were not left without air support. At least in terms of the operation, she was present. To support the operations of mechanized corps in the air and directly interact with them on the battlefield, one aviation division was allocated. The 21st Army also received an auxiliary mission with the left flank units of the 13th Army retreating to the east. The 21st Army had to hold the line of the Berezina River at all costs, and attack Bobruisk with strong detachments in order to blow up bridges on the enemy’s communications. This page of battles on the Western Front of the Zhlobin operation will be discussed separately.

It cannot be said that the very idea of ​​a counterstrike aroused complete and unconditional support. A.I. Eremenko later wrote: “The idea of ​​a counterattack, suggested by Headquarters, ran counter to the measures that had been planned before Tymoshenko assumed command of the front. In that situation, it would be advisable to concentrate the 5th and 7th corps in the Smolensk-Vitebsk-Orsha triangle in order to use them to launch a counterattack in the event of the enemy breaking through our defenses created on the Vitebsk-Orsha line.” Indeed, as has already been shown above, by the time Timoshenko arrived, there was already a fairly meaningful plan for the defense of the 20th Army, relying on a mobile reserve in the form of the 7th Mechanized Corps. The arriving 16th Army with the 5th Mechanized Corps became another module of the “shield plus support for it” type. With this army it was possible to cover another sector, also using the mechanized corps for counterattacks from the depths. Nevertheless, Tymoshenko’s headquarters decided to launch a counterattack. Painstaking work began to implement it. On the night of July 5, 1941, the 7th and 5th Mechanized Corps were ordered to march to their original areas during the day, where they would be ready to participate in an army counterattack. Already on July 5, the advanced units of the 7th Mechanized Corps began a battle with enemy mechanized units at the Beshenkovichi-Senno line.

After the tasks for the counterattack were formulated, they were brought to the attention of the troops. Colonel Vorozheikin arrived at the command post of the 7th Mechanized Corps at 2.00 a.m. on July 5 with the necessary orders from the headquarters of the 20th Army. It cannot be said that the commander of the mechanized corps was enthusiastic about the task assigned to him. Even at the first glance at the map, it was clear that the area of ​​the upcoming offensive of the two tank divisions of the corps was not conducive to the use of tank troops. It is replete with rivers, inter-lake defiles and other obstacles that cross the strip cut across the body. In fact, the 7th Mechanized Corps was squeezed into a narrow 6-kilometer strip between Lake Sarro and the Western Dvina. Two lakes stretching from north to south (Sarro and Lipno) drove the attack into this defile, which was also crossed by the Chernogostnitsa river. The lack of transportation means forced us to think about shifting the direction of the attack further to the south. In addition, the axis of attack of two tank divisions at once could only be one road (the highway from Vitebsk to Beshenkovichi), passing through the above defile.

Corps commander Vinogradov could not express his thoughts directly to Kurochkin. Flying light aircraft, common for German commanders and commanders, was not very common in the Red Army. The Germans used the Storch messengers for this. In the USSR it would have been, at best, a U-2 or R-5. Moreover, in the skies of July 1941, such a flight was, to put it mildly, unsafe. Therefore, Vinogradov personally could not quickly arrive in Orsha. He only asked Colonel Vorozheikin to convey his thoughts to the commander of Army 20.

Without time for approval, the commander of the 7th Mechanized Corps, at his own peril and risk, corrected the decision made at the top. One tank division of the corps (14th Tank) was supposed to advance as ordered by Army Commander-20. As noted above, this was the strongest formation under Vinogradov’s command, which received the largest number of new tanks. The second tank division of the corps (18th tank) was heading along a parallel route, south of the one designated from above. It was supposed to advance on Senno, and then to the Lepel area. Thus, she bypassed the border of lakes Sarro and Lipno from the south. In addition, the two corps formations received a certain freedom of action, each in their own zone. Now they could no longer “bump each other” along the same highway to Beshenkovichi. It is impossible not to note the reasonable initiative of Corps Commander Vinogradov, who did not slavishly accept the orders of the command. This is especially surprising due to the fact that Vinogradov himself previously commanded rifle units and formations. Perhaps the decision was suggested to him by the chief of staff of the 7th mechanized corps M.S. Malinin, who had extensive experience serving in tank forces. Vinogradov at least listened to him and took responsibility. But in any case, the success of the 7th Mechanized Corps was called into question from the very beginning.

Here is the time to remember that two mechanized corps were allocated for the counterattack. If one was forced into a narrow fashion show, then perhaps the second was doomed to success? However, the prospects for the offensive of the 5th Mechanized Corps were also far from cloudless. If the 7th mechanized corps managed to “inhabit” the combat area, then the 5th mechanized corps of Major General I.P. Alekseenko entered the battle from the wheels, or rather from the echelons. Initially, the mechanized corps as part of the 16th Army was transported from Transbaikalia to the Kiev Special Military District. The beginning of transportation in peacetime left its mark on the formation of echelons. None of them were independent combat units. The change in the direction of transportation led to a disruption in the order of arrival of the trains. The last trains loaded in Transbaikalia began to arrive at their new destination first. Changing the route only worsened an already difficult situation. Some of the trains not only managed to arrive in Ukraine, but also got involved in battle as part of the so-called Lukin group. Thus, out of 43 echelons of the 13th Tank Division of the 5th Mechanized Corps, 5 echelons managed to reach the city of Berdichev in Ukraine. The communications battalion and reconnaissance battalion of this division remained there. The 109th Motorized Division became most seriously involved in the battle. She fought near Ostrog, suffered losses, and some of her units remained on the Southwestern Front. 1 arrived on the Western Front? motorized infantry battalions and 2 tank battalions of the division. In total, the detachment of the 109th motorized division had 2,705 personnel, 61 serviceable BT-5s, 7 serviceable BT-7s and 11 serviceable BA-20s. In fact, it was a reinforced regiment of very moderate combat value.

Just like its neighbor from the Moscow district, the 5th Mechanized Corps received new types of tanks shortly before the counterattack. The 13th Tank Division received 7 KV and 10 T-34s, the 17th Tank Division received 6 KV and 10 T-34s. Receiving new equipment a few days before its introduction into battle, of course, did not have the best effect on its maintenance. In total, General Alekseenko's mechanized corps had almost 800 tanks, the vast majority of old types. For more detailed data on the number of divisions, see the table.

Table 5. The size of the tank fleet of tank divisions of the 5th MK by 7/7/41.

The availability of vehicles for the divisions of the 5th Mechanized Corps was at a good level. However, just as in the case of the 7th Mechanized Corps, the new materiel was not provided with means of evacuation. Neither the 13th nor the 17th tank divisions had a single Voroshilovets tractor or even an S-65. True, there were almost the standard number of “Cominterns” for the evacuation of old-type tanks - 23 in the first and 28 in the second out of 32 required by the state.

Speaking about the preparation of a counterattack in general, it is necessary to say a few words about its air support. Tymoshenko’s order contained good and correct words about the interaction between the troops and aviation participating in the counterattack. The 23rd Air Division was transferred to the 20th Army “for direct interaction with troops on the battlefield.” However, it was a pale shadow of those air formations with which the Western Front met the war.

In total, the air division had 98 operational aircraft: 54 fighters, 22 bombers and 22 attack aircraft. It was based at the Orsha air hub. This was clearly not enough to effectively cover two mechanized corps on a vast battlefield. Even leaving out the combat value of the I-153 as a means of covering troops on the battlefield. The strike capabilities of the 23rd Air Division were even more modest. Although we must pay tribute to the command - to complete the task, it received the latest Il-2 attack aircraft. Of all the armies of the Western Front at that time, only the 20th Army Air Force had aircraft of this type. It should also be noted that they tried to compensate for the lack of quantity with quality. The 401st Fighter Aviation Regiment of Stepan Suprun, formed from test pilots, was transferred to the 23rd Air Division. It was one of six "special purpose" regiments staffed by highly trained pilots from test centers. Suprun himself died in a battle with enemy fighters on July 4, and the famous test pilot Konstantin Kokinakki took his place at the head of the 401st regiment. The 430th assault regiment on the Il-2 was also one of the “special purpose” regiments. It was headed by the former deputy commander of the Air Force combat air unit, Lieutenant Colonel Malyshev. This air unit was studying methods of combat use of new aircraft of the KA Air Force. For the newest IL-2 at that time, this was more than relevant.

Note that during this period the Germans carried out another operation to destroy Soviet aviation at airfields. A kind of master class on “how it’s done” took place. On July 5, 1941, three raids were organized on the Vitebsk airfield (at 12.30, 15.40 and 17.00). They were successfully repulsed by Soviet fighters. However, at 18.20, after our fighters were exhausted and refueling, 18 Yu-88 managed to bomb the airfield with almost impunity. The raid resulted in 3 destroyed and 12 damaged aircraft. Classic case: success after several consecutive hits.

The transition from defense to offense created certain difficulties in implementing Tymoshenko's plan. Units of the 153rd Infantry Division, in order to create an obstacle course in front of their front line, blew up bridges across rivers and erected various engineering obstacles. Roads and bridges were mined. During the march to the starting position for the counterattack, the 14th Panzer Division lost three tanks to Soviet mines. Even without losses, clearing mines and removing obstacles took time. As a result, the 14th Panzer Division reached its original positions on the eastern bank of the river. Chernogostnitsa only in the evening of July 5th. Reconnaissance sent ahead found out that on the western bank of the river. The Germans prepared an anti-tank area in Chernogostnitsa. This reconnaissance cost the loss of 2 BT and 1 T-34. Moreover, due to the explosion of the river dam. Chernogostnitsa became impassable for light tanks; crossings were needed. The general offensive was postponed until the next day.

By and large, Kurochkin was right when he hurried his subordinates and demanded that they go on the offensive on July 5th. Every day and hour the situation changed in a direction unfavorable for the Soviet troops. This happened due to the approach from the west of the remaining mobile formations of the two tank groups. The calculations on which Tymoshenko proceeded in his decision to launch a counterattack were rapidly collapsing. The day the “proletarian” won from Borisov was lost. On July 4, another formation of the XXXXVII motorized corps of Guderian's group, the 17th Panzer Division, crossed the bridge at Borisov. She was abandoned along a parallel route to the Minsk-Moscow highway to Orsha. At first, approximately 40% of the formation was left in Borisov to defend the captured bridgehead. On July 4, the 17th Panzer Division had 80 combat vehicles out of 239 available at the beginning of the campaign (both tanks and armored personnel carriers are taken into account here).

On the morning of July 5, the 17th Panzer Division entered Cherey; by noon, units of the division covered half the route from Cheren to Senno. Already at 20.00 on July 5, she goes to Senno. Having discovered that it is occupied by Red Army troops, the Germans postpone the assault until the next day. Thus, a new enemy formation, this time from the 2nd Tank Group, appears on the path of the advance of the lagging 5th Mechanized Corps. Also, the breakthrough to Senno cast doubt on the success of the second tank division of the 7th mechanized corps. Strictly speaking, the very formation of two mechanized corps made the division from Guderian’s group a bone in the throat of the Soviet counterattack. The 7th Mechanized Corps prevented her from breaking through to Orsha and leaving the line of attack of the 5th Mechanized Corps. She found herself locked on the highway from Cherei to Senno and was forced to fight on this line. At the same time, the formation’s exit to Senno interfered with the advance of the 18th Tank Division according to the plan to bypass the lake defiles of Corps Commander Vinogradov. The daring plan of the front command to crush the enemy tank formations that had rushed forward in the Lepel area with a sharp attack was called into question. But neither army commander Kurochkin nor front commander Timoshenko knew about this yet. The situation could be corrected by the simultaneous offensive of two mechanized corps; the German division could not withstand two attacks at once.

In development of the decision of the front command, the commander of the 20th Army, General Kurochkin, on the night of July 5-6, set the following tasks for his troops: the 7th Mechanized Corps from the area southeast of Vitebsk to advance in the direction of Novoselka, Dolgoye, Kamen and by the end of July 6 to leave in the area of ​​Ulla, Kamen, Dolgoye. Thus, the mechanized corps reached the flank and rear of the German formations stationed on the approaches to the Polotsk UR. The 5th Mechanized Corps received the task of advancing from the Orsha area along the railway to Lepel. In fact, two mechanized corps were supposed to strike in converging directions. After the “pincers” closed in the Lepel area, the entire enemy group drawn into the corridor between the Western Dvina and the Dnieper found itself surrounded. The 44th and 2nd Rifle Corps were supposed to cover the attack of the mechanized corps from the south with an attack on Borisov. The 44th Rifle Corps was supposed to recapture Borisov, the 2nd Corps was to attack Borisov along the Berezina, cutting off the enemy’s escape route. The 69th and 61st Rifle Corps of the 20th Army remained a “shield”. As envisaged by the front command, they received from Kurochkin the task of continuing to hold the occupied lines and pushing forward infantry detachments in vehicles, reinforced with artillery, behind the mechanized corps. The start of the offensive of all units was planned at 5 o'clock in the morning, with the exception of the 2nd Rifle Corps, which was supposed to attack from 6 o'clock in the morning on July 6.

The most difficult technically was the task of the 14th Tank Division of the 7th Mechanized Corps on the right flank of the offensive. On the morning of July 6, it began an energetic assault on the positions of the German 7th Panzer Division in a narrow defile between Lake Sarro and the Dvina. Anti-tank guns and dug-in tanks awaited the Soviet units. Behind, numerous German artillery was ready to plow the banks of the river. Chernogostnitsy. It seemed that there was and could not be any hope for success. The positions in the defile were attacked at two points. The leaders of the attack were the new KV tanks. They were a shield for motorized riflemen and sappers. The offensive was carried out according to all the rules, with the support of artillery. It was necessary to seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the overflowing river, from which numerous battalion battalions of the division could then be brought into battle.

Closer to the Dvina and the highway to Beshenkovichi, a detachment consisting of 12 KV and 2 BT attacked. He was met with a real barrage of German artillery fire. Powerful HFs were knocked out one after another. 4 tanks exploded along with their crews, 1 tank was hit through the gun mantlet, 2 tanks were blown up by mines and were shot by enemy artillery. Only 2 KV tanks with damaged chassis were evacuated.

It seemed that the Soviet counterattack would fail in the first hours of the offensive. However, the actions of the second detachment, which attacked further south, closer to Lake Sarro, were more successful. It was supported by a smaller number of heavy tanks - 7 KV operated with it. Nevertheless, he was successful. This can be explained by the fact that further from the highway the German defenses were weaker. By the evening of July 6, Chernogostnitsa was overcome and a bridgehead was captured.

The following was said about these events in the combat log of the 3rd Tank Group: “12.00 - the 7th Tank Division repels enemy attacks with the support of tanks and heavy artillery on the Senno-Dubrova line. Obviously, fresh forces have been sent there from Vitebsk. The enemy even managed to slightly push back our troops.” By “slightly push back” in this case one should understand the seizure of a bridgehead on the western bank of the river by the advancing Soviet units. Chernogostnitsy. To some extent, this can be called a failure of the German defense. Fighting virtually one-on-one on a narrow front with a Soviet tank division, the “ghost division” made it possible to capture a bridgehead. It was immediately used to prepare the offensive. Under the cover of darkness, construction of four crossings began. The next morning, “splashing with fire, sparkling with the brilliance of steel,” dozens of battalion units were to go on the attack. The bad thing was that the captured piece of land on the western bank of the river was shallow. This meant that it was impossible to accumulate large masses of tanks on it in advance. They had to approach the crossings, cross the river and then go into battle.

The offensive began at 4.30 on July 7 with an attack by motorized riflemen. At 5.30 the artillery of the 14th Panzer Division opened fire. At 6.30, tanks approached the crossings from the east. There were 126 of them, including 11 KV and 24 T-34. Another 17 tanks got stuck on the approach to the crossing (including 2 KV and 7 T-34). At four crossings, tanks began to cross Chernogostnitsa. At that moment the German artillery began to speak. Columns of water rose, plumes of earth on the shore and among the tanks huddled at the crossings. The bridges built by sappers were damaged by German artillery fire and broke under the weight of tanks. Several combat vehicles began to look for other passages across the river, moving parallel to the front, but when trying to ford they got stuck. The tanks that managed to cross were met by artillery fire and tanks dug into the ground. 8-10 tanks under the command of the commander of the 27th Tank Regiment, Major Romanovsky, broke through the German anti-tank area and went missing. Most likely, they died already in the depths of the defense. But it cannot be said that the tank battle was unsuccessful for the 14th Panzer Division: it was announced that 42 German tanks were destroyed. One Pz.II tank was captured and brought from the battlefield as a trophy.

Meanwhile, German dive bombers appeared over the battlefield - Richthoffen's air corps entered the battle. The goals of the German pilots were already traditional for them - artillery and Soviet motorized infantry attacking together with tanks. As it was said in the ZhBD of the 14th Panzer Division, “enemy dive bombers and fighters flew in, which successively, in waves, bombarded the tanks and infantry of the 14th Motorized Rifle Regiment, inflicting significant losses on them.” The unit's headquarters also came under attack. The division commander, Colonel Vasilyev, was wounded by shrapnel in the face and arm, but remained in service.

The dive bomber strikes, coupled with strong anti-tank defenses, did their job. As had happened more than once on the Soviet-German front, a tank attack without infantry and artillery was not developed. A German tank counterattack on the flank soon followed, threatening to encircle the vehicles that had rushed forward. As a result, the BT, T-34 and KV returned to their original positions. The combat log of the 3rd Tank Group stated: “The 7th Tank Division achieved great successes in defense during July 7th (74 enemy tanks were destroyed).” This estimate correlates well with Soviet data. The headquarters of the 14th Panzer Division estimated the losses of its tanks at 50% of those participating in the attack, i.e. approximately 60–65 vehicles. Of the 61 tanks of the 27th tank regiment of the division that took part in the attack, 30 tanks returned to their original position. Of the 51 tanks of the 28th Tank Regiment, only 20 vehicles returned. This, without taking into account the losses of the reconnaissance battalion and the heavy tank battalion, leads us to the same estimate of 65–70 tanks lost per day.

On the evening of July 7, the 14th Panzer Division was withdrawn from the battle and until the middle of the next day put itself in order. Despite a glimmer of hope at some point, a miracle did not happen: it was not possible to break through the German defenses in a narrow defile from Lake Sarro to the Western Dvina.

The question may arise: where was the fighter regiment made up of test pilots? Traces of his activities in the offensive zone of the 7th Mechanized Corps are still being discovered. Thus, on July 8, 1941, the II Group of the 52nd Fighter Squadron (II/JG52) lost two Bf109F-2 aircraft and one pilot in an air battle (the second was wounded) in the Beshenkovichi area. The deceased non-commissioned officer Albrecht Hanika opened his account on June 22, 1941 and on the day of his death, July 8, he shot down his fourth aircraft, a DB-3 bomber. Prior to this, this group suffered losses mainly from accidents and, until July 8, lost only two Messers in air combat. Moreover, during the entire battle of Lepel, the group did not report a single shot down Soviet fighter. Also, the dive bombers of the VIII Air Corps lost two vehicles from fighter attacks on July 8. They can also be attributed to the activities of the 23rd Air Division. However, in general it must be recognized that from the point of view of the air war, even on this sector of the front, these successes were nothing more than pinpricks.

Despite the failure of the offensive in the direction assigned from above, the command of the 7th Mechanized Corps had its own solution in reserve with a breakthrough through Senno. What was happening here while the 14th Panzer Division was unsuccessfully trying to break through Chernogostnitsa? The 18th Panzer Division received orders to advance bypassing the defile at the Dvina and Lake Sarro along two routes. The axis of each of them was a road, winding through forests and lake defiles. The 36th Tank Regiment was supposed to make a wide outflanking maneuver to reach Senno from the north. This route turned out to be unpromising; the regiment did not even reach Senno. By July 7, he reached the center of the defensive position of the German 7th Panzer Division and fought an inconclusive battle here until the evening of July 8. Due to the lack of artillery and motorized infantry in this group, a different outcome of the offensive would have been surprising. In essence, this was an attempt, without blocking the road, to bring the tanks to Senno via an alternative route.

Much more interesting events unfolded in the zone of action of the second “battle group” of the 18th Panzer Division. It included both artillery and motorized riflemen and moved along the road directly to Senno. In the area of ​​this small town there was a real “layer pie” in those July days of 1941. Firstly, it was part of the defense zone of the 7th Panzer Division of the 3rd Panzer Group. Secondly, the vanguards of the 17th Panzer Division of the 2nd Panzer Group approached it from the west. It is interesting to note that the latter reported on the evening of July 5 that Senno was occupied by Soviet units. These units encountered by the Germans were most likely a reconnaissance patrol of the 17th Panzer Division and a battalion of the ill-fated 50th Infantry Division. The Soviet side, in turn, identified the enemy as “an airborne force dropped in the Senno area.” The strength of this landing was estimated at an infantry regiment “with 60 tankettes.” This was one of many examples of defining German tank units that had rushed forward as “landing forces.”

Nevertheless, luck smiled on the detachment of the Soviet 18th Tank Division in the battle with the “landing” on the morning of July 6th. A joint attack by a tank regiment and a motorized rifle regiment, supported by the artillery of the division's artillery regiment, was successful. The Germans were driven out of Senno. July 6 was generally a dark day for the German “ghost division”: it lost Senno and allowed it to seize a bridgehead in the defile near the highway to Beshenkovichi.

However, with the quick and energetic capture of Senno, the 18th Panzer Division of the 7th Mechanized Corps stirred up a hive of hornets. On the morning of July 7, a counterattack followed from two directions at once - from the north, along the eastern shore of Lake Senno, and from the west. The attacks were supported by artillery fire and waves of air strikes. Combat groups of two German divisions tried to simultaneously capture the city from different directions. The 7th Panzer tried to recapture what had been lost, and the 17th Panzer tried to make its way to Orsha. There was no direct communication between these two divisions. Moreover, the motorcycle battalion of the 7th Panzer Division, having lost contact with its division, acted together with the 17th Panzer Division of Guderian's group. Actually, one of the tasks of the tanks of the 7th division at that time was to restore contact with their motorcycle battalion.

One way or another, units of two German divisions went to storm Senno independently of each other. Retired Major General Horst Orloff, a tank officer of the 7th Panzer Division in July 1941, recalled: “About 3.00 the company moved south through the dense forest until a view of Senno opened up in front of us. At the edge of the village, about 30 Russians were drinking their morning coffee as tanks, trucks and reconnaissance vehicles moved along the eastward highway. The decision was made with lightning speed: one platoon, armed with Pz.IV tanks, should attack and destroy the vehicles. At the beginning of the attack, the Russians lost heart, and not one of them escaped alive. Their cars caught fire and their houses were engulfed in flames. However, they soon came to their senses and returned fire at our unarmored vehicles, hitting several of our soldiers.” In the report of the 7th Mechanized Corps we find the answer to the strange confusion of the Senno defenders: “In the northern group, up to 20 tanks were advancing. […] The tanks of the northern group were all advancing with red flags. The company of the 18th infantry regiment, located on the northeastern outskirts of Senno, mistook these tanks for their own, but the enemy, approaching, opened fire on the company and inflicted heavy losses on it.” Most likely, the “red flags” refer to the Nazi flags that German tank crews hung on the roof of the engine compartment of their vehicles. This was done to make it easier for Luftwaffe aircraft to identify their tanks from above. From some angles they might appear to be red flags.

Soon the attacking tanks with crosses on their sides were met with fire from the tanks of the 18th Division. Orloff's tankers managed to break into Senno, but were forced to retreat. During the day, according to Soviet data, the city changed hands three times. As a result, by evening the Red Army remained the master of the city. The combat log of the XXXXVII Corps noted that the 17th Panzer Division "failed to dislodge the enemy, who has large forces of artillery and tanks, at Senno and to the east, which is necessary for the movement from Senno to the south." As we see, the Germans note the successful interaction of artillery and tanks. It must be said that at that moment the 17th Panzer Division of Guderian’s group had practically a free hand - the 5th Mechanized Corps was just pulling up for a counterattack. The success in the defense of the 18th Panzer Division can be regarded as a great achievement, especially considering that this formation was armed with T-26 tanks. There were only 10 new HFs in the division. Moreover, these were KV-2s, completely useless in a tank battle.

author Isaev Alexey Valerievich

Counterattack of the “Kostenko Group” The balance of forces between the KOVO Air Force and Army Group “South” was more favorable than in the Western direction. As a result, despite numerous raids on the airfields of the district, the Air Force of the Southwestern Front on June 22 was far from a state of defeat.

From the book The Rise of Stalin. Defense of Tsaritsyn author Goncharov Vladislav Lvovich

Counterattack in the center The arrival of the 7th and 5th mechanized corps of “strategic tanks” in the Smolensk direction, in the Orsha region, allowed the command of the Western Front to plan a counterattack against the enemy who had broken through in the direction of Vitebsk and Orsha. In the conditions of a collapsed front

From the book In the Battles for Yelnya. First steps to victory author Lubyagov Mikhail Dmitrievich

Decisive battles in the Tsaritsyn area After the capture of Ilovlya, General Fitzkhelaurov’s group, concentrating its fist in the direction of Kachalino by August 12, launched a vigorous offensive, intending to capture the Gumrak area. On August 12, an energetic cavalry attack forced the Whites to retreat

From the book Unknown Stalingrad. How history is distorted [= Myths and truth about Stalingrad] author Isaev Alexey Valerievich

The Military Defense Council of Tsaritsyn is preparing a counterattack against the advancing White Cossacks. The command of the Tsaritsyn Front was faced with the question of transferring the tested working regiments of the 1st Communist Division from the Log area back to the Krivomuzginsk direction. Himself

From the book Prokhorov's Massacre. The truth about the "Greatest Tank Battle" author Zamulin Valery Nikolaevich

Part two COUNTERSTART!

From the book Everyday Truth of Intelligence author Antonov Vladimir Sergeevich

Battle for Semaphore II. Counterattack September 18–19 Hitler's statement regarding the inability of the Red Army to "response actions of a strategic nature" on September 12 was true, but only partly. Rifle divisions and tank divisions that were being reorganized

From the book Kharkov - a cursed place of the Red Army author Abaturov Valery Viktorovich

The counterattack did not achieve its intended purpose; it should be continued. The day of July 12 did not bring the desired result to any of the warring parties. The command of the Voronezh Front managed to keep the formations of Army Group "South" in the system of three army defensive

From the book Prokhorovka Unclassified author Lopukhovsky Lev Nikolaevich

IN THE AREA OF THE KHAKHIN GOL RIVER The history of this award is interesting. In 2013, it was 75 years since the tragic events in the history of our state associated with the armed attack of Japanese militarists on the territory of the USSR in the area of ​​Lake Khasan. Soviet border guards and

From the book Battle of Crimea 1941–1944. [From defeat to triumph] author

Chapter 4 Strike and Counterstrike At 6:30 a.m. on May 12, in the breakthrough area of ​​the northern strike group, artillery launched the first fire strike on enemy strongholds. The artillery preparation lasted exactly an hour. Twenty minutes before its end, Soviet aviation

From the book The Battle of Borodino in 3D. "Invincible" author Nechaev Sergey Yurievich

From the book All fortified areas and defensive lines of the Second World War author Runov Valentin Alexandrovich

Landing in the Evpatoria area At the beginning of 1942, the Germans made further attempts to capture Sevastopol. In order to pull enemy forces away from the main base of the Black Sea Fleet and block its reserves, the command of the Sevastopol defensive region made a decision

From the author's book

Landings in the Sudak area On January 8, 1942, the Military Council of the Caucasian Front issued directive No. 091/op on the transition of front troops to a general offensive. At the same time, the Black Sea Fleet was ordered to use several tactical landings to influence the right flank

From the author's book

Battle in the area of ​​the village of Semenovskoye After the capture of the Semenovsky flushes, Napoleonic troops tried to build on their success. General E. F. Saint-Prix: “As soon as the French army captured the flushes on the left flank, it directed all its efforts against the village of Semenovka and against

From the author's book

Fighting in the Przemysl area The 26th Army of the Kyiv Special Military District (commander - Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, chief of staff Colonel I.S. Varennikov) was formed in early 1941 to cover a 130-kilometer section of the state border,

Like other activities of the Red Army of that period, this operation was another unsuccessful attempt to stop the German offensive at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. Largely because of the failure of the Soviet counterattack in Belarus, it remained an undeservedly rarely mentioned episode of the fierce campaign of the summer-autumn 1941.

Fighting on the northern flank of the Soviet Western Front. 1-10.VII.1941 1. Line of the Polotsk Ur. 2. Encirclement of a detachment of the Soviet 17th Tank Division in the Tsotovo, Tolpino area.

The bloody battle of Senno was the last attempt of the Red Army to launch a counterattack with tank units. After the battle, the mechanized corps ended, and further efforts to seize the initiative from the enemy in 1941 were reduced to attacks by infantry formations. The second week of the war ended, and the Germans had already covered 500 kilometers - half the way from the border to Moscow. When the Battle of Senno began, the stunning Wehrmacht offensive had already shifted the front line to Vitebsk and Orsha.

From the very beginning, the high command of the German army chose the central sector of the Eastern Front as the main direction of attack on the Soviet Union. Army Group "Center" was deployed here - in some respects it was superior to the other two Groups "South" and "North" combined. The mechanized units of the Germans consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Tank Groups - in total they had at their disposal 7 motorized and 9 tank divisions.

This scale of the offensive allowed for deep encirclement and encirclement of Soviet troops. Units of the Western Front were indeed quickly defeated. By July 3, the Germans had crushed the last pockets of coordinated resistance. Soviet losses were enormous - about two-thirds of all front formations. The divisions that emerged from the “cauldrons” had 1–2 thousand people left. All heavy weapons (airplanes, tanks, artillery) were lost. Equipment was abandoned right on the roads. The front command was arrested and shot for this failure (including General Dmitry Pavlov). It was in such circumstances that the Battle of Senno began. 1941 was the worst year of the war, and the planned counter-offensive promised to be no less serious in terms of human losses than previous attempts to stop the German advance.

The idea of ​​the Lepel counterattack was to attack the tank units of the Wehrmacht before they were to be joined by infantry formations stretching from Minsk. This plan corresponded to one of the key military principles - to defeat the enemy piece by piece. In addition, the experience of the first two weeks of confrontation with the Germans showed that a chain of rifle divisions fights tank attacks extremely ineffectively. Therefore, it seemed more logical to launch a preemptive strike against the stretched Wehrmacht forces. This is how the battle of Senno should have been from a strategic point of view.

July 1941 was not the worst time to launch a counteroffensive in this region. Most of the German forces moved not to the east, but to the northeast - the Wehrmacht leadership sought to cross the Western Dvina as quickly as possible. Only two enemy divisions remained in the Soviet attack zone (17th and 7th tank), although they also represented a formidable force.

On the evening of July 4, Semyon Timoshenko (who became commander of the Western Front that day), German Malandin and Lev Mehlis approved a directive that set the task of preparing a counterattack in the direction of Ostrovno and Senno. The final point of the offensive was Lepel, who gave the name to the entire operation. However, already at the planning stage of the counterattack, the leadership of the Western Front made a serious mistake. The enemy's capabilities were incorrectly assessed, which was clearly demonstrated by the battle of Senno. There are almost no photographs left from the epicenter of the battle during that operation, but from the losses alone one can understand that the Red Army units failed their mission.

The command of the Western Front was in a hurry to organize a counterattack also because time was on the enemy’s side. A week later, the German infantry divisions, having completed the encirclement of the Minsk and Bialystok “cauldrons,” were supposed to approach the front line. In this case, the balance of forces changed radically. Every day the Red Army found itself in an increasingly difficult situation, and a delay of even a few hours was extremely costly.

Prepared for a counterattack, the 7th Mechanized Corps under the command of Vinogradov moved west from the Moscow Military District on June 24. Vehicles on wheels set off under their own power, and tracked vehicles were loaded onto railway platforms. Along the way, the mechanized corps received new tasks several times, as the situation in Belarus changed too quickly.

The German 7th Panzer Division was distinguished by a structure that was rare for such a formation. It included 4 battalions. The number of tanks was a record for the entire Eastern Front - 265 combat units, of which 25 were lost in two weeks of fighting. However, the Soviet 7th Mechanized Corps included twice as many vehicles.

Most of the German division's fleet consisted of Czech Skoda models produced in 1938. These light tanks had a 37 mm cannon and a hull assembled with rivets and bolts. When hit by an enemy shell, these elements were torn off and injured the crew. So it’s extremely difficult to call the Skoda a technical miracle. In addition to them there were also light PZ-IIs. They were armed with small 20 mm cannons. KV and T-34 were present in the Soviet units. The technical characteristics allowed them to neutralize this entire fleet in a shootout with the German models described above, with minimal losses. It was precisely this kind of battle that the artist Nikolai Nazarchuk demonstrated in his painting. “The Battle of Senno” by the Belarusian master has become one of the most recognizable illustrations of that battle.

In tank divisions, tanks were the “tip of the spear,” but any such formation also needed a “pole” - infantry and artillery. What was the condition of these units in the German divisions? The artillery regiment consisted of 36 guns - mostly howitzers and a few cannons. These figures were much more modest than the Soviet ones. The two tank divisions had almost a hundred guns. The ratio in the infantry was similar: 15 infantry battalions of the Red Army versus 4 of the Wehrmacht.

In the area of ​​​​the offensive of the 7th mechanized corps, the Soviet numerical superiority was twofold, and in the 5th mechanized corps it was seven to eightfold. The large number of tanks later became the reason for comparing the battle of Senno with the famous Battle of Prokhorovka during the Battle of Kursk in 1943.

The 5th mechanized corps had a unique structure in its own way - two additional artillery regiments were attached to it. These units were added from the reserve composition of the Western Front. They were also called corps artillery regiments. An important feature of these formations was the presence of heavy howitzer guns of 122 mm and 152 mm caliber. They created not only mathematical, but also qualitative superiority over enemy artillery.

The Battle of Senno could have ended even faster if the Germans had not left two of their motorized infantry battalions, a tank battalion and an anti-tank division in Borisov. These units remained to guard the strategically important crossing of the Berezina. These units arrived at Senno only on July 7, reducing the numerical superiority of the 5th Mechanized Corps to twofold.

On July 5, 1941, preparations began for the Battle of Senno. The 14th Tank Division and the 7th Mechanized Corps made a 40-kilometer forced march and took up the starting positions for the intended counterattack. This was the Ostrovno-Gnezdilovichi-Svetogory area, 10 kilometers east of the Chernogostnitsa River. The other 18th Panzer Division was delayed somewhat. By noon the next day, it concentrated on both sides of the Obolyanka River. The 5th Mechanized Corps took up positions in the Orsha area.

On July 6, the battle of Senno entered its active phase. In the 14th Tank Division, two detachments were formed (each included a company of tanks and a battalion of motorized infantry). These formations tried to cross Chernogostnitsa and hold on to the western bank of the river. One detachment actually managed to retain a small bridgehead near Lake Sarro. At this time, the forces of the 18th Panzer Division approached the eastern outskirts of Senno and there entered into a stubborn battle with the Germans. In the evening the enemy was driven out of the city. On this section of the front, Soviet troops went on the defensive. This was their only success during the entire operation.

On July 7, the tank battle near Senno continued. All the previous night, Soviet soldiers prepared crossings at Chernogostnitsa. In the morning, units of the 14th Panzer Division advanced along them to the western bank of the key river. Progress stalled after 4 kilometers of travel. The tanks collided with the main forces of the 7th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht. The Soviet formations suffered heavy losses and rolled back to their original eastern bank. Then they returned to Ostrovno and began evacuating their equipment.

Meanwhile, the Germans from the north began an attack on Senno, where the 18th Panzer Division was defending. The Red Army left the city by noon on July 8th. At this time, the 5th Mechanized Corps was fighting a fierce battle with enemy tanks 20 kilometers south of Senno. He managed to break the German column, but the subsequent counterattack restored the status quo.

On July 9, the 14th and 18th tank divisions retreated to the eastern bank of Obolyanka. The Germans from captured Senno began to advance to the highway to Smolensk. On the 10th, advanced detachments entered Oboltsy. By noon, the Germans had walked 40 kilometers and reached the highway 30 kilometers west of Orsha. The Soviet 5th Mechanized Corps faced the threat of complete encirclement. His command decided to retreat, and the remnants of the tank divisions did the same.

So, the tank battle near Senno ended in nothing for the Soviet army. The troops did not complete any of the tasks assigned to them. It was not possible to go even half the way to Lepel. According to the plan, the main blow was delivered to the flank of the Polotsk German group, but it did not suffer any losses - they simply did not reach it. In less than a week of fighting, about 70% of the equipment was lost. The remnants of the tank divisions lost their combat effectiveness and subsequently continued to roll back to the east until they finally disappeared into the “cauldron” near Smolensk.

What was the reason for this failure? On July 17, 1941, near the village of Liozno in the Vitebsk region, senior lieutenant Yakov Dzhugashvili, the son of Joseph Stalin, was captured. During interrogation, he complained about the terrible air attacks of the German Junkers. The same point of view was defended in the reports of the command to Moscow. Later it migrated to Soviet historiography and for a long time was considered an immutable truth. The main reason why the battle of Senno was lost was considered to be the all-destructive and omnipresent German aviation, which dived and dropped bombs on the Red Army soldiers from morning to night.

However, in reality everything was much more complicated. The inability of the command to maneuver and establish communications between various formations had an impact. In addition, the Red Army simply did not have experience in conducting such large-scale operations, while the Wehrmacht came to the USSR with many victories in Europe under its belt. All this made the numerical and qualitative superiority of the Soviet troops useless.

The condition of the command staff was undermined after the recent repressions. Most of the experienced military personnel, who also went through the civil war, were shot or imprisoned in camps. This could not affect how the battle of Senno ended. The consequences of haste and poor decisions in the first stage of the war were reflected in many failures on the Western Front. This trend spread not only to the Lepel counterattack, but throughout the entire 1941 campaign.

In terms of casualties, the 1941 Battle of Senno corresponded to the typical proportions of that war. The Germans lost approximately 4 wounded for every 1 killed (the total losses were 468 people). About 50 pieces of equipment (tanks) were lost. The heaviest losses occurred in the battle with the 5th Mechanized Corps near Senno on July 7–9.

The Soviet troops had completely different numbers. The 5th and 7th mechanized corps lost almost all of their tanks (in total more than 1000 units, which is about 20 times more than the enemy). Even today, historians have not been able to figure out exactly where that equipment went. The figures that were included in the reports of the Red Army command often did not correspond to reality and because of this it is impossible to compare them with the data of the Germans.

However, it is known for sure that when the tank battle of Senno ended in 1941, not a single one of the 220 tanks remained in the 18th Panzer Division, 14 tanks remained in the 14th, and 5 tanks out of 393 remained in the 13th. At the same time, things were better with cars. For example, in the 14th division there were 34 cars and 475 trucks, as well as 56 gas tanks.

The personal losses of the Soviet formations, as in the case of the German ones, were fully consistent with the proportions of the terrible year for the USSR in 1941. For example, according to an official report in the same 14th Panzer Division, 193 people were killed, 359 were injured, and more than 3 thousand people were listed as missing. However, these figures are now in doubt. They contradict the fact that the regiment was armed with only 552 small arms (rifles) on July 25, while according to the report, more than 5 thousand people should have remained in the ranks without replenishment.

The monstrous gap between facts and reports can only be explained by the desire of the leadership of the formations to hide and retouch their failures in front of their superiors. At the initial stage of the war, such stories were commonplace. The battle of Senno was no exception. The losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht were incommensurable in any case, and it is this indicator that most clearly demonstrates the catastrophe of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

In connection with the difficult situation that arose in early July 1941, the command of the Western Front took measures aimed at creating a stable defense along the banks of the Western Dvina in the Polotsk fortified area and preventing a breakthrough of enemy troops at Senno, Orsha, and between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers.

At this line, units of the 39th and 47th enemy motorized corps, which were part of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups, operated. They did not have a continuous offensive front, which was typical for the initial period of the war.

To rectify the situation, troops of the 19th Army, under the command of I.S., were transferred to the line. Koneva. But railway transport was overloaded, and the concentration of formations of this army was delayed. It was necessary to forestall the breakthrough of the enemy's motorized corps into the Vitebsk area. In connection with the threat of such a breakthrough, the Military Council of the Western Front, with the consent of headquarters, made a decision - the troops of the 20th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin, launch a counterattack in the direction of Senno - Lepel. The total impact depth was planned to be more than 100 kilometers.

To defeat the Lepel group, which was assessed as the main one, the commander of the 21st Army was tasked with the forces of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps to launch a counterattack in the direction of Senno with further development of the success of the 7th mechanized corps on Kubliki, and the 5th on Lepel .

On July 6 at 5 o'clock the 17th, 13th tank and a detachment of the 109th motorized rifle divisions set out in columns along designated routes.

At first, the Nazis offered no resistance, but the troops advanced too slowly. It was pouring rain, causing traffic jams on the muddy roads. As they approached the Masyuki and Oboltsy line, the tank divisions encountered organized resistance from the advanced units of the 47th Motorized Corps. With a swift attack, our troops shot down enemy detachments and by 20 o'clock, having advanced to a depth of 14-16 km, they reached the line: 17th Tank Division - Serkuti, Budino; 13th - Zamoshye, Oboltsy; detachment of the 109th motorized rifle division - 7 km west of Vyazmichi.

On the morning of July 7, the commanders of the tank divisions sent forward one advance detachment at a time, destroying individual pockets of resistance; they advanced to the Uzdorniki, Antopolye line, where they encountered organized defense.

On July 8, the corps troops resumed their offensive. The 17th Panzer Division, despite heavy air pressure, broke through the enemy defenses and successfully advanced throughout the day. By 6 p.m., the 34th Tank Regiment was fighting at the Spechka-Dubnyaki line, covering the open flank of the corps from the north. The 33rd tank and 17th motorized rifle regiments, working closely together, fought at the turn of the station. Grazino, Topino.

At 16:00 on July 8, the 17th Tank Division of the Germans, with the support of aviation, from the Senno direction carried out a powerful counterattack on the right flank of the 17th Tank Division of our mechanized corps. The main blow fell on the 34th Tank Regiment, the auxiliary one - on the right flank of the 33rd Tank Regiment. For three hours in the Dubnyaki area, Art. Grazino, Mal. There was a fierce tank battle in Belitsa. Having suffered losses in tanks, the Nazis were forced to abandon the attack on Mal. Belitsa.

Advancing along the railway, by the end of the day in the Budno Ryasno area the Germans cut off the rear echelons with fuel and ammunition.

Thus, as a result of the attack undertaken by the enemy, the corps troops were put in danger of encirclement. During July 9 and 10 they fought defensive battles.

On July 10, the 5th Mechanized Corps, by order of the headquarters of the 20th Army, was withdrawn from the battle and concentrated north of Orsha.

As a result of the battles on July 8-10 in the Tsotovo area, the 5th mechanized corps had losses: 13th tank division - 82 tanks, 11 vehicles, 3 tractors, 1 armored vehicle; 17th tank division - 44 tanks, 8 tractors, 20 vehicles; hull parts - 111 armored vehicles, of which 20% were stuck in swamps.

In total, losses in people and equipment amounted to 60%.

Complex and difficult battles were fought by units of the 7th Mechanized Corps.

On July 5, 1941, units of the 7th Mechanized Corps marched in two echelons in the direction of the river. Chernogostinki. The columns were continuously bombed and attacked by aircraft.

In addition to bombs and machine guns, the Germans dropped barrels of phosphorus liquid and fuel from planes onto our equipment. Our aircraft were not in the air. Therefore, large losses on our part largely explain the actions of enemy aircraft.

During the night from 07/05/41 to 07/06/41, all units took their starting position for the offensive in the forests and groves east of the river. Chernogostinka.

On the morning of July 6, 1941, the commander of the 27th TP, Major Romanovsky, with a group of heavy and light tanks, together with infantry and artillery, conducted combat reconnaissance of the enemy located along the western bank of the river. Chernogostinka. After an unsuccessful attack, the tanks retreated to their original position, the infantry remained on the eastern bank of the river. Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Kharaborkin died during this reconnaissance.

07/07/41 The 14th Motorized Rifle Regiment began an attack on the enemy’s front line in the morning and captured the opposite bank of the river, slowly moving west. At 6.30 the 27th and 28th tank regiments left their original positions to attack.

At the same time, at the artillery position, artillery base, and the deployed reserve of the corps commander, who was on the eastern bank of the river. Chernogostinka, and the tanks of 27 TP broke into the depths of the defense, the howitzer artillery regiment of the division and units in the Ostrovno area was attacked by enemy dive bombers and fighters, which successively, in waves, bombarded the tanks and infantry, inflicting significant losses on them. Nevertheless, tanks 27 and 28 TP, which crossed the Chernogostinka River, penetrated 3-5 km deep, but were met from the groves by strong anti-tank fire and were forced to retreat to their original positions.

By 17.00 on July 7, 1941, the surviving tanks and units concentrated on the eastern bank of the river. Chernogostinka. The enemy continuously bombed crossings and KV tanks. A group of tanks from the 27th TP, led by the regiment commander, Major Romanovsky, broke through the enemy’s anti-tank defenses and went into the depths of the defense. 27 TP brought 51 tanks into battle. In total, 126 tanks took part in the battle on July 7, 1941: 24 of them were KV-1, T-34. Over 50% of the tanks and more than 200 people were killed and wounded in the battle.

On July 8, the command of the 7th Corps learned that the enemy, having concentrated large forces north of Senno, had gone on the offensive. The German 17th Tank Division and an airborne force (numbering up to an infantry regiment) landed on July 5, armed with Oerlikon heavy machine guns, operated there.

It was necessary to contain and pin down the tank divisions in the Senno area. The 14th and 18th Panzer Divisions launched an offensive from north to south.

Bringing new mechanized units into battle, the enemy was increasing its forces in the Senno area every hour. The command of the 7th Corps made a decision: the corps units would fight to retreat to the area of ​​the crossing of the Obolyanka River near the village of Strigi.

The battles near Senno on July 8 took on the character of a so-called “layer cake” - several lines of attack and defense were formed, enemy units that were surrounded rushed to break through.

Fierce fighting in the Senno area revealed the superiority of forces on the enemy side. Our 14th Panzer Division was in danger of being surrounded. Using forest roads, units of the 14th Panzer Division made their way to the east through Kordany, Koroli and took up defense in the Liozno area.

As during the counterattack, in defensive battles units of the 7th and 5th mechanized corps showed high combat training, stamina, and the indomitable desire of the soldiers to defeat the enemy. The overall results of the battles indicated that the 5th and 7th mechanized corps basically completed the task assigned to them: for four days, conducting offensive and defensive battles, they exhausted the enemy (inflicting great damage on him), noticeably reduced the striking force of the 47th and The enemy's 39th motorized corps slowed down its advance to the defense line along the Western Dvina and Dnieper.

In tank battles, the advantage was on the enemy's side. This is explained by the fact that his aircraft reigned supreme in the air and our units suffered losses in tanks from bomb attacks.

I would also like to note that this was one of the largest tank battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War. On July 6, 1941, the 13th and 17th tank divisions brought 613 tanks (5MK) into battle, and the 14th and 18th tank divisions brought 801 tanks (7 MK).

For the battles on the Chernogostinka River on July 7, 1941, 25 people were nominated for government awards, including the battery commander, senior lieutenant Yakov Iosifovich Dzhugashvili (Stalin’s son).

The main disadvantages in organizing a counterattack in the Lepel and Sennen directions are:

Due to the fact that little time was allocated for preparing the battle, the headquarters of the 5th mechanized corps was not able to organize close cooperation with the 7th mechanized corps. In addition, the counterattack of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps was not supported by active actions of rifle formations of the armies, as well as aviation;

The logistical support for the corps' offensive was not organized clearly enough, with great interruptions, since the rear units and subunits at that time had not yet arrived at their destination;

The commanders and staffs of the divisions and regiments of the 5th and 7th MK had no practical experience in organizing and conducting combat;

The corps involved in the counterattack did not operate outside of tactical communication, independently in different directions;

The fighting indicates the high activity of our troops in the first month of the war. The combat experience of the initial period of the war in the use of mechanized corps was used by the Soviet command in the further struggle and made it possible to determine their role and place in the defensive and offensive operations of fronts and armies.

The battle of Senno (or Lepel counterattack) that took place on July 6-10, 1941 remained virtually unknown to posterity, although in terms of the number of tanks involved in it, its scale was comparable to the battle of Prokhorovka during the Battle of Kursk. Like other events of the Red Army of that period, this operation was another unsuccessful attempt to stop the German offensive at the initial stage. Largely due to the failure of the Soviet counterattack in Belarus, it remained an undeservedly rarely mentioned episode of the fierce campaign of the summer-autumn 1941.

Circumstances of the operation

The bloody battle of Senno was the last attempt of the Red Army to launch a counterattack with tank units. After the battle, the mechanized corps ended, and further efforts to seize the initiative from the enemy in 1941 were reduced to attacks by infantry formations. The second week of the war ended, and the Germans had already covered 500 kilometers - half the way from the border to Moscow. When the Battle of Senno began, the stunning Wehrmacht offensive had already shifted the front line to Vitebsk and Orsha.

From the very beginning, the high command of the German army chose the central sector of the Eastern Front as the main direction of attack on the Soviet Union. Army Group "Center" was deployed here - in some respects it was superior to the other two Groups "South" and "North" combined. The German mechanized units consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Tank Groups - in total they had 7 motorized and 9 tank divisions at their disposal.

This scale of the offensive allowed for deep encirclement and encirclement of Soviet troops. Units of the Western Front were indeed quickly defeated. By July 3, the Germans had crushed the last pockets of coordinated resistance. Soviet losses were enormous - about two-thirds of all front formations. The divisions that emerged from the “cauldrons” had 1-2 thousand people left. All heavy weapons (airplanes, tanks, artillery) were lost. Equipment was abandoned right on the roads. The front command was arrested and shot for this failure (including General Dmitry Pavlov). It was in such circumstances that the Battle of Senno began. 1941 was the worst year of the war, and the planned counter-offensive promised to be no less serious in terms of human losses than previous attempts to stop the German advance.

Counterattack plan

The idea of ​​the Lepel counterattack was to attack the tank units of the Wehrmacht before they were to be joined by infantry formations stretching from Minsk. This plan corresponded to one of the key military principles - to defeat the enemy piece by piece. In addition, the experience of the first two weeks of confrontation with the Germans showed that a chain of rifle divisions fights tank attacks extremely ineffectively. Therefore, it seemed more logical to launch a preemptive strike against the stretched Wehrmacht forces. This is how the battle of Senno should have been from a strategic point of view.

July 1941 was not the worst time to launch a counteroffensive in this region. Most of the German forces were moving not to the east, but to the northeast - the Wehrmacht leadership sought to force the Soviet strike zone as quickly as possible, only two enemy divisions remained (17th and 7th tank), although they also represented a formidable force.

On the eve of the battle

On the evening of July 4, Semyon Timoshenko (who became commander of the Western Front that day), German Malandin and Lev Mehlis approved a directive that set the task of preparing a counterattack in the direction of Ostrovno and Senno. The final point of the offensive was Lepel, who gave the name to the entire operation. However, already at the planning stage of the counterattack, the leadership of the Western Front made a serious mistake. The enemy's capabilities were incorrectly assessed, which was clearly demonstrated by the battle of Senno. There are almost no photographs left from the epicenter of the battle during that operation, but from the losses alone one can understand that the Red Army units failed their mission.

The command of the Western Front was in a hurry to organize a counterattack also because time was on the enemy’s side. A week later, the German infantry divisions, having completed the encirclement of the Minsk and Bialystok “cauldrons,” were supposed to approach the front line. In this case, the balance of forces changed radically. Every day the Red Army found itself in an increasingly difficult situation, and a delay of even a few hours was extremely costly.

Prepared for a counterattack, the 7th Mechanized Corps under the command of Vinogradov moved west from the Moscow Military District on June 24. Vehicles on wheels set off under their own power, and tracked vehicles were loaded onto railway platforms. Along the way, the mechanized corps received new tasks several times, as the situation in Belarus changed too quickly.

Balance of power

The German 7th was distinguished by a structure that was rare for such a formation. It included 4 battalions. The number of tanks was a record for the entire Eastern Front - 265 combat units, of which 25 were lost in two weeks of fighting. However, the Soviet 7th Mechanized Corps included twice as many vehicles.

Most of the German division's fleet consisted of Czech Skoda models produced in 1938. These light tanks had a 37 mm cannon and a hull assembled with rivets and bolts. When hit by an enemy shell, these elements were torn off and injured the crew. So it’s extremely difficult to call the Skoda a technical miracle. In addition to them there were also light PZ-IIs. They were armed with small 20 mm cannons. KV and T-34 were present in the Soviet units. The technical characteristics allowed them to neutralize this entire fleet in a shootout with the German models described above, with minimal losses. It was precisely this kind of battle that the artist Nikolai Nazarchuk demonstrated in his painting. “The Battle of Senno” by the Belarusian master has become one of the most recognizable illustrations of that battle.

Artillery and infantry

In tank divisions, tanks were the “tip of the spear,” but any such formation also needed a “pole” - infantry and artillery. What was the condition of these units in the German divisions? The artillery regiment consisted of 36 guns - mostly howitzers and a few cannons. These figures were much more modest than the Soviet ones. The two tank divisions had almost a hundred guns. The ratio in the infantry was similar: 15 infantry battalions of the Red Army versus 4 of the Wehrmacht.

In the area of ​​​​the offensive of the 7th mechanized corps, the Soviet numerical superiority was twofold, and in the 5th mechanized corps it was seven to eightfold. The large number of tanks later became the reason for comparing the battle of Senno with the famous Battle of Prokhorovka during the Battle of Kursk in 1943.

The 5th mechanized corps had a unique structure in its own way - two additional artillery regiments were attached to it. These units were added from the reserve composition of the Western Front. They were also called corps artillery regiments. An important feature of these formations was the presence of heavy howitzer guns of 122 mm and 152 mm caliber. They created not only mathematical, but also qualitative superiority over enemy artillery.

The Battle of Senno could have ended even faster if the Germans had not left two of their motorized infantry divisions and an anti-tank division in Borisov. These units remained to guard the strategically important crossing of the Berezina. These units arrived at Senno only on July 7, reducing the numerical superiority of the 5th Mechanized Corps to twofold.

Start of counterattack

On July 5, 1941, preparations began for the Battle of Senno. The 14th Tank Division and the 7th Mechanized Corps made a 40-kilometer forced march and took up the starting positions for the intended counterattack. This was the Ostrovno-Gnezdilovichi-Svetogory area, 10 kilometers east of the Chernogostnitsa River. The other 18th Panzer Division was delayed somewhat. By noon the next day, it concentrated on both sides of the Obolyanka River. The 5th Mechanized Corps took up positions in the Orsha area.

On July 6, the battle of Senno entered its active phase. In the 14th Tank Division, two detachments were formed (each included a company of tanks and a battalion of motorized infantry). These formations tried to cross Chernogostnitsa and hold on to the western bank of the river. One detachment actually managed to retain a small bridgehead near Lake Sarro. At this time, the forces of the 18th Panzer Division approached the eastern outskirts of Senno and there entered into a stubborn battle with the Germans. In the evening the enemy was driven out of the city. On this section of the front, Soviet troops went on the defensive. This was their only success during the entire operation.

Failure of plans

On July 7, the tank battle near Senno continued. All the previous night, Soviet soldiers prepared crossings at Chernogostnitsa. In the morning, units of the 14th Panzer Division advanced along them to the western bank of the key river. Progress stalled after 4 kilometers of travel. The tanks collided with the main forces of the 7th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht. The Soviet formations suffered heavy losses and rolled back to their original eastern bank. Then they returned to Ostrovno and began evacuating their equipment.

Meanwhile, the Germans from the north began an attack on Senno, where the 18th Panzer Division was defending. The Red Army left the city by noon on July 8th. At this time, the 5th Mechanized Corps was fighting a fierce battle with enemy tanks 20 kilometers south of Senno. He managed to break the German column, but the subsequent counterattack restored the status quo.

On July 9, the 14th and 18th tank divisions retreated to the eastern bank of Obolyanka. The Germans from captured Senno began to advance to the highway to Smolensk. On the 10th, advanced detachments entered Oboltsy. By noon, the Germans had walked 40 kilometers and reached the highway 30 kilometers west of Orsha. The Soviet 5th Mechanized Corps faced the threat of complete encirclement. His command decided to retreat, and the remnants of the tank divisions did the same.

Results and reasons for failure

So, the tank battle near Senno ended in nothing for the Soviet army. The troops did not complete any of the tasks assigned to them. It was not possible to go even half the way to Lepel. According to the plan, the main blow was delivered to the flank of the Polotsk German group, but it did not suffer any losses - they simply did not reach it. In less than a week of fighting, about 70% of the equipment was lost. The remnants of the tank divisions lost their combat effectiveness and subsequently continued to roll back to the east until they finally disappeared into the “cauldron” near Smolensk.

What was the reason for this failure? On July 17, 1914, near the village of Liozno in the Vitebsk region, senior lieutenant Yakov Dzhugashvili, the son of Joseph Stalin, was captured. During interrogation, he complained about the terrible air attacks of the German Junkers. The same point of view was defended in the reports of the command to Moscow. Later, it migrated to Soviet historiography and was considered for a long time. The main reason why the battle of Senno was lost was considered to be the all-destructive and omnipresent German aviation, which dived and rained bombs on the Red Army soldiers from morning to night.

However, in reality everything was much more complicated. The inability of the command to maneuver and establish communications between various formations had an impact. In addition, the Red Army simply did not have experience in conducting such large-scale operations, while the Wehrmacht came to the USSR with many victories in Europe under its belt. All this made the numerical and qualitative superiority of the Soviet troops useless.

The condition of the command staff was undermined after the recent repressions. Most of the experienced military personnel, who also went through the civil war, were shot or imprisoned in camps. This could not affect how the battle of Senno ended. The consequences of haste and poor decisions in the first stage of the war were reflected in many failures on the Western Front. This trend spread not only to the Lepel counterattack, but throughout the entire 1941 campaign.

Losses

In terms of casualties, the 1941 Battle of Senno corresponded to the typical proportions of that war. The Germans lost approximately 4 wounded for every 1 killed (the total losses were 468 people). About 50 pieces of equipment (tanks) were lost. The heaviest losses occurred in the battle with the 5th Mechanized Corps near Senno on July 7 - 9.

The Soviet troops had completely different numbers. The 5th and 7th mechanized corps lost almost all of their tanks (in total more than 1000 units, which is about 20 times more than the enemy). Even today, historians have not been able to figure out exactly where that equipment went. The figures that were included in the reports of the Red Army command often did not correspond to reality and because of this it is impossible to compare them with the data of the Germans.

However, it is known for sure that when the tank battle of Senno ended in 1941, not a single one of the 220 tanks remained in the 18th Panzer Division, 14 tanks remained in the 14th, and 5 tanks out of 393 remained in the 13th. At the same time, things were better with cars. For example, in the 14th division there were 34 cars and 475 trucks, as well as 56 gas tanks.

Reports and facts

The personal losses of the Soviet formations, as in the case of the German ones, were fully consistent with the proportions of the terrible year for the USSR in 1941. For example, according to an official report in the same 14th Panzer Division, 193 people were killed, 359 were injured, and more than 3 thousand people were listed as missing. However, these figures are now in doubt. They contradict the fact that the regiment was armed with only 552 small arms (rifles) on July 25, while according to the report, more than 5 thousand people should have remained in the ranks without replenishment.

The monstrous gap between facts and reports can only be explained by the desire of the leadership of the formations to hide and retouch their failures in front of their superiors. At the initial stage of the war, such stories were commonplace. The battle of Senno was no exception. The losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht were incommensurable in any case, and it is this indicator that most clearly demonstrates the catastrophe of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.