Having defeated Germany and itsallies, the Entente focused all its attention on the fightwith the Soviet Republic. By the spring of 1919 on the Eastern FrontKolchak's offensive was prepared. Almost 300 thousandthKolchak's army was moved through the Urals to Moscow. Her rear"provided" by English, French, American, Japanese,Czechoslovak troops. Over 100 thousand soldiers of the intervention armieshelped Kolchak.

They were supposed to attack Petrograd with the active support of the English fleet together with the whiteEstonians and White Finns, white detachments under the command of Yudenich.Denikin was supposed to move from the south along with his subordinatesto him by the Don and Kuban Cossack armies. Advance from the northprepared by General Miller. White Guard agents in Ukraineand the Entente were preparing counter-revolutionary uprisings of the banditAtaman Grigoriev. We were supposed to perform in Central AsiaBritish occupiers and Basmachi. This was the extensive plan of the firstEntente campaign. “This campaign was combined, because itassumed a joint attack by Kolchak, Denikin, Poland,Yudenich and mixed Anglo-Russian detachments in Turkestan andArkhangelsk, and the center of gravity of the campaign lay in the Kolchak area"(Stalin, Soch., vol. 4, p. 320).

Kolchak regime in Siberia. In the spring of 1919, mostmilitary forces of foreign interventionists were forced to leaveSoviet country; but they left theirguns, tanks, airplanes. The Entente imperialists did not refusefrom intervention, they only entrusted its implementation to theirproteges - Russian White Guards.

The first of them was Admiral Kolchak. Imperialists of England, France and Americagenerously supplied him with weapons, uniforms, food,money, sent him instructors and technical advisers.Prominent Entente generals with a large number of employeeswere sent to Siberia. Kolchak's complete dependencefrom his foreign masters, the people at that time even notedin his ditty songs:

English uniform,
French shoulder straps,
Japanese tobacco,
Ruler of Omsk.

In Siberia, Kolchak established a military-monarchical dictatorshipand restored the royal order. Siberian peasants, neverwho did not know the landowners were placed in almost serfdomconditions. Their grain and livestock were requisitioned and they were taxedindemnities - collected not only old arrears, but also taxesfor a number of years ahead. For the slightest resistance they were subjected topublic flogging. With particular cruelty Kolchakdealt with workers and Bolsheviks, mercilessly shooting And X.

Kolchak put up the slogan “For a single indivisible Russia” andbrutally strangled the national movement. He did not recognize the nationalautonomy of any people in the territory occupied by them.

At the beginning of 1919 Kolchakwent on the offensive along the entire Eastern Front. In the northerndirection (Perm - Vyatka) Siberian continued to operateKolchak's army against the Red Army. But thanksdecisive actions of comrades Stalin and Dzerzhinskyfurther Glazov Kolchak Siberian Army advanceI couldn't anymore.

Kolchak's Western Army in March and the first half of April 1919 captured Ufa, Bugulma and Buguruslanom. A direct threat was created to Simbirsk and Samara. AverageKolchak's group of troops connecting Siberian and Westernarmy threatened Kazan. Finally, south of Ufa and further toTurkestan was operated by the White Cossack armies of Dutov and Tolstov,threatening Orenburg and Uralsk. Kolchak's offensive tookthreatening proportions and created the danger of unificationeastern and southern counter-revolution. Kolchak assumedunite in the Saratov area with Denikin, so that from there onego to Moscow at the front.

Denikin at this time captured part of Donbass. Yudenich launched an attack on Petrograd.A mortal threat looms over the country. Should have acceptedquick and decisive measures to defeat the Kolchak regime.

On April 12, Pravda published “Theses of the Central CommitteeRCP (b) in connection with the situation on the Eastern Front." In the abstract,written by Lenin, it was emphasized that “The most necessaryextreme exertion of forces to defeat Kolchak" (Lenin,Soch., vol. 29, p. 251).

The party put forward the slogan: “Everyone to the Eastern Front!” In replyto the call of the party and Lenin, Moscow and Petrograd sent tofront a fifth of all communists and a tenth of memberstrade unions. The Komsomol sent severalthousands of the best youth. The volunteer registration covered all cities.In the rear, women replaced men going tofront.

The task of defeating Kolchak was entrusted to M. V. Frunze, appointed commander of the southern group of forces of the Easternfront, and V.V. Kuibyshev, appointed member of the Revolutionarymilitary council of the southern group of forces of the Eastern Front.

In the battles of the civil war, the old Bolshevik Mikhail VasilyevichFrunze grew up in a wonderful proletariancommander. Back in December1918 he was sent ascommander of the IV Armyto strengthen the Easternfront. Relying on workerstextile workers who arrived to himto the rescue, Frunze quickly restoredrevolutionary orderin the army and launched a successfuloffensive against the White Cossacks,and then against Kolchak.

Together with Frunze on the front linespositions against Dutov,White Cossacks and Kolchak in the mostwas in dangerous places andV. V. Kuibyshev. Frunze andKuibyshev raised manywonderful proletariancommanders and military politicalworkers. One ofthere were such heroic commanderslegendary V.I. Chapaev.

Vasily Ivanovich Chapaevborn in Chuvashia. As a child, he worked as a carpenter with his father and grandfather in the Volga regionvillages, in his youth he went through the harsh drill of the royalarmy, gave the best years of his life to the fronts of the imperialistwar. In these difficult wanderings, hatred burned in his heartto the oppressors and exploiters. Returning after the Februaryrevolution in the Volga region, Chapaev joined the Bolshevik Partyand from the first days of the October Revolution took the pathstruggle for Soviet power.

Under the leadership of Frunze, the Red Army crossed the riverBelaya and fought for Ufa.

The Chapaev division repelled the counterattacks of Kolchak’s selectedKappel's corps. As a result of fierce fighting, Ufa wasoccupied by red troops. Kolchak's army quickly retreatedto the East. Pursuing the Kolchakites, the Red Army enteredfoothills of the Urals.
On July 13, Chrysostom was busy, opening the wayto Siberia, July 14 - Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk).

At this time, a fierce war unfolded in Kolchak’s rear.the struggle of partisan detachments consisting of workers and peasantsUrals and Siberia. At the same time, the Red Army beganoffensive actions against Kolchak’s allies - the White Cossacks.

Chapaev's 25th Division was transferred to the Ural Front.With battles, Chapaev moved to the aid of Uralsk, which heroicallywithstood a two-month siege. Having liberated Uralsk,Chapaev drove the White Cossacks to the Caspian Sea. September 51919, in the village of Lbischenskaya, the Chapaev headquarters was surroundedthe Cossacks broke through to the rear. Shooting back from those around youhis enemies, Chapaev threw himself into the Ural River, and was already wounded in the waterand drowned. The image of Chapaev will forever remain in the memory of the Sovietpeople.

The Red Army dealt a crushing blow to Kolchak, buthe still retained some of his strength and tried to resist.

In August Lenin, in his “Letter to the Workers and Peasants”regarding the victory over Kolchak" warned: "The enemy is far awaynot yet destroyed. He's not even completely broken.Every effort must be made to drive out Kolchak and the Japanese.with other foreign robbers from Siberia..." (Lenin,Soch., g. 29, p. 511).

At this time, Denikin came to the aid of Kolchak in the south.and Yudenich in the west.

Contradictions in the camp of counter-revolution, and most importantly, resistanceThe Red Army thwarted this first campaign. Entente then everythingfocused her attention on helping General Denikin. On he was the main bet in the fight against Soviet Russia.This is how the second campaign of the Entente was prepared.
“The second campaign of the Entente,” wrote Comrade Stalin, “wasundertaken in the fall of 1919. This hike was also combined,for he assumed a joint attack by Denikin,Poland, Yudenich (Kolchak was counted out). Center of gravityThe campaign lies this time in the south, in the Denikin region" (Stalin,Soch., vol. 4, pp. 320-321).
But this campaign was also disrupted

The defeat of Denikin and Yudenich accelerated the complete liquidationKolchak. In the fall of 1919, the Red Army quickly stoppedKolchak's attempt to advance in the Tobolsk area. In cruelSiberian frosts The Red Army drove the dying Kolchakarmy through the Siberian steppes and taiga to the east. Powerfulthe allies of the Red Army were the red partisans of the Uralsand Siberia. The Bolsheviks led the struggle for Soviet power inSiberia.

November 14, 1919 The Red Army occupied Omsk, the capital Kolchak. At the beginning of January 1920 he was liberated by the rebelsworkers and partisans the city of Irkutsk, where he was takenKolchak, who was soon arrested. On February 7, Kolchak was shot.

Soviet power was established in Siberia.

In mid-September, opponents of the Bolsheviks held the Ufa Conference. Its main participants were the Socialist Revolutionary Komuch and the Siberian government (much more right-wing in sentiment). At the meeting, a unified government was elected - Directory- of five people. It included Cadets and Socialist Revolutionaries. However, the Directory lasted only a few weeks... At the end of September 1918. Kolchak Together with General Knox, he arrived in the capital of White Siberia - Omsk. He does not have any position, Kolchak is a private, civilian person. But already on November 4, the admiral was appointed Minister of War and Navy in the All-Russian Provisional Government.

On November 18, in Omsk, where the new government was headquartered, a military coup. The rebel officers arrested the left-wing members of the Directory, and the right-wing members transferred power to the Minister of War, Admiral A.V. Kolchak. , a famous polar explorer and scientist, former commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Kolchak becomes the de facto dictator of the country, the bearer of supreme power. There were no legal grounds for this. The government that gave power to Kolchak was itself elected by a handful of deputies from the disbanded “Uchredilka”. Moreover, it took its “noble” step as a result of the coup, being arrested.

As a political figure, Kolchak was quite consistent with the sentiments of the officers who fought the Bolsheviks. His government could count on full support in military circles. Admiral took the title Supreme Ruler of Russia.

Following General Knox, other representatives of the “allies” also came to Siberia. France sent General Janin to communicate with Admiral Kolchak's army. Having visited the Supreme Ruler of Russia, Janin informed him of his authority to take command not only of all Entente forces in this theater, but also of all the White armies in Siberia . In other words, the French general demanded complete submission from the head of the Russian state. Kolchak rejects Janin's proposal. However, he instructs Janin to replace him at the front and be his assistant...

Kolchak tried to achieve recognition from the West. To him, who came to Russia at the suggestion of the British and French, the lack of their official support seemed incredible. And it was postponed all the time... In November 1918, Kolchak A.V. launched an offensive in the Urals. Kolchak’s army tried to advance to Vyatka and further to the North in order to connect with the troops of General E.K. Miller. and organizing a joint attack on Moscow.

Once again the Eastern Front became the main one. On December 25, Kolchak’s troops took Perm, but already on December 31, their offensive was stopped by the Red Army. In the east, the front has temporarily stabilized.

From October 1918 to October 1919, the British handed over to Kolchak more than 600 thousand rifles, 6831 machine guns, 1200 guns, tanks, aircraft, ammunition, and more than 200 thousand sets of uniforms. Kolchak had many military advisers from England, France, the USA, and Japan. By the spring of 1919, the Supreme Ruler of Russia had gathered an army of about 300 thousand soldiers.

It should be emphasized that in March 1919, Kolchak rejected the proposal to begin peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks. He demonstrated again and again to Western emissaries that Russia’s interests were above all else for him. A.I. Denikin also abandoned the attempt to divide Russia. And then the British, French and Americans finally decide to rely on the Bolsheviks. It was from March 1919 that the West set a course for the final liquidation of the White movement.

But it was precisely in the spring of 1919 that it seemed that white victory is already close. The Red Front is about to collapse completely. We just need to help the white armies a little, just a little, and the bloody nightmare will end. The fighting is large-scale and therefore requires a large amount of ammunition, resources, people and money. It's like a huge firebox of a steam locomotive, where you have to throw, throw, throw. Otherwise, you won't go anywhere. Did the “allies” help Kolchak at this decisive moment? Was “coal” thrown into his military firebox?

Map of the defeat of A.V. Kolchak’s troops, October 1919 - March 1920.

Here is the answer to this question from the memoirs of Alexander Mikhailovich Romanov: “But then something strange happened. Instead of following the advice of their experts, the heads of the Allied states pursued a policy that forced Russian officers and soldiers to experience the greatest disappointments in our former allies and even admit that the Red Army was protecting the integrity of Russia from the encroachments of foreigners.” (Romanov A.M. « Book of Memories”, M.: ACT, 2008, p. 356).

The excitement of the offensive in 1919 struck Denikin, Yudenich, and Kolchak. All of their armies are not fully formed, not trained and not armed. And yet the whites stubbornly move forward towards their destruction. Marvelous. It was as if some kind of eclipse had come over them all. Whites are going to take Moscow, but only they do not step on it at the same time, but at different times, in turn. This will allow Trotsky to break them up piece by piece.

Of course, the White leaders, Russian generals, were not illiterate officers. Of course, they knew the basics of military art. Only those from whom the fighters could force them to act contrary to common sense could "for the One and Indivisible" completely dependent...

In the spring of 1919, the Supreme Ruler of Russia had two options.

1. Stand still and, taking advantage of the enemy’s complete passivity, complete the formation, cobbling together and supply of your army, and also certainly contact Denikin to agree on joint actions.

2. Immediately act actively so as not to give the Reds any respite. Admiral Kolchak chooses an offensive. You can also attack in two directions.

1. Having set up a barrier in the direction of Vyatka and Kazan, send the main forces to Samara and Tsaritsyn in order to unite there with Denikin’s army and only then move with him to Moscow. (Baron Wrangel tried unsuccessfully to get Denikin’s sanction for the same decision.)

2. Move in the direction of Kazan-Vyatka with further exit through Kotlas to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk, to the huge reserves of equipment concentrated there. In addition, this significantly reduced the delivery time from England, because the route to Arkhangelsk is incomparably shorter than the route to Vladivostok.

Kolchak chose... an even more unsuccessful strategy! The third option, the most unsuccessful, provided simultaneous attack on both Vyatka and Samara. Kolchak was convinced to accept this strategy. This disastrous plan of attack was reviewed and approved by the French General Staff. The British also ardently insisted on it. The Supreme Ruler of Russia sent his armies along diverging lines. And he aimed his strongest army at Vyatka, that is, at a secondary direction. Hitler’s strategists would make the same mistake in 1942, attacking Stalingrad and the Caucasus simultaneously.

Kolchak's offensive began on March 4, 1919. Along the entire vast stretch of the Eastern Front - from the forests of the Northern Urals to the Orenburg steppes - Kolchak's armies went on the offensive. Regardless of losses, they rushed forward. Soon the front was broken through. Capturing March 14 Ufa, Kolchak’s men fought their way to Simbirsk, Samara, Votkinsk.

By mid-April, the Whites were already 85 km from Kazan, approaching Samara and Simbirsk. Kolchak planned a breakthrough beyond the Volga and a connection with the general’s troops Denikin. During their offensive, the Kolchakites captured a significant territory with an area of ​​300 thousand km 2 with a population of over 5 million people, but the turning point came quite quickly. After advancing for only two months, Kolchak’s troops began to retreat uncontrollably.

The internal weakness of the anti-Soviet movement and the ambitions of a number of leaders who claimed to lead the entire movement had an impact. The split between socialists, cadets, and monarchists deepened. Dissatisfaction with the economic policies of the main part of the army - the peasants - grew. Behind the lines of the White Army (in the Urals, Siberia) a massive partisan movement grew. A departure from the white movement of national units (since their peoples did not receive state self-determination, autonomy) and the Cossacks (internally split along property lines) began. The morale of Kolchak's army was falling...

The sentiments of the local population were to play a very important, perhaps decisive, role. Will the peasants support Kolchak, will they provide his armies with a reliable rear? Here are lines from a letter from a Perm peasant, written after the arrival of the White Guards, in November: “We waited for Kolchak like the day of Christ, but we waited like the most predatory beast. Here we have everyone flogged, right and wrong. If they don’t fasten them up, they shoot them or pin them with a bayonet. God forbid this fierce Kolchak.”

The land program of A. Kolchak, who called on the peasants to wait for the decision of the future National Assembly, of course, could not satisfy the farmers. The land was returned to small owners (farmers, etc.), which also irritated the peasants. Any manifestation of dissatisfaction was severely suppressed by the authorities.

In 1919, while giving an interview, Kerensky A.F. , Kolchak’s political opponent, said: “In Siberia there are not only cases of execution and torture, but often the entire population of villages is flogged, not excluding teachers and intellectuals... Thanks to Kolchak, a new and strengthened Bolshevik movement was created.”

Many peasants began to join the red partisan detachments, operating behind the lines of the White Guards. In total, up to 140 thousand people fought in such units. A peasant uprising spread like a flood throughout Siberia, which catastrophically weakened the rear of A. Kolchak’s armies. It is curious that even in partisan detachments, the peasants continued to hesitate - who should they follow, the “whites” or the “reds”? Both had disadvantages from the point of view of the peasants, but the “whites” apparently aroused greater hostility.

In response to the party's call: “Everyone to fight Kolchak!” The Bolsheviks announced additional mobilization into the Red Army and were able to stop the advance of the Supreme Ruler's troops. Red Army troops under the command of Frunze M.V. launched active preparations for a counteroffensive. In May 1919, thanks to its precise preparation, Buguruslan, Bugulma and Belebey were liberated, which created favorable opportunities for further successful military operations on the Eastern Front.

In May Lenin V.I. wrote to the command of the Eastern Front: “If we do not conquer the Urals before winter, then I consider the death of the revolution inevitable; strain all your strength..." The main blow on the Eastern Front was delivered by the Red Guards in the southern sector of the army of Frunze M.V. In the steppe expanses of the Volga region, in the foothills of the Southern Urals, fierce battles broke out. And here the 25th Division, commanded by Chapaev V.I.

The Chapaevites endured a big and difficult battle near Ufa. The Kolchakites hoped to stop the Reds on the Belaya River and created heavily fortified positions here. “The enemy went across the river, blew up all the crossings and bristled on the high Ufa bank with the muzzles of guns, machine-gun throats, bayonets of divisions and corps,” recalled the commissar of the 25th division, writer Furmanov.

On a June night, the Chapaevites crossed the fast river on rafts and boats, on logs and planks. Hot fights broke out on the Ufa coast. Kolchak's troops continuously attacked the Reds, trying in vain to push them back across the river. But the Red Army soldiers fought to the death. Those among them were injured and a bomb exploded near them. On June 9, Ufa was liberated, and by the end of June 1919, a general offensive of the Eastern Front troops to the Urals began.

At the same time, the troops of the Northern Group of the Eastern Front, under the command of a former colonel of the tsarist army, were pushing back the Kolchakites in the Middle Urals. The regiments of the 21st Division, having made a difficult transition through burning peat bogs, reached the Kama. With the help of the Volga military flotilla, they crossed to the other side. Other Red divisions also crossed the deep Kama.

Kolchakites settled in Perm, found themselves in a hopeless situation. During their retreat, they burned more than 100 steamships and 38 barges, many of them carrying food, oil, and kerosene. The Red Army soldiers burst into the burning city, shrouded in smoke. The Kolchakites suffered defeat after defeat. On July 14, soldiers of the 28th division under the command of V.M. Azin. entered the largest city of the Urals, Yekaterinburg. Ten days later, the Red Army, led by the commander of one of the regiments of the 27th division, Vostretsov, burst into Chelyabinsk.

November 14 Kolchak A.V. lost its capital - the city Omsk. The White Army is retreating. This way of the cross would later be called the Siberian Ice March. Three thousand kilometers through the taiga, through the snow, along the beds of frozen rivers. The retreating White Guards carry all their weapons and ammunition. But you can’t drag guns through the forests. The artillery is rushing. General Kappel, appointed by the admiral to command the troops at this critical moment, froze his legs when he fell into the wormwood. In the nearest village, the doctor cut off his toes and a piece of his heel with a simple knife. No anesthesia, no wound treatment. Two weeks later, Kappel died - pneumonia was added to the consequences of amputation...

But even in the current nightmare situation, the frozen White Guards had a chance to stop and repel the advance of the Red Army. If only the fire of uprisings prepared by the Socialist Revolutionaries had not suddenly broken out in the rear. As if on schedule, uprisings began almost simultaneously in all industrial centers. The many months of agitation by the Socialist Revolutionaries had done its job. The Bolsheviks were much closer to them than the “reactionary” tsarist generals.

At the beginning of January 1920, Kolchak A.V. resigned the title of Supreme Ruler of Russia and handed them over to General Denikin. Two weeks later, the Czechoslovaks guarding the admiral handed him over to the new authorities for arrest. Kolchak’s extradition took place on January 15, 1920. This was largely explained by the fact that the Czechoslovak Corps had long looked with disapproval at the harsh methods of the Siberian military authorities’ fight against unrest.

One of the statements from the corps command said: “Under the protection of Czechoslovak bayonets, local Russian military authorities allow themselves to take actions that would horrify the entire civilized world. The burning of villages, the beating of hundreds of peaceful Russian citizens... are common occurrences.” If the “allies” wanted to take Kolchak out alive, no one would have stopped them from doing so. Such a force simply did not exist... But the Entente no longer needed the admiral... On February 7, 1920, Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak was shot by verdict of the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee.

Part 3. DEFEAT OF KOLCHAK’S ARMY…
After the fatal defeats of Kolchak’s Siberian armies, near Chelyabinsk and on Tobol, a wave of retreating troops, grouping in separate columns, rushed towards the Siberian Railway to the east, with the goal of leaving for Transbaikalia, under the protection of the troops of Ataman Semenov and the occupying Japanese troops. This is how the famous Great Siberian Ice Campaign began.
In March 1919, with a combat column of Colonel Casagrandi, the corps of General Verbitsky, under the onslaught of the Reds under the command of Army Commander Blucher, the 15th Votkinsk Division retreated further to the east...
Family members of officers and lower ranks also left with the white convoys. Many, fearing reprisals from the Reds, evacuated their families in advance.
So, some Izhevsk and Votkinsk residents, as well as people from the Kama villages and towns, who were all in the 15th Votkinsk Division, had their families evacuated to Irkutsk in advance. But the red troops were advancing. And when the Reds began to seize power in Irkutsk, families began to be transported to Transbaikalia, and there they waited for the arrival of the White Army.
A serious drama occurred in the Votkinsk equestrian division. From the day of its formation on May 25, 1919, he took command of the 2nd squadron of the division
Cornet Aristarchus Pucillo arrived from the Irkutsk Military School. He spent all the campaigns and battles commanding his squadron. He was loved by his subordinates and colleagues; he was greatly appreciated by the division commander, Captain Drobinin. For his courage, Pucillo received two promotions to the following ranks and rose to the rank of staff captain. He arrived at Innokentievskaya station seriously ill with typhus. He still had a family in Irkutsk. His father, an officer in the tsarist army, was retired. The news that the White Army would not liberate the city of Irkutsk greatly worried the captain. Being in a semi-delirious state, he, unnoticed by those present, took out a revolver and shot himself. Five days later, when the Votkinsk residents were already in Mysovka, Pucillo’s sister came to the division headquarters and asked where she could find her brother. It turned out that his family managed to leave Irkutsk in advance. It is not difficult to imagine the despair and grief of the family who learned of his premature and needless death.
The government and Kolchak's headquarters were forced to leave Omsk, which on November 14, 1919 was surrendered to the Red Army without a fight. Now the headquarters is forced to lead the troops while in a train car, although it consoled itself with the hope that it would soon restore its “stationary” activities, having reached Irkutsk. But it was just a dream. With such a massive and rapid retreat, in a constantly changing combat situation, there could be no talk of real and qualified leadership of military operations from a single center. It should be recalled that Kolchak’s train was followed by a train with “Russia’s Gold Reserve. This gave special specificity and importance to the railway marathon that had begun. Thanks to the will of General Kappel, the remnants of the Siberian armies in October 1919 were able to be united into the Moscow Group of Forces, which reached Transbaikalia in early March 1920, paying for it with the lives of Admiral Kolchak and General Kappel himself.
When, while still in Omsk, General Kappel saw the train of the “Gold Reserve”, the very one that he ordered to be taken out of Kazan at the end of 1918, and uttered truly prophetic words: “The Gold of the Rhine did not bring happiness to the Nibelungs of Germany, nor will it bring happiness to the Russian heroes.” Starting from Novonikolaevsk, the Czechs began to delay Kolchak’s “letter” trains and the train with gold for a long time, racking their brains as to how to sell this “good” so desired by the Bolsheviks at a higher price.
Kolchak could only rely on his convoy, although he understood that these forces were not enough to feel safe and for the Golden Echelon to be safe. The admiral became virtually a prisoner and at the same time a hostage in the flirting of the allies, who were the Czechs, with the Bolsheviks. At all stations, even junior officers made it clear to Kolchak who was boss.
The clarification of relations between the allies reached its climax in December 1919, when in Krasnoyarsk the Czechs detained the Supreme Commander's train and, using force, uncoupled the locomotive, citing the need to connect it to the train with soldiers of the Czechoslovak Corps escaping to Vladivostok, and also referring to the queue for sending ambulance trains with wounded.
Unable to bear it, General Kappel “exploded,” demanding that General Syrov immediately attach the locomotive back to the admiral’s train and make an appropriate apology. Otherwise, General Kappel threatened to use force against the Czech troops. Syrovy ignored this challenge. This is how the Allied command behaved in relation to representatives of the military authorities of Siberia, setting clear examples for their subordinates. On the way to Nizhneudinsk (Ulan-Ude), the admiral was informed that at the station. Cheremkhovo, 130 kilometers northwest of Irkutsk, as a result of the uprising, power passed to the Bolsheviks. In Nizhneudinsk, the Czechs detained the admiral's train. From the commandant of the city, Major Gassek, it became known that representatives of all military missions of the Entente countries in Siberia and the Far East decided that the admiral’s trains and the train with the “Gold Reserve” were taken under the direct protection of the Allied powers. After two weeks, Major Gassek announced a new decision to the Allied headquarters - Kolchak was offered safe travel in only one carriage. The remaining carriages and the train with gold should remain at the disposal of the allied (Czech) troops.
Kolchak rejected this decision. Having assembled his convoy, he invited everyone to leave, and only those who categorically did not want to leave to stay. To his surprise, he saw that almost the entire convoy had left him and immediately went over to the Bolsheviks, only a few officers remained. This fact completely undermined Kolchak’s faith in a happy ending to his career and life in general. According to the last chief of staff of General Headquarters, General Zankevich, the admiral’s head became completely white from hair that had turned gray in just a few hours.
On the same day, Kolchak informed the headquarters of the Japanese Admiral Kato that he agreed to travel to Irkutsk only in one carriage provided to him.
A large Pullman carriage was attached to the train of the 1st Battalion of the Czech Regiment, housing 60 loyal officers of his personal escort. A carriage of the Omsk government was attached to the same train. General Pepelyaev and other staff officers joined the train at Taiga station.
Meanwhile, the troops under the command of General Kappel continued to retreat on foot along the taiga trails, periodically repelling attacks from the pursuing Red Army troops and local partisans.
On January 4, 1020, Kolchak’s guard was replaced exclusively by Czech soldiers. The convoy officers, like the admiral himself, were forbidden to leave the carriage. The Allies dragged the “Golden Echelon” behind them. The St. Andrew's flag and the flags of the allied states were raised above Kolchak's carriage.
On the same day, January 4, 1020, Admiral Kolchak signed his “renunciation,” transferring the power of the Supreme Ruler of Russia to General Denikin, and control in Transbaikalia and the Far East to Ataman Semenov.
Having traveled 120 kilometers from Nizhneudinsk, the train with Czechoslovak troops passed the town of Tulun, which was already controlled by the partisans. And on January 11, 1920, in the area of ​​Zima station, partisans blocked the railway.
The commandant of the train, Czech Major Kadnitsa, ordered machine guns to be installed on the roofs of the train cars and categorically forbade all Russians to leave the cars.
The partisans uncoupled the locomotive, demanding that Admiral Kolchak and the “Gold Reserve” be handed over to them. The negotiations lasted quite a long time, as a result of which an agreement was reached that the partisans would bring in their fighters to guard Kolchak’s carriage. The locomotive was hooked up and allowed to continue on its way to Cheremkhovo-Irkutsk.
But before Irkutsk, Kolchak faced another test. The Innokentievskaya station was blocked by a large mass of partisans who demanded that the admiral and the “Gold Reserve” be given to them. After lengthy negotiations, the parties agreed to a compromise - the security of the train was strengthened by a large unit of partisans.
After the addition of a new detachment of guards, the trains moved further to Irkutsk, where they arrived on January 15, 1920. A few hours later, a train with “Gold Reserve” arrived at one of the dead ends (1878 bags and 5143 boxes of gold in 29 cars, and 7 cars with platinum and silver).
The guards who jumped out of the carriages (the Czechs together with the partisans) gathered at the door of Kolchak’s carriage. On the platform stood a group of Irkutsk communists, surrounded by armed workers. Quite a lot of Czech, Japanese and Polish troops gathered around the station, and armed workers' squads were also present. Neither the diplomats concentrated in Irkutsk, nor even General Syrov, who was entrusted with the safety and security of Kolchak, met the arriving admiral.
In the evening, almost immediately upon the arrival of the train, on the orders of General Syrov, soldiers of the Czech company, accompanied by 20 warriors and 10 partisans, sent Kolchak, wrapped in a fur coat, across the Angara to the opposite bank. The chain of this procession along a narrow icy path led Admiral Kolchak and General Pepelyaev to solitary confinement in the provincial prison.
February 7, 1920, Admiral A.V. Kolchak and General V.N. Pepelyaev, according to the verdict of the revolutionary court, were shot on the ice-covered Angara, and their bodies were thrown under the ice...

And at this time, General Voitsekhovsky, who took command of the white troops, gave the command to march on Irkutsk. The path was chosen from the Innokentievskaya station along the railway, crossing the Irkut River and, before reaching the Glazko suburb, southwest to the village of Smolenskoye. From here, through a number of small villages and summer cottages, movement bypasses a large wooded hill located south of Glazkov. Then turn east again and exit to the Angara River. Then you could move to the village of Distvenichnoye, at the source of the Angara from Lake Baikal, then along the river, or go out to the right bank, where the road went. General Wojciechowski warned the command of the Czechoslovak corps about this decision in order to avoid misunderstandings on their part. The Czechs expressed satisfaction with the decision not to take the city and promised not to create any obstacles.
The 3rd Army was ahead, with the Izhevsk Division at its head. Behind it is the Ufa group of the 2nd Army and at the end, the group of General Verzhbitsky. At the forefront of the Izhevsk division was the Horse Regiment. The night was dark and frosty. Having passed Smolenskoye, we continued moving through the villages of Medvedevo, Markovo, Kuzmikha, Grudino, and by morning, near the village of Mikhalevo, we reached Angara. After descending onto the ice, we walked along the river...
In the history of the civil war in eastern Russia, a special place is occupied by the thousand-mile march of the white army in thirty to fifty degrees below zero in deep snow, through the terrible Siberian taiga, with battles to the saving Chita.
And on January 26, 1920, at the Utai junction, near the Tulun station near the city of Nizhneudinsk, Lieutenant General Kappel died of double pneumonia.
The general’s last words were: “Let the troops know that I was devoted to them, that I loved them, and by my death among them I proved it.”
January 30, 1920. Stubborn fighting broke out in the area of ​​Zima station. The detachment of Captain Nesterov and the 1st Balagan partisan division, which went over to the Red side, offered stubborn resistance to the White troops. At the decisive moment, General Voitsekhovsky brought the 26th Infantry Regiment named after Admiral Kolchak into battle. The defeat of the Reds was complete, captain Nesterov was captured. The next day, January 31, units of the 5th Red Army entered Taishet, moving along the Trans-Siberian Railway. On February 1, 1920, the troops of General Voitsekhovsky occupied Cheremkhovo and began to prepare for the assault on Irkutsk. Having defeated a cover group near Usolye-Sibirsky, the Kappelites came close to Irkutsk, on the outskirts of which fierce battles broke out on February 5-6. Particularly heavy fighting took place near the villages of Sukhovskaya and Olonki. In his ultimatum sent by the Reds, Wojciechowski, who took command of the White army after the death of General Kappel, demanded that their troops be withdrawn to the north and that Kolchak and the gold reserves be handed over. Provide the white armies with food, fodder and warm clothing for 50 thousand people.
Fearing that Kolchak would be released by the Whites, on February 6 the Military Revolutionary Committee adopted Resolution No. 27 on the execution of the Supreme Ruler of Russia. On February 7 at 5 a.m. the sentence was carried out. After fierce and bloody battles, having learned about the execution of Kolchak, Voitsekhovsky stopped the assault on Irkutsk and, dividing the army into two groups, began to bypass the city. One group moved north, rounding Lake Baikal, entered Transbaikalia, and the other, crossing the railway line between Glazkov and Innokentievskaya station, rounding Irkutsk from the south, headed towards Chita.
February 10 Art. Innokentievskaya was occupied by the Reds. On the night from March 1 to March 2, the last Czech trains left Irkutsk, and on March 7, units of the Red Army entered the city.
At the beginning of March 1920, the Kappelites, who managed to escape beyond Baikal, reached Chita and declared their subordination to Ataman Semenov, appointed by Kolchak as commander-in-chief in Eastern Siberia. They fought the Reds until the end of 1920 as part of the 3rd Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Molchanov. In the fall of 1920, the ashes of Vladimir Kappel were transported from Transbaikalia to Harbin, and the Kappelites continued to fight the Bolsheviks in the Far East for another two years. The 3rd Corps also included the 15th Votkinsk Division...

In April 1920, on the outskirts of the village of Vladimiro-Aleksandrovskoye, the entire officer corps of the division was assembled, or rather what was left of it after continuous and brutal battles with Soviet troops. The issue of leaving Primorye and going to China was discussed. Two generals, several colonels, and other officers were in the common audience, seated on benches, stools, and chairs, next to the house. Which housed the division headquarters.
At the table taken out of the hut was the division chief, General Molchanov. Behind the chair on which the general was sitting was attached the banner of the 1st Votkinsk Regiment, which was the symbol of the division. Its green color symbolized the color of the Motherland, its hopes, its fields and forests, red - belonging to the working class and solidarity with the workers.
General Molchanov began without preamble, “You and I all remember when we were in Omsk, a commission from the Omsk government came to our division. The late Vladimir Oskarovich Kappel was present then. I saw how irritated he was by these high civilian officials. They then came to see and get acquainted with the Izhevtsevites and Votkinsk residents who rebelled against the Bolsheviks. And when this commission saw that in the division, instead of junior officers, senior workers were bosses, whom ordinary soldiers addressed with the word “comrade,” the commission members immediately declared, “These are not our soldiers, they will be of no use!” But these Ural workers in the division were about 40 thousand staunch fighters. It was strength, and what a trump card against the Bolsheviks.
Next, gentlemen, officers, I am now addressing you personally. You have all dedicated your lives to serving the Motherland, and I would like to continue with the words of the late General Kappel, who told me about this personally. Yes, now there is a civil war. Anyone who doesn’t understand it has no time to teach it. It is necessary to give the opportunity to work in the liberation of the Motherland not to those who, due to some privileges or length of service, have the right to occupy this or that post, but to those who can, understand and know what needs to be done. Most of us, being unfamiliar with the political life of the state, were in trouble. And many people find it difficult to understand this. Revolution is a powerful, unstoppable flow, and trying to stop it is sheer madness. It is necessary to give this flow the desired direction and let it follow the desired course. But we did not want and did not even want to understand this... We are dealing with a seriously ill Russia. And instead of treating her, we care about the color of her outfit. An example of this, gentlemen, is the acquaintance of the Omsk government with the soldiers of our 15th Votkinsk Division. Now it is too late to teach what is possible and how to do it to someone who does not understand the main thing.
But you and I know that they rebelled when Kappel took Kazan, and subsequently, under our command, they went through all of Siberia and fought with the Bolsheviks in Primorye. One against ten, naked and almost unarmed against well-armed and warmly dressed Red Army soldiers...
I will not encourage you to fight further. I'll just say it. Anyone who wishes can stay with me and continue the fight against the Bolsheviks. Those who don’t want to can go to China. And I ask you to announce this to all lower ranks. They did everything they could. This is especially true for those who have families in their train. Please, I will provide you with food,
convoy, fodder You have weapons and ammunition. At the border, leave all excess ammunition to the officers accompanying you, leave only personal weapons...
Headquarters - Captain Sklyuev, turned to a frowning officer standing in the distance. -You have a seriously ill wife. I give you the order to lead the convoy with refugees and tomorrow, early in the morning, set off towards the border.
-That's it, gentlemen officers, the meeting is over. Tomorrow, after sending the refugees, we will go into battle again. I ask the regimental commanders to stay. The rest are all free...

15 Votkinsk Rifle Division under the command of General Molchanov continued to fight the Bolsheviks in Primorye until the end of 1922...
Having broken through with the remnants of the 15th Votkinsk Division to Ataman Semenov, General Molchanov took command of the 3rd Rifle Corps, which included the remnants of his division - the Izhevsk-Votkinsk Regiment. Without leaving heavy battles with the Reds, after the famous Volochaev battles in February 1922, he had to retreat beyond Iman. During the reorganization of the army into the Zemskaya Rat of General Diterichs, Molchanov headed the former 3rd Corps, renamed the Volga Group. In the battles near Spassk, the Zemstvo troops suffered a final defeat and retreated to China... With this, the history of the Kama units ended.

The author tried to find participants in the Izhevsk-Votkinsk uprisings, those who could leave behind their memories. And he was lucky, he found the former commander of the Prikamsky Infantry Regiment of the 15th Votkinsk Infantry Division, Colonel A.G. Efimov, who before his death (1972, buried in San Francisco) wrote a book about these bloody events, which is presented below:

So, who are they, the few participants in that distant uprising in the Kama region, about whom the author managed to find out very little...

Efimov Avenir Gennadievich, b. October 19, 1888 Simbirsk Cadet Corps (1907), Nikolaev Engineering School (1910). In the white troops of the Eastern Front from the capture of Kazan. Participant of the Izhevsk-Votkinsk uprising. In September-October 1918, commander of the Izhevsk Rifle Regiment. After completing wartime courses at the General Staff Academy - at the headquarters of the 2nd Ufa Corps, from February 24, 1919, chief of staff of the Izhevsk brigade, captain, then of the Izhevsk division, from December 11, 1919, commander of the Izhevsk cavalry regiment, from March 12, 1920. commander of the Izhevsk regiment, from August 25, 1921 commander of the Izhevsk-Votkinsk brigade and. columns in the Khabarovsk campaign, in September 1922, commander of the Prikamsky rifle regiment. Colonel. In exile in 1923 in Girin and Shanghai, then in 1932 in the USA. Member of the Veterans Society, editor of the “Bulletin of the Society of Veterans of the Great War in San Francisco”, by 1967 an employee of the magazine “Military Truth”. Died on April 25, 1972 in San Francisco (USA).
Soldiers. Captain. In the white troops of the Eastern Front. Chairman of the Union of Front-line Soldiers in Izhevsk, one of the leaders of the Izhevsk-Votkinsk uprising, member of the defense, then in December 1921 in the Izhevsk regiment. Subsequently Colonel. In exile in Shanghai, since 1927. In the Shanghai Russian Regiment. Died after 1943
Non-commissioned officer Oskolkov (later - ensign) went through the entire war with the Izhevsk formations and, as part of the Izhevsk regiment, was killed on January 4, 1922 near Olgokhta during the Khabarovsk campaign of the Far Eastern Army.
Yuryev Georgy Nikolaevich. From the nobles of the Kyiv Province. Mikhailovsky Artillery School. Staff captain of the 5th artillery brigade. In the white troops of the eastern front. One of the leaders of the Votkinsk uprising. In August 1918, the commander of the Izhevsk-Votkinsk detachment, then the commander of the Consolidated Votkinsk Division, from September 2, the chief of staff of the units of the People's Army of the Votkinsk region, from October 20, 1918, the commander of the Kama Army, from January 3 to January 11, 1919, and from March to October 1919 year, head of the 15th Votkinsk Rifle Division, then assistant head of the naval rifle division. Order of St. George 4th class. Colonel (since January 1919) Died in the fall near the station. Kemchug.
Bolonkin Andrey Lavrentievich, b. September 30, 1893 In the Vyatka province. From the workers of the Votkinsk plant. Lieutenant. Participant of the Votkinsk uprising. In August 1918, the battalion commander, head of the Mishkinsky combat sector, at the end of September was appointed to command the Sharkan Front of the Votkinsk People's Revolutionary Army. Since September 1918, staff captain. From January 1, 1919, commander of the 4th Votkinsk regiment, battalion commander of the Votkinsk division. Heavily wounded, he remained behind the front line. A year later he joined his unit in Transbaikalia. In January 1922, assistant commander of the Votkinsk regiment. Lieutenant Colonel In exile since 1922 in China. (Since 1923 in Girin, since 1923 in Australia (Brisbane, since 1929 in Sydney). Member of the monarchist movement. Died on October 9, 1970 in Sydney.
Cornet, Prince Ukhtomsky Yu.P. In the white troops of the Eastern Front. Since September 17, 1918, chief of staff of the People's Army troops of the Sarapul region.
Albokrinov Nikolai Petrovich. Lieutenant colonel. In the white troops of the Eastern Front since September 1918. (passed from the Reds), chief of staff of the Votkinsk People's Revolutionary Army. In November 1918, at the headquarters of the Kama Army, from January to May 1919, Head of the 15th Votkinsk Rifle Division. Colonel.
....Drobinin Vladimir Nikanorovich, born in 1890. From the peasants of the Vyatka province. Real school in Sarapul (1913), Oranienbaum school of warrant officers (1916). Lieutenant, battalion commander of the 75th Infantry Regiment, Knight of St. George. In the white troops of the Eastern Front. In August 1918, Participant in the Votkinsk uprising, head of the Kelchin combat sector, in early September 1918, Commander of the 3rd battalion of the 1st Votkinsk regiment, factory rifle regiment on August 17, November 1918, commander of the 2nd battalion of the Votkinsk regiment , adjutant of the headquarters of the Votkinsk division. Since January 1919, Acting commander of the 4th Votkinsk regiment, staff captain. Since May 1919, Commander of the Votkinsk Cavalry Division. Since January 1920, captain, lieutenant colonel. Participant of the Siberian Ice March. Since September 1922, commander of the Prikamsky cavalry division. In exile in China, Colonel. He died on March 7, 1950 in a Russian refugee camp on the island. Tubabao (Philippines).
Buskin Ivan. Lieutenant. In the white troops of the Eastern Front. In November 1918, commander of the 2nd battalion of the 4th Votkinsk regiment. October 1920 Commander of the 3rd company of the Votkinsk regiment. Staff Captain. Participant of the Siberian Ice March. Killed on January 4, 1922 near Olgokhta.

This is how the events of those years were shown by their direct participant A. G. Efimov...
IZHEVTS AND VOTKINS
Workers of some factories near the Urals took a large part in the fight against the Bolsheviks on the Eastern Front. Together they rebelled against the oppression and bullying of the authorities, which called themselves “workers and peasants.” The working formations were distinguished by their strong cohesion and outstanding resilience in battle. The greatest fame was earned by the Izhevsk and Votkinsk workers, whose uprising in the fall of 1918 dealt a heavy blow to the Bolsheviks and diverted significant forces from other sectors of the front. Subsequently, the rebel workers joined the general tide of the struggle.
The residents of Izhevsk and Votkinsk wrote many bright and beautiful pages into the history of the Civil War with their exploits. They poured their blood abundantly along the long path from their native factories to the shores of the Pacific Ocean.
Those whom fate spared in the battles did not submit to the power of the Soviets and went into exile. In foreign lands, they carefully preserve the memory of the days spent in the struggle for the happiness of their native country, and sacredly honor the memory of their fallen brothers.
This essay gives a brief history of the uprising and struggle of the Izhevsk and Votkinsk people against the enslavers of the Russian people.
Izhevsk plant
The founder of the plant was master Deryabin, who built a small ironworks in 1752, from which over the years a huge arms factory grew. There is a monument to Master Deryabin on the shore of Zavodskoye Lake.
The plant is located among forests on the Izh River in the Sarapul district of the Vyatka province, 40 versts from the Kama River. In 1774, the plant was destroyed by Pugachev, but after the rebellion was pacified, it was restored.
In 1807, guns began to be produced at the factory. Since 1809, it came under the jurisdiction of the military department. In some years, the manufacture of guns was handed over to private entrepreneurs. Needle guns were made by Captain Bilderling, and Captain Stranderskiöld began making “berdan guns”.
Since 1873, the plant began to produce different types of steel for gun barrels and parts and for making tools. The plant turned into a dual one - weapons and steel - and began to expand rapidly. In 1884 it came under the jurisdiction of the Main Artillery Directorate.
To ensure its operation, the plant had a land plot of 130 thousand dessiatines, of which 120,000 dessiatines were forests. The plant ran on wood fuel.
Before World War I, the plant produced 150,000 rifles per year for the army and barrels for all other rifle factories, and in total up to half a million barrels annually. In addition, steel was produced for gun parts, for artillery shields, spring knurls, gun carriages, tool steel for artillery factories, etc.
Since 1904, the plant produced up to 200,000 small-caliber shells per year.
In addition to state-owned factories, several small private factories producing hunting rifles settled in Izhevsk (Evdokimova, Petrova, Berezina, etc.).
Before the war, up to 18,000 workers worked in Izhevsk, who, together with the families and non-working population of the plant, made up about 50,000 residents.
In addition, the peasants of the neighboring villages were closely associated with the plant, finding secondary income there in the sale of their products and getting work for the plant, especially in the procurement of forest materials and firewood, transporting them to the plant, and in transporting finished products to the railway and pier Galyans on the Kama River.
Factory workshops were on one side of the Izh River, worker settlements were on the other. The dam on the river formed a large lake, and the dam served as a connection between the factory and the residential area. The water energy of the lake drove the electrical installations of the plant.
Over more than a century and a half of existence, the life of the plant developed within the stable framework of a large state enterprise and flowed calmly and measuredly, like the flow of high-water rivers on the great Russian plain. Many generations of workers changed, and often sons and grandsons worked in the same workshops and on the same machines and machines that their fathers and grandfathers worked on. The plant has produced many skilled craftsmen. They brought their improvements and enhancements to production, and the plant and workers were proud of their names.
The factory population, provided with permanent work, lived well and in abundance. Most working families had their own houses and plots of land with gardens, vegetable gardens and meadows. In addition to factory schools for specialists, Izhevsk had many primary and secondary schools for children of workers.
There were several churches. The beautiful, magnificent architecture of St. Michael's Cathedral, built with funds raised by the workers themselves, adorned the residential part of the plant. On major holidays, one could see workers in caftans of the old style in the cathedral and on the streets. These were craftsmen who received caftans by royal decree as a reward for excellent work and various merits. They were very proud of the Royal gift, and they themselves enjoyed great honor and respect from the rest of the population.
Young people loved to get together and walk through the streets singing and playing accordions. There were also fights between a group of guys from one street or area with the same group from a neighboring one. This was in the order of things, but it taught us to stick closer to our “friends” and not to forget about mutual assistance.
From generation to generation, the character and qualities of Izhevsk workers developed: hard work, independence of views, love for a strong family and social structure, attachment to their breadwinner-factory, resilience of spiritual qualities, a warm Russian heart, not inclined to tolerate injustice and insult, and a willingness to give everything , not excluding his life, for his native country and a just cause.
War and revolution
The World War, which broke out in 1914, brought many changes to the life of the plant. Some of the workers were drafted into the army, and many of them gave their lives for their Motherland.
Instead of those who had gone to the front, workers from Moscow, Petrograd and other industrial centers began to arrive for the ever-increasing production of rifles and steel products. The number of new workers grew, and by the beginning of the revolution the number of workers at the plant reached 27,000, including several hundred women. Counting the peasants who worked in the forest and in transportation, up to 40,000 people worked at the plant and for the plant.
Among the new arrivals there were a significant number of supporters of various varieties of extreme teachings. As elsewhere, they carried out treacherous work to destroy old Russia and prepared to seize power, taking advantage of the time of war. And they achieved their goal. A revolution broke out and the front collapsed.
Izhevsk residents, drafted into the army, began to return home. They hoped to return to their usual work at the factory, but aliens took their places. In addition, due to the devastation that began, there was less work. The resulting Bolshevik committees, entirely made up of newcomers, greeted those returning from the front with great hostility, just as they were hostile to all the order at the factory and to the private life of the workers with its “bourgeois” way of life.
A “council” of workers was elected twice, and the workers defeated the non-partisans and moderates. Both times followed the dispersal of the “soviets” and the arrests of prominent representatives of the population disliked by the Bolsheviks. The local red ruling head deprived the workers who arrived from the front from all the rights and benefits they had earned and deserved at the factory and at the front. “Sign up for the party and do what the commissars order you, or wait in line to be accused of counter-revolution, to be arrested and subjected to torture and death in the basements of the security officers” - this was the meaning of the “conquests of the revolution” prepared for the defenders of the Motherland who returned home.
But the returning soldier-workers did not want to join the Bolshevik Party. Both at the front and here at home, they quickly learned the criminal, predatory nature of the new government and began to resist its persecution, tyranny and oppression. They created the “Union of Front-line Soldiers” - the board in Semenov’s house on Kazanskaya Street. The Union's task is to protect the economic interests of former factory workers who returned from the front. The charter was not approved by the Bolshevik leaders, since it did not say anything about support for Soviet power.
Life became harder and harder. Basic necessities began to disappear. Free trade was prohibited. A card system was introduced, according to which the commissars and their henchmen received everything in abundance, and the workers received crumbs. Searches began, they took away gold, silver, money, ransacking all the household belongings, turning out the floorboards, some of them three times. A grain monopoly was being prepared. The goal is to screw the worker and force him to fulfill all the whims of the Soviet government, since there could be no famine in the Vyatka province. The Votyak peasants accumulated huge stacks of bread over the years, and their reserves were inexhaustible.
On August 5 or 6, the first clash with the Bolsheviks took place at the bazaar. Stopping the private trade in bread, they sent mounted police to disperse the grain traders. The latter had steelyards for weighing out bread. The traders attacked the policemen, pulled them off their horses and beat them with steelyards. The crowd at the bazaar helped the traders beat the police.
Meeting resistance, the advisers intensified persecution and reprisals. Arrests of merchants, artisans, etc. were made. Several of the merchants were shot to intimidate the population. Of the working foremen, the innocent Krugovykh was killed. The turner Sosulin, beloved by the workers, was killed. He boldly spoke at meetings against the Bolsheviks, their oppression and atrocities. Returning from one of the meetings, he was shot from around the corner. Many, warned of another reprisal, fled from the plant, finding refuge in the surrounding villages or in deep forests, in dugouts. Their wives secretly brought them food and reported on the situation at the factory and events outside it.
And events at the plant and in Russia took their course. The crimson clouds of the bloody Civil War began to cloud the sky of their native country and approach Izhevsk. For a long time there had been information about uprisings and the fight against the Bolsheviks in the south of Russia, in the Orenburg steppes, in the Urals, in Siberia... Finally, the fight against the Reds began to spread along the Volga and came close when the Bolsheviks fled from Kazan on August 6.
The capture of Kazan by Kappel's detachment and the Czechs greatly alarmed the Bolsheviks. Their Eastern Front was cut into two parts in the center. The leaders of the Bolsheviks in Izhevsk received orders to immediately mobilize the workers and move them to Kazan. Early in the morning of August 7, they called a meeting and, shouting about saving the gains of the revolution, demanded that the workers obey the order and go to the front.
The Union of Front-line Soldiers was ready for this and had a pre-developed plan. The rest of the workers joined the front-line soldiers and supported them. Immediately, the Bolshevik leaders were presented with 10-point demands, of which the most important: 1) to conscript everyone from 18 to 30 (40) years of age; 2) arm and uniform the factory and send everyone out together; 3) provide for families; 4) guard the plant and dam with workers, etc.
The commissioners sensed a conspiracy. Their answers: 1) they do not hope to cope with the mobilization and call for 4-5 terms; 2) they cannot arm them - there are only 300 rifles, the rest will be issued at the front; 3) families will be taken care of; 4) the dam is guarded reliably by Red Army soldiers, etc.
- If that’s the case, we won’t go! Down with the Soviets! - shouts were heard from the crowd of workers.
The Bolsheviks hastened to close the meeting, but the workers did not disperse. The Chairman of the Union of Front-line Soldiers suggested moving to the Union headquarters on Kazanskaya Street, and the workers marched there harmoniously, singing, and continued to discuss the demands of their advisers.
Thus began an open rebellion against the red power of the Izhevsk workers, so far without a bloody clash. But it didn’t take long to arrive. In the evening, news spread that Soldatov and many members of the Union of Front-line Soldiers had been arrested.
Early in the morning of August 8, the horn sounded. This factory whistle was very powerful, and its roar could be heard 40 miles from the factory. The workers rushed, according to a pre-agreed plan, to the sighting workshop, where there were rifles and cartridges. They disarmed the confused guards from the captured Austrians, divided the found stock of cartridges - some received 5-15, others got nothing.
The Reds are dispersing crowds on the streets, prohibiting gatherings, and threatening to shoot them. On the Nagornaya part, where the Red Army barracks were located, shots were heard. The tension was growing. But then armed workers appeared at the dam. The dashing non-commissioned officer Oskolkov, who came from the front, rushed forward and fired the first shot at the Red outpost blocking the road. The battle has begun. Another detachment of workers moved around the Long Bridge. The whole plant stood up.
Some had rifles hidden. But there were few weapons, and few could arm themselves. The Reds had more than 700 armed forces: a company of Red Army soldiers, two batteries, 100 foot and 20 mounted policemen and several “food” detachments for beating bread.
The battle broke up into separate outbreaks. Both sides fought fiercely. Around midnight, the entire plant was cleared of the Reds, who suffered heavy losses and fled in different directions.
At night the enemy fled, and early in the morning of August 9, friendly work began to organize the defense. It was clear to everyone that the “worker-peasant” government would try to stifle this explosion of workers’ anger as quickly as possible.
The struggle ahead was stubborn and fierce, not for life, but for death. Time was precious; it was necessary to immediately develop leadership of military operations and organize the armed forces. The assembled front-line soldiers chose a defense headquarters consisting of three persons - captains Tsyganov and Soldatov and lieutenant Zebziev.
Command of the armed forces was offered to Colonel Fedichkin, the only combat personnel officer who found himself at the plant. A rifleman of the 13th Turkestan Regiment, he gained extensive combat experience on the Caucasian Front and was awarded many military awards, including the Order of St. George, 4th degree. He began his military service as a young officer during the Japanese War.
The head of the school of gunsmiths, Colonel Sorochinsky, organized a commissariat. Retired gendarme colonel Vlasov was called to headquarters. Other peacetime officers who made up the peaceful senior artillery technical staff avoided helping the rebels. The direct conduct of hostilities fell on non-commissioned officers and wartime officers, who were not finished off by the war and the “great bloodless one.” Most of them were factory workers and technicians before the war.
The most experienced of them were appointed commanders of “fronts” and company commanders. “Fronts” were the directions from which the enemy threatened - Kazansky, Northern, Kalyansky (pier on the Kama River), Agryzsky (railway station south of Izhevsk), etc. The detachment operating in this direction was “Fronts”. front,” consisted of several companies. In quiet times, the companies took turns guarding, and everyone gathered when alerted.
In the first battles, only a detachment (company) of artillery technicians and a detachment of front-line soldiers participated. As the Reds' pressure intensified, an increasing number of companies were organized, the number of which reached 50, with an average strength of 100 bayonets, sometimes (on the Northern Front) up to 250 bayonets.
The companies had numbers, and some of them had names, indicating the composition of the company. There were companies: “Technical” - from the plant’s technicians, who acted excellently under the command of their energetic commander, Captain Kurakin; there were “peasant” companies, the composition of which was predominantly or entirely composed of peasants; later a company of the “Constituent Assembly” was formed; The 30th company was called “Lesnaya”, apparently formed from foresters, and this company was commanded by a forester, Lieutenant Lesin, outstanding for his courage and ability to carry out deep reconnaissance in the Red areas, which provided complete data on the strength and location of the enemy.
The Izhevsk plant began to live the life of a “military camp.” The workers fought on the fronts, served as guards, and worked at the machines. The production of rifles, which had fallen to 600 pieces per day under the Bolsheviks, rose to 2500. The entire population took part in the defense of the plant - women fed the soldiers at the front, dug trenches, worked at the plant; teenagers also dug trenches, stuffed machine gun belts, and did a lot of other work on their own...
The fighting began the very next day after the uprising. On the morning of August 9 from the Kazanskaya railway line. They warned that a detachment of Reds was being sent to the plant by train to suppress the uprising. Colonel Fedichkin immediately assembled a detachment of 300 front-line soldiers and set out to meet them. At 5 versts the Red train was met. Quickly turning around, the Izhevsk residents surrounded the train from both sides. The Reds, who tried to jump out of the cars, fell immediately under the bullets of the front-line soldiers. Colonel Fedichkin invited them to surrender, which they hastened to do in the amount of 300 people.
On August 14, the Bolsheviks launched an offensive from two sides: again from Kazan and from the Galyana pier. From Kazan, the Reds sent a detachment in two trains, with a force of two and a half thousand. They are met by the same small detachment of front-line soldiers of 300 people. 6 versts from the plant, the Izhevsk residents dismantled the path, and they themselves positioned themselves sheltered on the sides in the bushes.
The leading train stopped in front of the dismantled place. Due to the large number of Reds, the Izhevsk residents did not reveal themselves and shot them from the bushes. The Reds hung white flags and surrendered. The Izhevsk people stopped firing, and at that moment 40 Reds rushed to run into the forest. All of them were overfished and turned out to be members of the Izhevsk Bolshevik leader, who terrorized the population of the plant and disappeared after the uprising. They were tied up and, after correcting the route, on their own trains, separately from the rest of the prisoners, they were sent to Izhevsk to receive the proper “reward.”
On that day, a small detachment of Reds, 200 on foot and 50 on horseback with four machine guns, was advancing along the highway from the Galyana pier. The defense headquarters sent a company of artillery technicians against them under the command of Captain Kurakin. The Reds fled.
Battles near Izhevsk August 17-19
The first battles of the rebel workers were successful for them, but indicated that the red government would not stop at any measures to crush the rebels. Indeed, on August 17, the enemy again launched an offensive from the direction of Kazan and from the city of Sarapul through the Galyana pier.
Expecting a new offensive from Kazan, the Izhevsk people, 12 versts from the plant, chose a good position on hilly and bush-covered terrain, dug and skillfully camouflaged trenches, dug communication passages, set up observation posts, and measured exact distances.
A permanent garrison of 800 soldiers was placed at the position under the command of Lieutenant Zebziev. 6 versts in front of the position, the railway track was destroyed to prevent enemy armored trains from approaching the position.
On the morning of August 17, a red detachment of 2,000 infantry, 200 cavalry, with 8 guns and several dozen machine guns reached the destroyed area and began to unload. A horse patrol was sent towards Izhevsk. Moving along a dirt road that ran next to the railroad track, the scouts drove past the Izhevsk residents without finding them. Moving further, they reached a hillock from which the plant was visible. There was no traffic anywhere on the road. The patrol returned and reported the absence of the “enemy.”
The Reds, in a marching column, without proper security, moved towards Izhevsk. The Izhevsk soldiers allowed them close to the position and here they covered the column with machine-gun fire from their only machine gun and cross-fire from rifles on both sides of the road. The unexpected appearance of the enemy caused general panic. Unfired peasant horses, who were in large numbers in the Red convoy, rushed back or to the side, into the forest, and upset the ranks of the column. A disorderly retreat began. The Izhevsk residents pursued the enemy for 6 miles, capturing various abandoned equipment and property and many prisoners.

On this day, the offensive of large Red forces began from the direction of Galyan. This time they collected everything combat-ready from their 2nd Army and sent about 6,000 soldiers with 8 3-inch guns, 2 field howitzers and 32 machine guns to Izhevsk. The detachment included a significant number of communists and Latvians and Magyars loyal to the Reds. The detachment was commanded by the experienced and cautious Bolshevik Antonov.
Several dozen artillery technicians under the command of Captain Kurakin blocked their way. Antonov began to surround them, but they disappeared into the forest. Night has come. Antonov was afraid to enter the forest clearing along which the highway to Izhevsk went, and stopped for the night in the village of Zavyalovo.
At night, Kurakin went to the factory, took several pounds of gunpowder and returned to the forest. At 6-7 versts from Izhevsk, a bridge explosion was prepared and two demolition men from Kurakin’s detachment were left behind. One of them, Vladimir Aksenov, graduated from the Votkinsk Secondary Technical School, the surname of the second has not been preserved.
In the afternoon of August 18, Antonov’s column approached Izhevsk 6 versts and began to cross the bridge. There was an explosion and 200 Reds were thrown into the air. Panic arose, which was difficult to stop. But the demolition heroes were discovered and immediately shot.
Having restored order, the Reds rolled out their cannons and began shelling Izhevsk. The horn sounded. It buzzed non-stop. Workers flocked from everywhere, formed front-line soldiers into companies and marched towards the enemy. At the highway, at the entrance to the forest, Colonel Fedichkin met those approaching and directed them into the forest on both sides of the highway clearing. He decided to surround the Reds from all sides and destroy the entire detachment.
Under the command of Captain Tsyganov, the Izhevsk people spread through the forest, bypassing the enemy’s left flank; Captain Perevalov went around the right flank and had the task of also going to the rear of the red detachment; Captain Terentyev acted from the front. The companies that arrived later were sent to reinforce those that had left earlier. The old forest hid all the movements of the Izhevsk residents. When the hitherto invisible enemy appeared from all sides, the Reds developed furious fire. Izhevsk residents lay down in the forest or climbed trees, answering rarely but accurately.
Night found both sides in occupied positions, and the firefight gradually died down. Dawn was approaching. The chains of Reds stretched along the highway lay helplessly in front of the two walls of the dark forest. A mighty whistle barked. There was a loud “Hurray!”, and a brutal bayonet attack ended the existence of the red detachment. The Izhevsk people captured all the guns and machine guns in full working order, and a large convoy of Reds. Antonov managed to escape with a small group of his subordinates.
The population of Izhevsk was anxiously awaiting the outcome for the third day. The good news spreads quickly - a complete, brilliant victory. Izhevsk greets the return of its heroes with bells and a religious procession. There are tears in everyone's eyes, prayers and greetings to the winners on their lips. The cathedral choir sings thanksgiving to the Almighty.
Uprising at the Votkinsk plant
On that day, August 17, when the Reds launched an attack on the Izhevsk people from both sides, intending to crush their resistance, a new blow awaited them - the Votkinsk uprising.
The situation in Votkinsk under the yoke of Bolshevik power was the same as in Izhevsk. The same persecution by the commissars - searches, arrests, torture in the Cheka and, as in Izhevsk, special attention to the defenders of the Motherland who returned from the war, who organized the Union of Front-line Soldiers. But the Votkinsk people had very few weapons. Having agreed with the Izhevsk residents, the Votkinsk residents prepared to march.
The union of front-line soldiers, about 180 people, under the command of non-commissioned officer Koryakov, secretly got out of the plant and headed to Izhevsk to get weapons. Having received weapons, a detachment of Votkinsk front-line soldiers and the 15th company of Izhevsk residents approached the plant on the morning of August 17 and with a quick blow overthrew the detachments of Red sailors and Red Guards. The Chairman of the Council managed to escape, but his guards were captured almost entirely. The population, embittered against the Soviet regime, did not give them the opportunity to escape.
The battle ended, and the joyful ringing of bells was heard from all the churches. Residents of Votkinsk, as if on Easter, joyfully hugged and greeted each other. Almost the entire population of the plant gathered for the funeral of the liberators killed in battle. At the open graves, people cried and swore an oath to defend their newly won freedom and homeland until their last breath. This is how one of the Votkinsk residents remembers this day, who participated in the Izhevsk uprising, then returned to his home plant and was then appointed commander of the 4th Votkinsk Regiment.
After the end of the battle, only a few Reds managed to escape, mainly towards the station. Cap of the Perm Railway. A large number of fleeing Bolsheviks were caught. One of the front-line soldiers - M.I. Agafonov - captured the fleeing mounted policeman, hurried him and, without wasting time, began to gather former cavalrymen, laying the foundation for the formation of Votkinsk cavalry units. This valiant and energetic warrior died in one of the battles while defending the plant.
As in Izhevsk, the Votkinsk residents energetically began organizing the armed forces. The pilot Captain Nilov was placed at the head of the command. Captain Yuryev was chosen as chief of staff. These two officers were the only career officers of the old army who were in Votkinsk. Captain Nilov turned out to be an unsuccessful commander, and his actions caused displeasure. He showed little energy in organizing the fight against the Bolsheviks and was more engaged in politics in the spirit of deepening the revolution according to Kerensky’s recipes, rather than saving the Motherland.
At a general meeting of senior command staff and representatives of public organizations, Cap. Yuryev. Captain Yuriev was an energetic organizer and, possessing the talent of a good speaker, he knew how to attract everyone to united work, encourage them in failures and, during difficult battles, instill confidence in success in the ranks of Votkinsk residents. He enjoyed great trust and love among the Votkinsk people.
The annexation of the Votkinsk plant, with its large population, approximately equal to the population of Izhevsk, doubled the ranks of the rebels. An energetic struggle began between two huge Russian factories and the peasants who joined them against the bloody Bolshevik government, a struggle full of exploits, self-sacrifice and love for the Motherland. If the great Russian composer P.I., born in Votkinsk, Tchaikovsky could have witnessed this struggle, then another overture would have been added to his enchanting musical works.
In this work, to the familiar motifs of the “Overture of the 12th year” - to the chimes of church bells - would be added the noise of factory machines, interrupted by the roar of factory whistles and the rolling of machine gun fire, and among the sounds of the alien “Marseillaise”, which became the anthem of Russian revolutionaries, one could would like to hear the motives of Magyar war songs sung on the approaches to the besieged factories by the fierce mercenaries of the Red International.
Joining the rebel peasants
The uprising at the Izhevsk and Votkinsk factories spread among peasants in the districts of Sarapul, Malmyzh, Urzhum, and partly also in Nolinsky, Glazov and Okhansky. An independent uprising under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Molchanov broke out and grew in Yelabuga district. The entire southern part of the Vyatka province rose up against red oppression.
The villages and villages closest to the factories immediately supported the rebellious workers, as they were closely connected with them by common interests: work, selling their products, family ties... But besides this, the peasants had their own scores to settle with the Bolshevik government. The Vyatka province, rich in bread and various agricultural products, attracted the attention of the red rulers of the country. Numerous “food” detachments were sent here to take bread, livestock and other products from the peasants to feed large starving cities and the growing Red Army.
These detachments, composed of the scum of city residents, criminals released from prison, “the beauty and pride of the revolution” - sailors and other rabble, taking food from the peasants, at the same time robbed them of money and everything valuable. Their “food” activities were accompanied by violence, beatings and often murders. After the defeat of Soviet power in the Izhevsk and Votkinsk factories, scattering in different directions, these detachments completely lost the signs of organized units and turned into gangs of marauders.
Peasants in areas further away from the rebel factories were looking for ways to get rid of the robbers and the Soviet government that sent them. They organized gatherings in forests and ravines and sent their representatives to Izhevsk with a request to give them weapons. In return, they pledged to supply the factories with food supplies. Colonel Fedichkin and the defense headquarters began to arm the peasants with rifles, lead the organization of their detachments, and gave them combat missions.
The uprising spread over a large area. The area of ​​the uprising reached 12-13 thousand square meters. versts with 700-800 thousand population. But on the maps of the red historical publications, the area of ​​the uprising occupies at least an area of ​​35,000 square meters. versts, stretching on the parallel of the city of Osa from the Kama River to the Vyatka River for more than 250 versts and from north to south for about 150 versts.
Directing military operations in such an area, covered with impenetrable forests and swamps, was, of course, difficult, but it was greatly facilitated by the highly developed telegraph and telephone network built in the Vyatka province even before the Great War. The Vyatka zemstvo was one of the most active in Russia - the construction of roads and telephone communications was very widespread, and the school business was well developed.
According to some Izhevsk residents, at least 60,000 rifles were issued to peasant detachments; others think much more. Peasant formations significantly increased the strength of the rebel workers, but made it more difficult to supply ammunition. If the old stocks of materials at the Izhevsk plant could support the production of a large number of rifles, then the situation with cartridges was bad. At the Izhevsk plant their stock was insignificant. Cartridges, guns and machine guns were obtained mainly in battles from the Reds, sometimes in large quantities.
In this regard, the testimony of one participant is interesting. He reports that the 3rd Red Army, which defended Perm and was unable, shortly after the uprising, to allocate sufficient forces to secure the railway from Perm to Vyatka, provided only personnel for a few regiments. To replenish these regiments, mobilization was carried out in the northern districts of the Vyatka province and in the Perm province.
These regiments worked well for the benefit of the rebels: after meeting the enemy, they hastily retreated or scattered, leaving behind their weapons and ammunition. They were again collected and armed, and they repeated the same thing again, and so on several times, until more reliable units began to arrive from the center of the country to replace the local population who did not want to fight for Soviet power.
Defeat of the 2nd Red Army
In the battle near Izhevsk on August 17-19, Izhevsk destroyed the most combat-ready units of the 2nd Red Army. It was necessary to complete the complete defeat of this army by destroying the remnants of their detachments and rear institutions grouped near the city of Sarapul. The headquarters of the 2nd Army was also here.
Colonel Fedichkin sent captain Kurakin to clear the road to the Galyana pier from the red ones. After capturing the pier, the same detachment headed for the city of Sarapul and cleared it of the enemy at the end of August.
The Izhevsk people also crossed to the left bank of the Kama and occupied the village of Ershovka, the Kambarsky plant and some other points, where they set up small garrisons. Communication between the 2nd and 3rd armies was interrupted. The defeat of the combat units of the 2nd Red Army resulted in the complete collapse of the entire army.
The Red historian describes how “the forces remaining in Sarapul, which were joined by those retreating from Yelabuga, as well as the detachments that broke through to Sarapul, could not resist the onslaught of the Czechoslovaks (there were no Czechoslovaks here at all. - A.E.) and broke out of the hands of control; Part of these detachments rushed to the Kama and Vyatka rivers, captured steamers and, loading them with the loot along the road, quickly sailed up the river. Vyatka, drinking and spreading the most fantastic and absurd rumors along the way; those who did not manage to board the ships continued to retreat in disarray along the banks of the rivers and along the Yekaterinburg railway line. roads to Vyatskie Polyany”... The alarm was sounded in the center and new Red commanders and commissars were urgently sent. They headed to the city of Vyatka, where they were in a hurry “... to counter the further spread of White Guard gangs, immediately take measures to strengthen the city of Kotelnich and ensure the railway bridge there from capture and explosion, as well as build trenches near the villages of Medvedskoye and Petrovskoye along the river. Vyatka”...
From Izhevsk to the city of Kotelnich the direct distance is 300 versts, and to the indicated villages 200 versts. The Reds' "immediate measures" indicated how threatened they felt from the further spread of the uprising. The newly appointed commanders and commissars set off from the city of Vyatka on a steamship to look for the scattered army: “The further the steamer went down, the more often they began to come across passenger steamships, tugs with barges, and even the remnants of a combat river flotilla stretching in the wake columns. All this was receding; The Red Army soldiers and sailors on these ships represented a completely disintegrated element, behaved defiantly, and did not want to carry out any orders; On the way they robbed villages and drank. No one was able to stop these panicky people, although attempts were made to do so... From one of the steamships we met, we managed to learn that the field headquarters was located in Malmyzh...”
At the field headquarters, the newly arrived commanders found the old command and political composition in the following form: “All these persons made a depressing impression; as a result of a series of failures and retreats, they were exhausted, deprived of all energy and desire to work; Everyone was in a depressed mood. It was not possible to obtain any valuable and detailed information about the actions of his troops and about the enemy from the temporary commander. Communication was only with the detachments closest to the headquarters, since there were no means of communication with more distant ones. Everything seen led to the conclusion that, in essence, no army exists and that the 2nd Army needs to be built anew...”
Such is the evidence of the Reds themselves - the defeat of their forces near Izhevsk and in subsequent battles put their entire 2nd Army out of action.
Small groups of Reds, unable to escape in time, wandered in the forests south of the Kazan-Sarapul railway. According to red information, south of the station. Agryz was hiding a detachment of 2000 people under the command of Chevyrev. The presence of these Red groups at a relatively close distance from the rebel factories prevented the establishment of reliable communications with other anti-Bolshevik forces.
Preparing for a decisive confrontation
The month of September passed in the expansion of the area of ​​the uprising; There were clashes between advanced units, and both sides were preparing for decisive battles. Izhevsk and Votkinsk residents, liberating the nearest areas from the scattered Red gangs and from the “food” detachments, advanced in all directions.
In the west, the Izhevsk people and the peasants who joined them approached the Vyatka River in the area of ​​​​the cities of Malmyzh and Urzhum. In the north, the Vyatka-Perm railway was under the threat of the rebels, where the Izhevsk people came close to the city of Glazov, and the Votkinsk people threatened to capture the station. Caps. In the east, the Votkinsk people were not far from the city of Okhansk, at one time occupying the large village of Sosnovskoye, and on the left bank of the Kama they fought near the city of Osa. Both cities are in the Perm province. To the east of their plant, the Votkinsk people beyond the Kama occupied some points; where clashes took place with the left flank of the main front of the 3rd Red Army (5th Ural Division of the Red Army).
To the south of the factories, as was said earlier, the city of Sarapul was taken, and further to the west on the Kazan-Ekaterinburg railway line, the Izhevsk people ousted the Reds from the station. Agryz, from which there was a branch to Izhevsk and Votkinsk. Attempts were also made to enter into contact with other anti-Bolshevik armies to coordinate actions and obtain missing supplies; on the other hand, to send excess rifles to where they were needed.
Fire supplies were very small. The shells and cartridges available at the plant in Izhevsk and captured in battle from the Reds were melting, and it was not possible to organize their manufacture in sufficient quantities due to the lack of gunpowder, capsules and other materials. A number of rifle cartridges were made from old cartridges collected from the trenches with red wire copper bullets.
When Kazan was still in white hands, three Izhevsk residents got there through the red disposition and asked for help by sending military supplies. But the Kazan people were going through difficult days and could not help. Later, the same energetic captain Kurakin with a small detachment reached Samara, where he received 10,000 three-inch shells, 60 pounds of explosives, money and various other supplies. He could only bring all this to the city of Birsk. Making his way through the Reds' location, he returned to Izhevsk, delivering only money and telephones.
Only the Volga flotilla of Admiral Stark and Captain 2nd Rank Fedosev, which reached Sarapul after the fall of Kazan, gave the Izhevsk people one 37-mm cannon with 50 shells, 40,000 rifle cartridges, 30 pounds of tolu, 100 capsules for hand grenades and 50 saddles. What insignificant help this was can be judged by the fact that Izhevsk residents issued at least 60,000 rifles to arm the rebel peasants, and according to some information, much more. The number of cartridges received from the flotilla was not enough, even one per rifle.
Intensified preparations were underway in the red camp to suppress the uprising of Izhevsk and Votkinsk residents. The defeat, flight and complete collapse of the 2nd Red Army and the obvious sympathy and assistance of the peasants to the rebel workers made the uprising extremely dangerous for the Red government. The unreliability of those mobilized from the local population forced troops to be sent from the center of the country. Perseverance in military clashes required the sending of especially persistent units made up of communists, from “cheka” detachments, from Latvians and Chinese... The detachments of mercenary foreigners in their cruelty did not differ from home-grown communists, and the struggle took on a ferocious, bloody character with heavy losses from both sides.
Izhevsk residents who were on the “Northern” Front recalled how they had to deal with some kind of international regiment, in which all the soldiers were dressed in red shirts. Heavily intoxicated, they, singing “The Internationale,” which turned into a wild roar as they approached, rushed at their enemy, suffered heavy losses, but repeated the attacks several times.
The restored 2nd Red Army was entrusted with the task of suppressing the uprising. The 3rd Army helped it in the north, assigning strong detachments to protect the Vyatka-Perm railway, and the 5th Ural Division, located in the area of ​​​​the city of Osa, was assigned to protect the city of Perm from the south. With the arrival of new commanders, the 2nd Army began to heal its wounds. From broken, demoralized and disbanded detachments and groups, new command and political personnel began to form battalions, regiments and divisions.
The composition of the formations is worth dwelling on. Using the same source (Civil War, vol. 1), we find: “The 50th, 51st and 52nd marching companies of the Moscow food detachment are reduced to a battalion; detachments of the Elabuga and Menzelin groups make up the 2nd battalion; units vol. Anisimova and Nikulina make up the 3rd battalion. All three battalions are consolidated into the 1st consolidated regiment.” The 2nd consolidated regiment is formed from the same marching companies and random detachments. The third regiment in the 1st consolidated division thus formed includes the 1st Smolensk Regiment. The regiments are supplied with artillery. For example, the second consolidated regiment is assigned 2 guns from the Moscow food detachment and 3 guns from a naval battery. The composition of the Moscow food detachment of more than 50 companies with artillery, who descended on the peasants of the Vyatka province to “collect” grain, explains a lot in the course of the events described here. The cannons collected the bread. In addition to the 1st consolidated division, the Vyatka division was temporarily attached to the 2nd Army.
After the fall of Kazan on September 9, the Reds freed up new forces, and Azin’s detachment arrived to strengthen the 2nd Army. This detachment was reinforced by other units and reorganized into the 2nd consolidated division, consisting of three infantry regiments, one cavalry and an artillery brigade. At the end of September, Raskolnikov’s red Volga flotilla came to the aid of the 2nd Army. They had armored trains on the railway.
In mid-October, companies of emergency commissions are sent to this army: Moscow, Tambov, Smolensk-Ryazan, Saratov and Nizhny Novgorod. The 6th consolidated regiment is formed from these security officers. Finally, already formed regiments arrive for reinforcement: Karelian, Penza and Muslim.
Reforming and organizing the 2nd Army, strengthening it with reliable units, the red government supplies it with large combat reserves. Gradually, the superiority of forces and advantages in material supplies are passing to the side of the Reds.
The nature of the struggle
In the absence of documents and sufficiently complete testimony from the participants, it is possible to reconstruct the course of the struggle of the rebel workers and peasants with the ever-increasing forces of the Reds only in the most general terms.
Personal impressions and stories of the participants in these events provide a lot of valuable data about the ever-increasing tenacity and fierceness of the fighting, which began at the end of September and in October turned into almost daily clashes in all directions. But time, place and other important information are usually not indicated - they are forgotten.
The records that some kept were lost in subsequent campaigns. The same fate befell orders and other documents of the units. The descriptions of the two battles offered here, as being quite complete, can give an idea of ​​the nature of the fighting.
In the last days of September, information was received that a large red detachment was moving towards the city of Sarapul from the direction of the city of Ufa. The Votkinsk people had to allocate part of their forces to defend the city of Sarapul.
The enemy who was not expected from this direction turned out to be Blucher’s detachment, about 6 thousand fighters, which was thrown back by Ataman Dutov from the Orenburg region to the north, passed through the Ufa area east of this city and was now looking for a convenient point to break into the red location.
Blucher was able to safely pass through the rear of the white front, since there were no significant reserves here. All forces were either at the front or formed in the rear. Blucher was not intimidated by small enemy detachments. At overnight camps, Blucher used a successful technique, positioning his forces in a triangle, in the corners of which combat units were placed, and convoys inside. When an attack was made on one of the detachment's locations, the garrison of that point repelled the attack, while others sent units to help in order to encircle the enemy from the flanks and rear. The small detachments of whites who met Blucher had to retreat so as not to be surrounded and destroyed. Using these tactics and without encountering large white forces, Blucher successfully advanced north.
Having received information about the movement of Blucher’s detachment to Sarapul and not having reserves at hand, the commander of the Votkinsk army, Captain Yuryev, called the commander of the newly formed battalion, Lieutenant Bolonkin, a valiant and energetic military officer, and sent him with the battalion to the disposal of the Sarapul People’s Army, cornet Prince Ukhtomsky.
The Sarapul army began to organize itself after the capture of the city by Izhevsk on August 31, but consisted only of a headquarters and did not have combat units. Within 24 hours, Lieutenant Bolonkin's battalion was transferred to the city of Sarapul. Here the battalion commander received an order to move to the Mikhailovsky plant, located across the Kama River, and impede the enemy’s movement towards the city of Sarapul.
Having crossed the Kama River, the battalion arrived at the indicated plant, where the partisan detachment of warrant officer Presnov was located (later the 15th Mikhailovsky Regiment of the 4th Ufa Division). Having found out that Blucher was located 50-60 versts northeast of the Mikhailovsky plant, Lieutenant Bolonkin set out towards the enemy and attacked the Reds in the village of Zapunovo at night. In the village there were Magyars and Kashirin’s Red Cossacks, hardened in campaigns and battles against Ataman Dutov for several months.
The battle was distinguished by great tenacity, although it was not long. The Votkinsk people fiercely attacked the Reds and, after a hot battle inside the village, forced them to hastily retreat, abandoning 200 carts with military equipment. Blucher did not dare to get involved in a further battle with a daring enemy, did not resort to his favorite technique - encirclement from the flanks - and, probably, did not imagine that against his 6,000-strong detachment there was only one battalion of Votkinsk troops, many times weaker and just formed. Blucher's entire detachment began an immediate retreat to the north, where it soon reached the Red front line east of the city of Osa.
The Votkinsk people inflicted heavy losses on the “Blyukherites”, but they themselves suffered greatly - there were 83 killed alone. There was no pursuit of the Reds, who consisted of cavalry and infantry on carts and quickly left. The Votkinsk people had only a few mounted orderlies. After arriving in the area occupied by the Reds, Blucher's detachment was reorganized into the 30th division.
Votkinsk residents had to meet with an old acquaintance several times in the Ural Mountains and beyond the Urals. During this period of his activity, Blucher was unable to boast of great successes and move to the top of the Soviet commanders. He became famous later.
In the first half of October, under the pressure of the Reds, Izhevsk began to shorten their extended fronts and retreat to positions closer to the plant. In the Glazov direction, they retreated to the south and stayed about 30 miles from the plant, repelling the onslaught of the Reds and launching a counter-offensive. The village of Yakshur-Badya and the small Zaimka, located not far to the south, with several courtyards, were occupied by large Red forces. Zaimka stood in a dense forest, not far from the road Izhevsk plant - the village of Yakshur-Badya.
The right group of the Northern Front received the task of defeating and driving back the enemy from Zaimka. The group commander, Second Lieutenant Vershinin, with a detachment of 3,000 soldiers, set out to complete the task. He sent one company to bypass both flanks, and with the main forces moved along the road, calculating the movement so that the outflanking companies had time to make their way through the old, impassable forest and strike from the flanks.
The bypass from the right flank was entrusted to a company that arrived from Izhevsk, consisting of 250 workers under the command of Warrant Officer X. There were no machine guns in the company. There were no guns in the entire group of Second Lieutenant Vershinin, since the shells ran out in October and the existing guns were sent to the factory. The company commander did not inspire confidence: pale, apparently sickly, he had, according to a battle participant, “the appearance of a doomed man.” Therefore, Second Lieutenant Vershinin appointed another officer to him, under the guise of a battalion commander. But he didn’t know this random officer either, and the task required the guidance of an experienced combat commander.
Second Lieutenant Vershinin also sends his assistant, Lieutenant Mikhailov, with the company. He knew the latter very well, since Mikhailov was the organizer and leader of a secret anti-Bolshevik group of officers in the city of Glazov. Vershinin was in Mikhailov’s group. Together with other officers of this organization, they were both captured, went to prison and from there made a very risky and daring escape.
Second Lieutenant Vershinin, a very young officer, had arrived in the area of ​​the uprising earlier and was given command of the right group of the Northern Front. Lieutenant Mikhailov, having made his way to the Izhevsk people later, ended up as an assistant to his accomplice in the secret organization and escape from the Bolsheviks. Sending Lieutenant Mikhailov to the bypass company, Vershinin was confident that success was guaranteed.
The company went deeper into the forest and took a direction with the expectation of reaching Zaimka on the right. The traffic was heavy - thickets of bushes and especially the trunks of huge fallen trees, often a yard in diameter, blocked the road. Based on the elapsed time, it turned out that Zaimka should be close. Not seeing her, they began to doubt whether they had taken too much to the right and passed by.
Suddenly, shots rang out from the red outpost. Lieutenant Mikhailov shouted “Hurray!”, and everyone rushed after him. The enemy outpost fled. Jumping over fallen trees, the Izhevsk residents pursued them, continuing to shout “Hurray!” Three times the Reds stopped and tried to delay the Izhevsk people by shooting, hiding behind tree trunks. But the Izhevsk people ran forward and drove the Reds further. In this way, the red outpost helped the bypass company find Zaimka.
Buildings appeared. There was a cleared space in front of them, about 70 steps in total. The company was greatly stretched out. Running through the forest and overcoming obstacles tired the weaker ones. With Lieutenant Mikhailov in front there were only about 20 soldiers and the “battalion commander”. The Reds opened machine-gun and rifle fire. The “battalion commander” was seriously wounded in the leg. He cannot run any further; there is an expression of annoyance on his face. Lieutenant Mikhailov ordered him to make his way back and find a paramedic. The enemy is confused. They are in a hurry to pick up two cannons and take them away. Mikhailov, scattering the fighters in a chain on a small hillock at the edge of the forest, ordered them to kill the horses. Left without horses, the Red artillerymen turned their guns on the Izhevsk people and opened wild fire with grapeshot. Due to the proximity of the distance, the shells exploded over the heads and behind those lying in the chain, hitting the stragglers who ran up.
The forest resounded with cannon fire. In the chain, it seemed that gunfire was happening from behind, behind those lying on the hill. From behind the black curtain of shrapnel smoke, individual fighters occasionally jumped out and joined the chain. It was impossible to move forward. Many were killed and wounded by grapeshot and pieces of trees smashed by shells. The difficult situation worsened even more when the Reds placed a machine gun on the right and opened longitudinal fire on the hillock behind which the soldiers were hiding. It seemed that everyone would be killed.
But to the left of Zaimka a group of a hundred soldiers appeared from the forest and rushed at the Reds. After a short bayonet battle, the Reds fled, abandoning their guns. Unexpected help came from those who had fallen behind during the pursuit of the outpost and those who had gathered around the company commander. But he himself was not there. To the question: “Where is he?” - came the answer: “Killed on the offensive.” But that was not the case. It turned out that the ensign was overwhelmed by the noise of the shooting and refused to lead those gathered around him forward. The lagging behind Izhevsk residents were eager to help their own. There was no time to convince and persuade the company commander. Every moment was precious. Several bayonets ended the life of an unworthy commander.
A non-commissioned officer, a participant in the World War, took command. He immediately realized that the frantic fire of the Reds had delayed those in front and that it was necessary not to support them from the rear, but to hit the enemy from the flank. His resourcefulness saved the company from destruction. The company lost a third of its strength - 80 people were killed and wounded.
The stubbornly fighting Red detachment consisted of Latvians. The main forces of Second Lieutenant Vershinin’s group and the left outflanking company did not have time to take part in the battle. But the Reds opened fire on the column of the main forces following the road from the direction of the village of Yakshur-Badya.

The two battles, the description of which is given here from the words of the participants, are random in the general course of the struggle between the Izhevsk and Votkinsk residents. But they point to the extremely high fighting inspiration of those who rebelled against Bolshevik oppression - that inspiration that did not leave them during all three months of defending their homelands, and then in the four-year struggle in the Urals, Siberia, Transbaikalia and Primorye.
Surrounded by red
The capture of Kazan by the Reds on September 10 (the retreat of the Whites from Kazan began on September 9 in the evening) not only allowed them to significantly strengthen their broken and disheveled 2nd Army, but put it in an advantageous position of unhindered exit from the area of ​​the Vyatka River to the Kama and movement along it to the rear revolting factories.
Saturated with communists and reliable detachments of Magyars, Latvians and other mercenaries, the 2nd Red Army began a slow advance towards Izhevsk. From the center of their concentration near the village of Vyatskie Polyany (120 versts northeast of Kazan and 140 versts from Izhevsk), the Reds moved in two ways: along the Kazan-Yekaterinburg railway and along the Vyatka and Kama rivers to Sarapul.
By the end of September the Reds approached the station. Agryz, where the branch line to Izhevsk-Votkinsk comes from, and here the battles broke out, which lasted throughout October. Having descended on steamships along the Vyatka River and moving up the Kama River, the Reds captured the city of Sarapul in the first half of October. Our Volga flotilla shortly before this went into the Belaya River for the winter. This opened the way for Raskolnikov's red flotilla.
The enemy encirclement increasingly surrounded the rebel factories. Requests for help went unanswered. Replenishment of ammunition, almost exclusively captured, became more and more difficult. The shells were running out, and there was an insignificant amount of rifle cartridges. It was necessary to take into account the possibility of leaving the factories and look for ways to do this with the least losses.
On October 20, the commander of the Kama Army, Colonel Fedichkin, convened a meeting of senior army ranks and the local Committee of the Constituent Assembly, which represented the highest civilian authority. Colonel Fedichkin, explaining the current situation and the impossibility of counting on the timely arrival of help, proposed to begin the early evacuation of the wounded, women and children, as well as valuable property and a supply of rifles, to the eastern bank of the Kama, while this could be done in order and in conditions of sufficient security.
The Chairman of the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly, Evseev, did not agree with the prudent Colonel Fedichkin and called his proposal for evacuation cowardice. In response to this, Colonel Fedichkin submitted his resignation. After this meeting, the entire Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly disappeared. For two days they could not be found anywhere. Even his secretary A.P. those who escaped did not warn about where they were disappearing, and the secretary did not know where to look for them.
The reason for the disappearance of the entire committee, as it turned out, was the fear of arrest by Colonel Fedichkin. But the latter did not threaten anyone with any arrests. Not wanting to cause any disagreement and split the ranks of the defenders in these anxious and decisive days, Colonel Fedichkin, announcing his resignation, left Izhevsk and made his way to the city of Ufa at the disposal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Boldyrev.
In the “general’s house,” as the former house of the head of the Izhevsk plant was called, the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly was located on the second floor. The newspaper “Izhevsky Defender” was published on the ground floor. Every day everyone who was involved in the affairs in charge of the committee members, including suppliers to the army, who were waiting for urgent orders for various supplies, since all the amounts were in the hands of the committee, gathered at this house.
The disappearance of committee members could quickly spread through the population and cause anxiety and panic. Therefore, the employees in the committee offices and newspaper employees who were in the “general’s house” agreed to hide the flight of the “supreme power”. Volunteer M.T., who contributed to the newspaper during breaks from the fighting, stated that the committee could only escape to Votkinsk, and undertook to find him.
Taking a locomotive with two drivers and capturing 5 armed high school students as guards, since Red reconnaissance parties appeared in the 60-verst gap between the factories, M.T. at 8 o'clock in the evening I rushed to Votkinsk. There, in Tchaikovsky’s house, where the Votkinsk Defense Council met, M.T. found the escaped committee members. Having received the necessary information and orders, M.T. At night he returned to Izhevsk, reassuring the interested parties. Meanwhile, suppliers were told various lies about why they could not be accepted for their cases. But it became harder and harder to hide the truth,
In place of Colonel Fedichkin, Captain Yuriev was appointed commander of the Kama Army. Command of the Izhevsk units was transferred to Captain Zhuravlev, according to some, a very brave officer, but an inexperienced and stupid commander. It is interesting to note that during his short command - about a month - Captain Zhuravlev was not known to many Izhevsk residents, even among the senior commanders, and some had never even heard of him.
A few days after the flight, the calmed-down members of the Committee of the Constituent Assembly arrived in Izhevsk for a crowded meeting they had organized. The new army commander, Captain Yuryev, also came with them. At this meeting, Izhevsk residents heard fervent calls to save factories from being captured by the Reds and even calls for a march on Moscow. The eloquent speakers did not talk about whether the cartridges would be delivered or how to get to Moscow without them.

The closer the Reds got to the factories, the more stubborn and fierce the fighting became. The Reds pressed especially hard from the south. By the end of October, fighting from the area of ​​Art. Agryz moved 18 versts to Izhevsk. In the north, the Izhevsk and Votkinsk residents held the enemy at an average of 30 versts from the factories.
Every step was costly to the enemy. But the defenders of the factories also suffered heavy losses. The lack of cartridges was very sensitive; I had to resort to the bayonet more and more often and save ammo in every way for emergencies.
All the workers, according to the established procedure, no matter where they were, did not part with their rifles. No matter who did what work, the rifle was nearby. At the alarming roar of the factory whistle, everyone immediately ran to the assembly points of their companies. Orders came from headquarters, and the companies were quickly sent to the attacked points.
The captured Red Army soldiers showed that as soon as the commissars began to drive them forward, they anxiously awaited the roar of the mighty factory whistle. Hearing him, panic begins to grow in their ranks. They know that in an hour waves of workers will approach the battlefield and overwhelm them, and a bloody bayonet fight will begin.
According to volunteer M.T. (only initials), in Izhevsk alone, up to 20,000 workers took part in repelling enemy attacks when the Reds rushed to attack in large masses. No one tried to avoid the fight. Mutual adhesion and revenue were unusually high. If someone did not have time to join his company, he joined another.
One of the participants in the battle of the last day of defense of the plant on November 7 tells how the last reserve was collected. This was a consolidated company, which included everyone who still remained at the plant for various reasons, could not now get into their company or did not know where to look for it. The company was commanded by Colonel Vlasov, who enjoyed the love and trust of the Izhevsk residents as a brave and efficient officer. When the soldiers who had lost their companies learned that Vlasov was in command, they willingly joined this combined company. In total there were about 300 fighters.
The company went along Kazanskaya Street to the Izhevsk station, located one mile from the plant. Here she occupied trenches near the Tatar cemetery. The enemy was gathering in large numbers in the cemetery and to the left. Colonel Vlasov decides to prevent the Reds from concentrating and preparing for the assault and attack them now. He gives the order, and he himself, with a flag bearer and one soldier, is the first to jump out of the trench and rush to the cemetery. At the same time, volunteer M.T. with five fighters rushes to the left.
But the Reds already had machine guns ready, and their fire killed all those who jumped forward and forced the rest, who had risen to attack, to take cover in the trenches. Colonel Vlasov was seriously wounded, and with great difficulty he was pulled out from under fire. The volunteer narrator had a broken leg. He began to crawl towards the trench. Schoolgirl Popova, who worked as a nurse and was distinguished by her extraordinary courage, jumped out to him and wanted to bandage his wounded leg. The bullet wounded her in the forehead, and her face was covered in blood. The volunteer ordered her to run zigzag into the trench. He managed to crawl to the trench himself, where he was bandaged and sent to the rear.
After several persistent attacks, the Reds captured the station. She was left at 2 pm. Around the same time, other points lying in front of the plant were cleared, and the defenders retreated to their last positions at the outskirts of the plant. Tired of the fighting and shocked by the tenacity of the defense, the Reds did not feel confident of final success, stopped and gained strength for further action. They were inactive at night.
According to red information, the last days of the defense of Izhevsk are stated as follows: “The battles near Izhevsk on November 5, 6 and 7 reached great tension; Both sides fought with great tenacity, suffering heavy losses. These battles confirmed intelligence information that the enemy had dug trenches around the plant territory with communication passages to the rear and reinforced wire barriers. The troops are given the order to take Izhevsk on November 7 at any cost. On November 7, in the morning, artillery preparation for the attack and the construction of passages in the wire barriers began. The belief in success is so great that it was ordered to maintain a direct line with the Moscow Kremlin to immediately transmit a message about the fall of Izhevsk on the day when the anniversary of the October Revolution was celebrated. By 17 o'clock the troops were already at the barbed wire barriers and were preparing for the assault. The enemy fired wildly from guns, machine guns and rifles... On the right flank of the battle line, among other units, was the 2nd Muslim Regiment, which could not withstand the fire, faltered and shamefully fled from the battlefield, leaving the enemy with a battery, machine guns and other material Part. On the way of escape, the regimental convoy was plundered by the regiment's people, and the belongings of the command staff were stolen. The entire command staff in this regiment behaved in an exemplary manner. The 2nd Muslim Regiment was disbanded for its shameful and criminal behavior. At 7 p.m. 40 min. Izhevsk was taken by storm... The armored train “Free Russia” burst into the Izhevsk station and with its fire brought severe disorder into the ranks of the White Guards. The cavalry, following the infantry, burst into the city, on the streets of which fierce battles broke out.”
This description of the Red historian has significant inaccuracies. The Izhevsk residents did not have any serious wire barriers: the wire was not produced at the factory and there were no reserves of it. The defenders were unable to fire wildly from guns, machine guns and rifles due to a lack of ammunition. There were no battles on the streets of the city, the Reds did not dare to enter the city at night, and a premature “congratulatory” telegram about the capture of Izhevsk was sent to Moscow, which did not correspond to reality.
It should also be noted that the flight of the 2nd Muslim Regiment was not an isolated incident. The defenders turned the Reds into panicky flight many times, but their historian notes only one case, which is difficult to silence, since the battery was abandoned, the convoy was looted and the regiment was disbanded.
After clearing the station and other forward points in front of the plant, further resistance was put up by the Reds on the southern outskirts of the city. Here, with the onset of darkness, the battle died down. The Reds stopped, not daring to move further at night.
The three-month struggle for Izhevsk was coming to an end. The heroism and self-sacrifice of the rebels had to submit to the brute force of the Reds' numerical superiority and overwhelming firepower. An order was given to abandon the plant. Izhevsk residents - both fighters and most of their families - left their homes.
The wounded M.T. (the author of the work indicates this person only by initials) was transported along with another wounded man on a cart. He could hear the crying of women and children. He peered into the darkness. It was difficult to distinguish people, but a huge number of white spots could be seen moving. These were bundles with clothes and food - everything that the residents of Izhevsk could take with them. There were few carts; most walked.
About 40 thousand, maybe up to 50 thousand workers and their families abandoned their homes and everything that was dear to them. They escaped reprisals and revenge from that government that called itself the protector of all working people.
Last days of the uprising
The abandonment of the Izhevsk plant put on hold the future fate of the entire struggle of the rebels against the Red regime.
At a meeting in Votkinsk, which was attended by the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly, the commander of the Izhevsk-Votkinsk Army, Captain Yuryev, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel Albokrinov, and the Izhevsk Commander, Staff Captain Zhuravlev, it became clear: 1) that there are not enough forces to recapture Izhevsk; 2) that the defense of Votkinsk against superior enemy forces on the eastern and northern approaches to the plant, where stubborn fighting continues, and in the presence of large Red forces in Izhevsk captured by them, becomes impossible; 3) that the arrival of the promised and long-awaited Siberian units is not expected. The meeting decided to leave the area of ​​the Izhevsk and Votkinsk factories and withdraw the army beyond the Kama River.
In anticipation of the possibility of withdrawal, materials were already collected and the construction of a floating bridge across the Kama began (the length of the bridge is 482 fathoms, construction began on December 26, completed on November 4) on barges 2 versts upstream from the village of Ust-Rechka. The builder was Captain 1st Rank Vologdin.
On the morning of November 10, Captain Yuriev summoned the commander of the 4th Votkinsk regiment, Lieutenant Bolonkin, and ordered him to transfer the 2nd and 4th battalions to army headquarters.
The general situation at Votkinsk by this time was as follows: the 4th Regiment occupied an extended front; two battalions (1st and 3rd) defended the approaches to the plant on the highway from the station. Cap; The 2nd battalion guarded the area northwest of the plant and was located in the village of Svetloye, maintaining contact with the northern front of the Izhevsk people; The 4th battalion was advanced to the village of Pazdery, 20 versts southwest of the crossing under construction, with the task of preventing the enemy from moving north from the village of Galyany, which he occupied.
With the two battalions remaining at his disposal, Lieutenant Bolonkin was ordered to stubbornly defend the northern approaches to the plant, keeping close contact with the 2nd Votkinsk Regiment located to the right under the command of Lieutenant Drobinin. Further east, near the Kama River, the 1st Votkinsk Regiment operated in the area of ​​the Nozhovsky plant. On the other (left) bank of the Kama, the 3rd Saigat Regiment operated against the Red units advancing from the city of Osa.
The requirement for stubborn defense was determined by the need to carry out a systematic evacuation of hospitals, to give the opportunity to the population of Votkinsk and its environs, who did not want to remain with the Bolsheviks, to go beyond the Kama and allow the Izhevsk residents to approach the crossing. Lieutenant Bolonkin had to leave his position only by special order. The remaining regiments received corresponding orders.
The Izhevsk residents, retreating along the railway to Votkinsk, were ordered to turn to the crossing by the shortest route, having a strong barrier towards the village (and pier) of Galyana. The red units that occupied Izhevsk were so exhausted by the battles that they could not move in pursuit, and, according to the testimony of the participants, only enemy reconnaissance detachments followed the rearguards of the retreating Izhevsk residents.
In fulfillment of the task specified to him, the 2nd battalion of the 4th Votkinsk regiment (Lieutenant Buskin) moved from the village of Svetly to the villages of Verkhniy and Nizhny Kokuy (10-12 versts west of the plant). The enemy, noticing the preparations for the evacuation of the plant, intensified their attacks, but the Votkinsk residents held all their positions.
Around this time (according to other sources, it was earlier), Lieutenant Drobinin near the village of Mishkino dealt a crushing blow to the 4th Latvian Regiment, capturing several guns, machine guns and many prisoners and sending the Red Latvians into a hasty flight.
On November 11 and 12, the enemy attacked day and night. There was almost no need to sleep. Everyone is tired and exhausted. The mood was nervous, especially in the city itself. On the night of November 12-13, Lieutenant Bolonkin was again summoned to the headquarters of Captain Yuryev. At the headquarters, which was already empty, he was met by Captain Yuryev, the chief of staff, Colonel Albokrinov, and the chief of communications, Captain Shchadrin. Lieutenant Bolonkin recalls:
“They all looked like dead people from fatigue. Here I am personally from the cap. Yuryev received an order to leave his positions on November 13 at nightfall, assemble a regiment (two battalions) and retreat through the eastern part of the city to the crossing. Giving me the order and giving the last instructions, the army commander was very nervous and several times asked the chief of staff and the chief of communications what information they had about the Izhevsk people, and also what the situation was in the sector of the 4th battalion, which was at the disposal of the headquarters and guarding the direction from the side With. Galyans...”
Lieutenant Bolonkin was informed that the central telephone exchange would work until 6 pm on November 13 and that the 2nd battalion of his regiment, which was at the disposal of the headquarters, would withdraw with the last telephone operators of the army headquarters and with demolitionists, who would have to blow up the railway bridge across the river Sivu, which is 5 versts south of the plant (on the branch from the plant to the Galevo pier).
Having successfully repulsed all the attacks of the Reds on the day of November 13, Lieutenant Bolonkin reached the eastern outskirts of Votkinsk at about 9 o’clock in the evening, at 3 o’clock in the morning on November 14 he was at the bridge and at 5 o’clock in the morning crossed to the left bank of the Kama. The head of the crossing was the bridge builder, Captain 1st Rank Vologdin. At his disposal was Captain Samartsev, who met the units and showed them the order of crossing.
From Samartsev, Lieutenant Bolonkin learned that his 2nd battalion had already crossed, and the 4th was located 2 versts below the crossing and was allowing the last arriving units of the Izhevsk troops to pass. Samartsev, in a conversation with Bolonkin, expressed his opinion about the very unsatisfactory management of the Izhevsk units by Captain Zhuravlev. According to him, the Izhevsk residents retreated, not knowing the situation and having no instructions about the direction of movement. Samartsev’s opinion is confirmed by other people and by the facts of the events that took place.
Poor management or its complete absence in relation to the Northern Front of the Izhevsk people led to the fact that most of this front was cut off by the Reds. A small part got out safely, leaving with the 2nd battalion of the 4th Votkinsk regiment. Another part tried to break through Izhevsk, which had already been captured by the Reds, was captured and became a victim of KGB atrocities. A few managed to disperse and hide in the forests.
In addition, individual small groups of Izhevsk residents kept approaching the bridge. When the Reds, advancing along the right bank from the east, came close to the bridge and it could be captured by them, the leaders of the crossing gave the order to set it on fire. Some belated Izhevsk residents ran across the already burning bridge. Among them was one of the ranks of the commandant’s team of the Agryz Front, V.M. Novikov. According to information, several groups of Izhevsk residents did not have time to reach the bridge and were captured by the Reds.
The number of Izhevsk and Votkinsk residents who crossed the Kama is indicated by the participants very differently. The minimum figure for Izhevsk residents will be approximately 16,000 people, of which 10,000 are combat-ready men. Others estimate that 30,000 or more were spent. Lieutenant Bolonkin gives figures for the Votkinsk residents: there were about 15,000 armed Votkinsk residents and almost the same number of civilians - family members.
Izhevsk residents took with them several thousand rifles. Votkinsk residents, together with hospitals and families, evacuated the plant's management and took away some electric machines, which made the plant inoperable for a long time.
With the crossing of the Kama, the largest uprising of workers against the red “proletarian” government in terms of its spontaneity and scale ended - the uprising of Izhevsk and Votkinsk workers and the peasants who joined them. This uprising independently fought against its oppressors. It began on August 7 with the refusal of front-line workers at the Izhevsk arms factory to come out in defense of Bolshevik tyranny.
November 14 - the day of the crossing of the last units of the rebels across the Kama - is the 100th day of the struggle in their native places. These hundred days should be summed up.
Results of the uprising
The struggle of Izhevsk and Votkinsk residents against Soviet power while defending their factories received only brief coverage on the pages of Vestnik. Lack of sources, lack of time and other reasons limited the ability to provide a more detailed outline.
It is the duty of the surviving participants in the uprising to preserve in one form or another the memories of these days. The task of future researchers is to collect all the surviving materials and give a complete description of this uprising. But the brief information that was given here allows us to evaluate this interesting page from the Civil War and draw some conclusions.
The significance of the uprising in the course of the armed struggle against red enslavement will be clearer and more understandable if we recall the general situation that has developed on the Eastern Front. The action against the Bolsheviks of the Czechoslovak Corps, which began on May 25, gave impetus to the uprising of numerous secret anti-Bolshevik organizations on the Volga and Siberia. The Bolsheviks began to immediately and energetically prepare for resistance.
Already on May 29, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee announced the organization of the Red Army, instead of weakly working voluntary replenishment, with mobilization kits. This gives the Reds the opportunity to quickly multiply their forces. They spend June and July in reinforced formations of detachments and armies. The Eastern Front attracts a lot of attention from the red authorities, but they have no success. Gradually they are losing the Volga region, the Urals and vast Siberia. On the Volga they are beaten by Colonel Kappel. On July 21, he took Simbirsk with a brilliant maneuver.
The Reds are sending more and more forces to the east. Vatsetis is appointed instead of the front commander-in-chief Muravyov, who was killed or shot himself. The new “commander in chief” believes that he has enough forces at his disposal to take decisive action. On July 28, he reported to the People's Commissar of War: “I decided in the near future to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy and throw him back from the Volga line to the east” (N. Kakurin: “How the Revolution Fought,” T. 1. P. 225).
He sets the task: the 3rd Army must go on the offensive to “capture Yekaterinburg and further action on the Chelyabinsk-Zlatoust front.” The 2nd Army is given the task of capturing Ufa and capturing the Chishma junction station, advancing in one group towards Bugulma in the direction of Samara, shielded from the side of Syzran. Finally, the 5th Army, newly created in the Kazan region, was supposed to concentrate the largest possible group of troops in the Chistopol-mouth of the Kama-Tetyusha area and launch a decisive offensive on the Simbirsk-St front. Bryandino. “If we succeed,” wrote Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis, “the immediate task will be to capture the Aktobe-Orsk-Troitsk-Kurgan-Tyumen front” (Ibid.).
When Vatsetis developed his plan, which planned to capture the White and Czech units in the Simbirsk-Syzran region in pincers, the question in Samara was: what to do next? Samara did not have any armies, the formation of volunteer detachments was slow, and the Czechs were not inclined to large operations. Colonel Kappel and Captain Stepanov, commander of the 1st Czech Regiment, insisted on the capture of Kazan. To take and hold this great city required a much greater force than that which was under the command of these two chiefs. There was nothing to support them. There were also other reasons that diverted Samara in the opposite direction - to the south, towards the Saratov direction. However, the blow to Kazan was made, the Reds fled in panic. There is no need to guess how the situation in Kazan would have been even more difficult if the 2nd Red Army had been moved to Kazan.
The uprising of the factories distracted large Red forces. Their 2nd Army was first confined to the Sarapul area, and was soon defeated by the Izhevsk people. Its disorganized remnants fled to the Vyatka River basin. From here, some of these fugitives were sent to strengthen the red troops that besieged Kazan, and acted in the Arsky (eastern) sector.
The uprising also had a great influence on the actions of the 3rd Red Army. The need to protect the line of communication with the center - the Perm - Vyatka railway - forced the 3rd Army to allocate significant forces from its composition to guard the road. This weakened the enemy army, and the attack on Yekaterinburg, according to Vatsetis’s plan, not only could not take place, but the army barely held out against the Siberians. Later, in December, it was driven out of Perm.
After holding out for more than a month, Kazan was captured by the Reds. They did not undertake an energetic pursuit of the retreating Kazan garrison, and it quite calmly crossed the Kama River near the village of Epanchino near Laishev. The Red troops, liberated near Kazan, sent them against the Izhevsk and Votkinsk people, in a hurry to put an end to the uprising. First of all, Azin's detachment, which formed the 2nd Consolidated Division (later the 28th), and the Latvian regiments were transferred. The 4th Latvian regiment, as noted earlier, was defeated by the Votkinsk people, and the 5th Latvian regiment, which was badly damaged during the capture of Kazan by Colonel Kappel, apparently acted from the direction of the city of Glazov, and one of the episodes of the Izhevsk residents meeting with it was described in the “Vestnik” "
Thus, the uprising diverted forces and affected the actions of the three Red armies of the Eastern Front. Significant reinforcements also came from the internal districts and from the quiet Western Front, while especially loyal and experienced units were sent against the Izhevsk and Votkinsk people, including companies of the Chezvychaeks. If Vatsetis’s plan was disrupted by the capture of Kazan by a detachment of Kappel and the Czechs, then its complete collapse was due to the uprising of the Izhevsk-Votkinsk workers.
After the recapture of Kazan, the red troops were able to gain some successes on the Volga line and move forward. To the north, the rebels chained large Red forces for another two months, and on the left sector of their front all their efforts to go on the offensive were paralyzed for a long time.

The Bolshevik government crushed the uprising with great sacrifice and cruelty. If ten, a hundred times more blood had to be shed, the Bolsheviks would not have thought about it. Human life comes last in their calculations.
More significant for them was the political side of events. Having arrogated to themselves the right of exclusive leadership of the working masses, they could not allow the workers to not go with them or, even more so, against them. They try to immediately suppress the uprising of the Izhevsk residents, fearing that their example may captivate others. They failed. Izhevsk residents were supported by Votkinsk residents, and several other Ural factories rose up at different times. It was impossible to silence these speeches - they became part of the history of the Civil War. But the Bolsheviks are not shy about history and give everything their own explanation and interpretation.
“History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)”, ed. 1938, interprets the events as follows: “The rebellion of the corps (Czechoslovaks) served as a signal for the rebellion of the kulaks on the Volga and Siberia and the Socialist Revolutionary-minded workers at the Votkinsk and Izhevsk factories...” A similar explanation is given by Kakurin (“How the Revolution Fought.” Vol. 1. P. 96): “The Izhevsk uprising was organized by a union of front-line soldiers, numbering up to 4 thousand members, in which Socialist Revolutionary propaganda was carried out for a long time.”
The Bolsheviks have every reason to highly value the power of propaganda, which they themselves have always used so skillfully and brazenly. But their accusations against the Social Revolutionaries that they caused an uprising in Izhevsk with their propaganda have no basis. The union of front-line soldiers, which launched the uprising, was far from the 4,000 people indicated by Kakurin, and did not have any political program, but was organized solely to protect the rights of soldiers returning from the front, former workers.
After the success of the uprising, the Socialist Revolutionaries, members of the Constituent Assembly, emerged from underground, took advantage of the lack of power after the destruction of the Bolshevik “council” and, as convinced “people's rights activists,” without asking anyone, declared themselves the highest civil authority under the name of the “Prikamsky Committee of the Constituent Assembly.” As was their usual practice, they hastened to seize the treasury and began to manage the funds. Their appearance and the Socialist Revolutionary propaganda that had now begun, after the uprising, were met with indifference by the majority of workers.
It was necessary to wage a stubborn struggle against the Bolsheviks, and not engage in politics and party chatter. But the Socialist Revolutionaries, at least the more influential of them, put their own party interests first and, under the banner of the “Constituent Assembly,” try first of all to strengthen their power. They begin to form their own units - at first a company “named after the Constituent Assembly”.
There were no volunteers for this company, and there were no people willing to take the position of company commander. Then two Socialist Revolutionaries, Shmelev and Shelomentsev, were sent from Samara Komuch, who brought money and began campaigning for admission to this company. The company was finally organized. When the time came to take the position, Shmelev hurried to the rear. Shelomentsev, commanding a company, fulfilled his duty and died in the battle near Izhevsk.
If the majority of workers were indifferent to the propaganda and initiatives of the Socialist Revolutionaries, then the latter did not trust the Izhevsk people, and especially their command staff. This explains the hasty flight of Evseev and the members of his committee, who fled from the danger they themselves imagined.
Subsequent events, which removed the Socialist-Revolutionaries from any participation in establishing state order and which ended with the transfer of power into the hands of Admiral Kolchak, emphasize even more clearly that the Izhevsk and Votkinsk people chose the road along which all honest Russian people who truly loved their homeland went. They, with the few exceptions of stubborn “party members,” recognized the power of Admiral Kolchak without reservations. They did not follow the party, which always put its party interests above the well-being of Russia and the Russian people.
Having challenged the Bolsheviks to mortal combat, the workers forgot which parties they belonged to, forgot who their political associates or opponents were, who their friends or enemies were, all of them, as one, rose up against the red oppression. For them, the time for words, programmatic differences and other disagreements had passed, and, firmly united in their impulse, they stubbornly and selflessly fought the enemy. Those who considered themselves Social Revolutionaries did not want to stand out from the ranks of other rebel workers and did not follow their hapless leaders. Among those who rebelled against Bolshevik oppression were also those who belonged to the Bolshevik Party. These Bolsheviks refused to support the atrocities and crimes of their fellow party members.
Unlike the “Bolsheviks” who stood at the head of the bloody power, they called themselves “Bolshevik avengers”, and their enemies “commissar-powers”. All this, of course, is well known to the Bolsheviks and their historians. They also know very well that their oppression and bloody reprisals against rebellious workers caused indignation and embitterment and were the real reasons for the uprising.
Izhevets M.K. Danilov recalls how, three weeks before the uprising, the “All-Russian headman” Kalinin was sent to Izhevsk, who tried to calm and appease the workers gathered in one of the vast workshops. The irritation against him, as a representative of the hated government, was such that he was not allowed to speak. Noise and threats greeted all his attempts to begin his speech. He hastened to leave Izhevsk, having achieved nothing, but having personally become acquainted with the real attitude of the workers towards the Soviet government. I also noticed, without a doubt, the unanimity with which all the workers, as one, seethed with anger at his speech.
This anger erupted three weeks later and cost the Soviet government dearly. The long path of the Civil War was traversed with honor and glory by the residents of Izhevsk and Votkinsk, whose deeds were distinguished by high valor and self-sacrifice. No propaganda of any party could lead the residents of Izhevsk and Votkinsk along the path they had traveled. Only love for the suffering Motherland could do this. The Bolsheviks know this, but they do not dare talk about it.
It is necessary to touch upon one more question - why the rebel factories were not provided with sufficient assistance from other anti-Bolshevik forces.
The rebels received minor assistance with military supplies from the squadron of Captain 1st Rank Fedosev. Captain Kurakin, who made his way to Samara, received 10,000 shells and other reinforcements of material supplies, but could not bring them to Izhevsk due to our failures on the Volga.
The Siberian Army, which captured Yekaterinburg on July 25 and accumulated its forces there, had more opportunities to help the residents of Izhevsk and Votkinsk. Actually, this would not be help, but the use of the current situation for the Siberian Army’s own purposes - inflicting a strong blow on its enemy, the 3rd Red Army, and, if successful, destroying this army.
Instead of a frontal attack on Perm, the Siberian Army was given the chance to capture this city faster and with less effort by making a deep detour through the area of ​​the uprising. In this way, the Siberian Army not only captured Perm, but also solved a more important task - defeating the enemy. The 3rd Red Army was in a very difficult situation, as the rebel workers cut it off from its neighbors and threatened its rear. Unfortunately, at the head of the Siberian Army was General Gaida, who was incapable of such actions.
These were the sad consequences - both for the Izhevsk-Votkinsk uprising and for the general course of the struggle on the Eastern Front - the appointment of General Gaida, who was completely unprepared for this, to the important post of commander of the Siberian Army...

KOLCHAK OFFENSIVE 1919, a strategic offensive operation of the Kolchak armies, carried out from March 4 to May 19, with the goal of defeating the Soviet troops of the Eastern Front, uniting with other white armies in the north and south of Russia and creating a united front against the RSFSR. By the beginning of spring 1919, Soviet troops (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th armies; Volga military flotilla - only 95 thousand bayonets, 9 thousand sabers, 362 guns, about 1.9 thousand machine guns, 9 armored trains, about 30 aircraft, 38 ships and vessels) of the Eastern Front (commander S.S. Kamenev, from May 5 A.A. Samoilo) reached the line of Lbischensk, Aktyubinsk, Orsk, east of Ufa, Okhansk and further to the north. They were opposed by the troops of Admiral A.V. Kolchak, which included the Siberian and Western armies, the Kama military flotilla, as well as the Cossack Separate Orenburg and Ural armies (a total of 100-120 thousand bayonets, about 26 thousand sabers, 211 guns, 1 ,3 thousand machine guns, 5 armored trains, 12 armored cars, 15 aircraft, over 40 ships and vessels). On March 4-6, they went on the offensive, delivering the main attacks in the Ufa-Samara (Western Army) and Izhevsk-Kazan (Siberian Army) directions. Having inflicted a series of defeats on the Soviet troops, the Siberian Army at the end of April reached the approaches to Elabuga and Glazov, and the advanced units of the Western Army were located 100-120 km from Samara and Kazan. The Cossacks fought for Orenburg and Uralsk. The center of the Eastern Front was broken through, a gap about 200 km wide opened between the Soviet 2nd and 5th armies, where a group of Kolchak’s troops rushed. Further advance of Kolchak’s armies and the retreat of the Red Army units beyond the Volga inevitably led to the connection of Kolchak’s troops with units of the All-Soviet Union of Socialist Republics and created a threat to the central regions of Soviet Russia. However, the troops of the Eastern Front, having withstood the enemy’s attack, retained their combat effectiveness and gained time to concentrate reserves and prepare a counter-offensive. At the same time, they intensified actions against the Western Army. A series of private counterattacks by Soviet troops (on the Salmysh and Dema rivers, in the Buzuluk area) led to the defeat of several Kolchak formations and created the conditions for launching a counteroffensive. The Southern Army Group (M.V. Frunze) of the Eastern Front launched a counterattack on the left flank of the Western Army on April 28 and defeated it. The counterattack marked the beginning of the defeat of Kolchak’s troops (see Counteroffensive of the Eastern Front of 1919). At this time, the Siberian army continued its offensive and by mid-May its units reached the Vyatka and Kilmez rivers. However, the beginning of the retreat of the Western Army forced the Siberian Army to first weaken its onslaught, and on May 19 to stop the offensive altogether.

Despite the fact that during the Kolchak offensive, units of the Western and Siberian armies inflicted a number of defeats on the Soviet troops, threw them back to a depth of over 400 km to the west and reached the approaches to the Volga, the main task was to unite with units of the white armies operating in the north and south European part of Russia - was not implemented.

Lit.: Eikhe G. Kh. Kolchak’s Ufa adventure (March - April 1919). M., 1960. See also the literature under the article by Kolchak’s army.

Chapter Four

The first campaign of the Entente. Spring 1919

Having defeated Germany and its allies, the Entente had the opportunity to use its armed forces much more widely to fight the Soviet state. The spread of Soviet power in the Baltic states and further to the west, the failure of the summer (1918) plan to eliminate the Bolsheviks, the transition of the Red Army to a successful offensive on both the eastern (against the Czechoslovaks) and the southern (against Krasnov) fronts - all this pushed the Entente leaders into a feverish preparing a decisive attack on Russia.

At the end of 1918, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of England Lloyd George, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of France Clemenceau and US President Wilson decided to accelerate an armed campaign in Russia to overthrow the proletarian dictatorship, establish the power of the bourgeoisie and subordinate Russia to the Entente. This decision was covered up with phrases that “the Russian people must be given the opportunity to elect a national assembly, which should consider the issues of peace that are on the agenda.” But the “Russian people” - the workers and peasants of the Soviet republics - fully supported the Soviet government and the Communist Party, selflessly defended their workers’ and peasants’ homeland and did not need any “national assembly”. A bourgeois government could be imposed on the workers and peasants of the Soviet country only by force, only by armed means.

As Churchill says in his memoirs, the commander-in-chief of the allied armies, General Foch, when asked “what can you do in Russia” asked by the leaders of the Entente, gave the following answer: “If you want to subjugate the former Russian Empire to your power... you only need to give me the appropriate order, we will not face any special difficulties and are unlikely to have to fight for a long time. Several hundred thousand Americans, acting together with volunteer detachments of the British and French armies, could easily capture Moscow with the help of modern railways. And besides, we already own three outskirts of Russia." (Churchill, World crisis, p. 6).

The order that General Foch spoke about was soon given: large Allied forces were sent to Ukraine and Crimea. The Allies decided to involve defeated Germany in the intervention in Soviet Russia. She was asked to hold back the advance of the Red Army to the west until the required number of Entente troops arrived.

Along with preparing its own armed forces to overthrow the Soviet regime, the Entente is striving by all means to strengthen the forces of the Russian counter-revolution.

The Menshevik-Socialist Revolutionary governments formed in the Volga region, Siberia, the Urals and the north no longer satisfied either the Russian bourgeois-landowner counter-revolution or the Entente. During 1918, these governments not only failed to overthrow Soviet power, but were not even able to hold on to the territory that was conquered by the Czechoslovaks. In the area of ​​their domination, they not only failed to lead the broad masses of the peasantry, much less the workers, but also failed to provide the bourgeoisie with even the most necessary order in the rear. Worker uprisings and partisan uprisings of the peasantry in areas dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries kept the bourgeoisie in constant fear. And these speeches were suppressed, but in her opinion, not brutally enough. At the same time, in the few months of their rule, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, as far as they could - and they tried their best - had already cleared the ground for the establishment of the open rule of the bourgeois-landowner counter-revolution. In fact, as a result of their treacherous policies, Kolchak and other generals literally came to power on their backs.

All these reasons and considerations prompted the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, landowners and the military to persistently strive for the establishment of a military dictatorship capable of more decisively carrying out the will of the bourgeoisie. In the hands of this military dictatorship it was supposed to concentrate all power within the territory captured by the whites.

The Entente, especially England and France, also demanded the creation of an all-Russian government in the form of a military dictatorship. At the same time, England and France sought to form a government that would be completely dependent on them, would do their will, and carry out their tasks.

On the night of November 17-18, 1918, a “coup d’etat” was carried out in Siberia. Reactionary officers, with the direct support of British troops under the leadership of General Knox, arrested the Socialist Revolutionary “Provisional All-Russian Government” in Omsk and proclaimed Admiral Kolchak, a protege of England, as a military dictator. Kolchak’s government was called the “Knox government” - after the English general.

Poster from the Civil War period.

In the south of Russia, power gradually concentrated in the hands of General Denikin, who headed the volunteer army after the death of the rest of its leaders. In contrast to Krasnov, who licked the boots of the Entente and German imperialists, Denikin always stuck to his allies. The allies considered Krasnov insufficiently loyal to them. Therefore, soon after the revolution in Germany and leaving. German troops from the Don Krasnov was forced to cede power to Denikin.

Kolchak was declared the supreme ruler and supreme commander of all Russian armed forces. Denikin was considered his deputy in southern Russia. Other white generals - Yudenich and Miller - became, as it were, representatives of Kolchak in the north-west and north of Russia. Moreover, unlike other generals, Yudenich actually had to operate on the territory of either Finland or Estonia all the time. He didn't even have his own territory to form an army.

“My main goal,” wrote Admiral Kolchak in his address to the population of Russia, “is the creation of a combat-ready army, victory over the Bolsheviks and the establishment of law and order.” All the other white generals set themselves the same goals.

The above words of Kolchak’s first address opened up a whole program for restoring the rule of capitalists and landowners, the most brutal struggle and suppression of workers and peasants, the physical destruction of all fighters for Soviet power, and the even greater enslavement of peoples oppressed by the tsarist autocracy.

The “establishment of law and order” proclaimed by Kolchak in reality meant the return to capitalists and landowners of their rights to the property taken from them by the great socialist revolution and the further strengthening of this property in the territory of white supremacy.

On the question of land, the policy of the bourgeois-landowner counter-revolution boiled down to returning to the landowners the lands, agricultural implements and livestock taken from them by the Soviet government. Part of the land was supposed to be transferred to the kulaks for a fee. In order to ensure the spring sowing of 1919, the white governments promised to preserve the harvest for those who cultivated and sowed the land, regardless of whose land it was. But it is clear that this promise did not in the slightest degree satisfy or reassure the broad masses of the peasantry. The opposition shown by the peasantry to this measure of Kolchak led to the fact that the whites used violent measures to force the peasants to carry out sowing. The discontent and unrest of the peasants were brutally suppressed by punitive detachments. The floggings and executions of peasants under the rule of Kolchak and Denikin reached incredible proportions. The dead numbered in the tens of thousands. But all this did not help the whites. The peasantry, under the influence of the agitation of underground Bolshevik organizations, more and more definitely went over to the side of the working class, taking up arms against the White Guards.

The policy of the bourgeois-landowner counter-revolution in the field of the labor question pursued, first of all, the task of destroying any traces of the recent domination of Soviet power. Communists and non-party advanced workers who had previously taken part in the work of Soviet bodies were mercilessly shot. In order to shoot a person, it was enough for some rogue to declare that this person was a communist, a commissar, or simply a former Soviet worker. Along with the extermination of the best part of the working class, there was a destruction of the mass organizations of the proletariat, primarily the trade unions.

The Kolchak and other white governments destroyed all the rights won by the proletariat and working people in October. Everywhere in white territory the working day was increased to 10 hours or more. Workers' accident insurance was abolished. The dismissal of workers from enterprises has reached enormous proportions. Due to the inactivity of large industrial enterprises, unemployment affected large sections of the proletariat, especially in the south of Russia.

The national policy of the White Guards was determined by one of the main slogans of the White Guards - “For a united and indivisible Russia.” Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich - all of them were ardent opponents of any independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Ukraine, the mountain regions of the North Caucasus and other outskirts, which were provinces of Tsarist Russia before the revolution. The question of self-determination or independence of nationalities on the territory of Russia proper was completely removed. The oppressed nations continued to be in the same oppressed and enslaved state as under the king. Kolchak and Denikin crushed and oppressed them no less than the viceroys or governors of the former Russian Empire.

A group of communists who were members of an underground party organization in Yekaterinburg. According to the verdict of the Kolchak military court, they were shot in April 1919. Sitting from left to right: vol. M. Sh. Brod, M. O. Aveide, A. Ya. Valek, V. A. Vozhakov; standing from left to right: O. M. Buzdes, V. A. Golub, F. O. Walter, E. K. Kokovina.

Continuing the old great-power tsarist policy, the White Guards set one nationality against another and systematically carried out pogroms against Jews. These pogroms, in terms of the number of victims and their atrocities, surpassed the pogroms of the times of the rampant tsarist reaction.

In organizing their armies, the whites at first relied on elements close to them in class, primarily on the Cossacks, officers and kulaks. The presence in the white armies of a large number of officers as ordinary soldiers and junior commanders initially ensured their relatively high combat cohesion. But the transition to forced mobilization of the working peasantry significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of the armies of Kolchak and other white generals and served as the main reason for their internal collapse. The peasantry did not want to fight against the Soviet Republic for class interests that were alien to them. And no punishments, no preventive measures could save the white armies from the exacerbation of class contradictions and class struggle within them.

The relationship between the Russian and national (outskirts) bourgeois-landowner counter-revolution with the allies was determined by the complete dependence of Kolchak and Denikin, Yudenich and Miller on the Entente. Representatives of the Entente, primarily England and France, were the actual masters of the situation. They dictated their will to the white generals. Despite the lack of grain and raw materials (ore, fuel, wool) in the white-occupied regions of Russia, all this was exported abroad in significant quantities at the first request of the allies. As payment for the received military property, the largest enterprises passed into the hands of Western European and American capitalists. In the north and especially in the east, foreign capitalists received a number of concessions. Satisfying the demands of the allies (although not without resistance and protests from part of the Russian bourgeoisie, who did not want to give the allies the lion's share of their profits), Kolchak and Denikin were actually preparing for Russia the fate of China, torn apart by foreign imperialists.

Such was the policy of the bourgeois-landowner counter-revolution in the person of its military dictators - Kolchak, Denikin - and their associates in the territory of our country they occupied. The loyal agents of the bourgeoisie - the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (although temporarily removed from direct participation in government) - provided full support to this policy.

The White armies were to play a major role in the planned decisive offensive of the Entente against Soviet Russia. That is why, during the preparation for this offensive, the Allies paid especially great attention to the White Guards. We have already pointed out in the previous chapter the enormous material assistance provided by the Allies to the White Guards. But it must be said that the Entente generals were somewhat disdainful of the military talents of the white officers, and they simply despised the soldier of the white army, as in their time the soldier of the tsarist army. He was cannon fodder for them and nothing more. Therefore, during the period described, the Entente intended to deliver the main, decisive blow to Soviet power with its own armed forces.

By the beginning of 1919, from 40 to 50 thousand Entente soldiers were concentrated in the north, mainly in the Arkhangelsk region. In addition, there were about 25 thousand White Guard troops here. In the south, the Entente also assembled large forces. By the beginning of February, about 12 thousand French troops had accumulated in Odessa alone, three-quarters of them were colonial troops, in addition to 2 thousand Serbs and 4 thousand Polish legionnaires. There was a lot of artillery and tanks. There were significant naval forces in the Black Sea. At the request of the Entente, Greece also sent large forces to Ukraine; On March 15, there were over 12 thousand Greek troops here. Romania also began transferring its troops to Ukraine.

In total, in the south, the Entente had up to 50 thousand of its own soldiers, not counting the White Guards.

To “intimidate” the Bolsheviks, the Greek government published the following decision: “By the goodwill of the Holy Synod, the Greek government decided to send to Russia, along with its troops, which are already completely ready to board transports, three bishops, four archimandrites, forty priests with a clergy of selected people, who know the Russian language well and have the gift of eloquence. The purpose of the business trip is to have a spiritual impact on Russians.” So the church - and not only in Greece, but everywhere - helped the capitalists in their fight against the Bolsheviks.

In mid-February, the government of Ukraine led by Petlyura, formed after the departure of the Germans, signed an agreement with the Entente on a joint fight against the Bolsheviks. According to this agreement, the Ukrainian Directory (as this government was called) was obliged to create an army of 300 thousand people by August 1, 1919. The draft military treaty was accompanied by a draft political treaty, which read as follows: “1) France receives a 50-year concession for all Ukrainian railways; 2) Ukraine undertakes to pay France the debts due to it from the old tsarist and Provisional governments; 3) payment of interest is guaranteed by that part of the income from the railways that is attributed to the Ukrainian government; 4) all financial, trade, industrial and military policies of Ukraine for five years from the date of signing the agreement are conducted under the direct control of representatives of the French government.”

This agreement, which was not implemented only thanks to the victories of the Red Army, exposes in the best possible way the true face of the Russian, Ukrainian and other bourgeoisie and their servants - the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, who sold Russia, Ukraine, Don, Georgia and other territories wholesale and retail, where they temporarily managed to come to power.

French General d'Anselm already in mid-January 1919 took over the joint command of the white armies of southern Russia and the imperialist troops.

The Entente's military plan boiled down to delivering a simultaneous attack on Moscow: from the south - with the combined forces of the Entente with the assistance of Denikin and Petliura, from the north - mainly by Anglo-American troops and from the east - by the forces of the Czechoslovaks and Kolchak's troops. But the Entente, like its previous plans, again failed to implement this plan. The Entente encountered the ever-increasing influence of the October Revolution on the soldiers of the occupying armies (French, English, etc.), the heroism of the proletarians of the Soviet state and the soldiers of the Red Army, the revolutionary agitation of the Bolshevik organizations both at the front and in the rear of the Whites and among the soldiers of the interventionist armies .

By the active policy of the proletarian state, with the assistance and direct assistance of the world proletariat, the Entente plan was thwarted. Massive refusals to fight against the Soviet Republic began among soldiers in the Entente forces. The soldiers demanded to return home, some of the most conscientious ones went over to the side of the Reds. The sailors of the French fleet located in the Black Sea, under the leadership of Andre Marty, began an uprising on April 19, 1919 and refused to speak out against the workers and peasants of the Land of Soviets (The work of communists among the intervention troops, the revolutionization of French soldiers are well shown in L. Slavin’s play “Intervention.” ).

In March 1919, soldiers of the English Yorkshire Infantry Regiment (on the northern front) refused to fight.

The revolutionary actions of soldiers and sailors of the Entente on the territory of Soviet Russia found a response in their homeland. Mass revolutionary uprisings also began among the troops stationed in England, France and other countries. Thus, these troops could not replace the interventionist army located in Russia. One of the leaders of the Entente, the head of the English interventionist policy, Lloyd George, was forced to admit that “if he had proposed sending English troops to Russia for this purpose (i.e. for intervention - S.R.), then in the army there would be a mutiny,” and that the soldiers in the American troops were of the same mind.

At the end of April 1919, under the pressure of Soviet troops, a panicked flight of Entente troops from Ukraine began. By the end of summer, Entente troops were forced to clear northern Russia. These troops managed to stay somewhat longer only in the Far East. But even from here, under a double blow - the Red Army from the front and the Red partisans from the rear - they had to evacuate, with the exception of the Japanese troops, who were expelled from Primorye only at the end of 1922.

The troops of the Ukrainian Directory (Petlyura) could do absolutely nothing to help the Entente troops, since they themselves barely escaped their final defeat by the Red Army. The Greek and Romanian troops stationed in Ukraine also could not help the Entente, although in their plans the Entente counted on the active participation of Romanian troops in the intervention in southern Russia. The victory of Soviet power in Hungary on March 22, 1919 finally upset the plans of the Entente.

Leaders of the revolutionary movement in capitalist countries in 1919. From left to right: 1st row: K. Liebknecht, E. Levinet, R. Luxemburg; 2nd row: R. Eglhofer (command, Bavarian Red Army), Rakosi; 3rd row: Tibor Samueli (military commissar of the Hungarian Soviet Republic), A. Marty.

Romanian troops were entrusted with the task of suppressing the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

Lenin attached extremely great importance to the fact that the Entente was forced to refuse to use its troops, regarding it as a huge victory for the Communist Party and Soviet power. He repeatedly emphasized that “the victory we won, forcing the removal of British and French troops, was the most important victory we won over the Entente. We took her soldiers away from her. We responded to its endless military and technical superiority by taking away this superiority with the solidarity of the working people against the imperialist governments" ( Lenin, vol. XXIV, p. 594).

But the Entente had no intention of giving up the fight against Soviet power. Convinced from experience that it is impossible to use its own armies to fight the Soviet Republic, the Entente shifts the center of gravity to organizing and conducting an offensive mainly with the forces of the White Guards.

The establishment of Soviet power in Hungary, and in April in Bavaria, the proximity of the Red armies to Western Ukraine and Romania and the possibility of uniting our and the Hungarian Red armies posed the most immediate threat to the existence of the capitalist system in Western Europe. In order to divert the forces of the Red Army from the western front to the eastern, the Entente pays special attention to organizing the offensive of the white armies from the east. The implementation of this task is entrusted to Kolchak. The latter, at the end of 1918, having become convinced of the impossibility of uniting with the southern (Krasnov-Denikin) counter-revolution, decided to try his luck in the north, on the right flank of his front. In the south, on the routes across the Volga, an insurmountable barrier stood Tsaritsyn, the hero city, defended by a remarkable army under the leadership of Stalin and Voroshilov. But on the Kama, on the left flank of our front, there was no such barrier. Parts of the Third Red Army were deprived of that unique leadership that, thanks to Stalin and Voroshilov, the fighters of the southern front, its Tsaritsyn section, had. Kolchak knew through traitorous officers who fled from the Red Army, through his spies about the weak points of the III Army, about the poor defense of Perm. And concentrating large forces on the right flank, he, throughout November - December 1918, tried to break through the Red Front and leave to unite with the British and Russian White Guard troops moving from Arkhangelsk, he partially succeeded in resolving this task. On December 24, the Whites captured Perm. The Red Army defending the city retreated under the blows of the numerically superior White troops.

“As a result of six months of constant fighting,” as Comrade Voroshilov writes in his work “Stalin and the Red Army,” “in the absence of any reliable reserves, with the insecurity of the rear, disgustingly well-established food supply (the 29th division fought for 5 days literally without a piece of bread ), with a 35-degree frost, complete impassability, a huge extension of the front (more than 400 kilometers), and a weak headquarters, the III Army was unable to withstand the onslaught of superior enemy forces. To complete the bleak picture, we must add massive betrayals of the command staff from former officers, the surrender of entire regiments as a result of poor class selection of recruits, and a worthless command. In such a situation, the III Army completely fell apart, retreated in disorder, covering 300 kilometers in 20 days and losing 18 thousand soldiers, dozens of guns, hundreds of machine guns, etc. during these days. The enemy began to quickly move forward, creating a real threat to Vyatka and the entire eastern front."

The Central Committee of the Party and Lenin clearly saw the dire consequences for the revolution that Kolchak’s further advancement could lead to. It had to be stopped as soon as possible, and the Central Committee decides: “Appoint a party commission of inquiry consisting of members of the Central Committee Dzerzhinsky and Stalin for a detailed investigation into the reasons for the surrender of Perm, the latest defeats on the Ural front, and to clarify all the circumstances surrounding these phenomena. The Central Committee authorizes the commission to take all necessary measures for the speedy restoration of both party and Soviet work in the entire region of the III and II armies” (telegram from Comrade Sverdlov No. 00079). This resolution seems to limit the functions of the comrade. Stalin and Dzerzhinsky "investigation of the reasons for the surrender of Perm and the latest defeats on the Ural front." But Comrade Stalin shifts the center of gravity of his “party investigative” work to the adoption of effective measures to restore the situation, strengthen the front, etc.

Literally within just ten to fifteen days, Comrade Stalin is achieving a turning point in strengthening the combat capability of the Third Army. He organizes the sending of class-reliable reinforcements to the front, organizes the purge of Soviet and party institutions in the rear of the army, clears headquarters of treasonous former officers, creates revolutionary committees, organizes work on the railways, strengthens military bodies, directs the planting of strong party and Soviet organizations in the countryside, etc. . etc., etc. And as a result, it achieves a pause in the enemy’s offensive, a turning point in the mood of the Third Army, and subsequently its transition to a counteroffensive.

Having investigated the reasons for the defeat at Perm, Comrade Stalin outlined his conclusions and proposals in an extensive and comprehensive report to Lenin.

Comrade Stalin uncovered and exposed the system of recruiting mobilized units, practiced by the All-Russian General Staff with the knowledge and blessing of Trotsky, regardless of their social status. As a result of this, class-hostile elements penetrated into the Red Army, and at the first opportunity they went over to the side of the enemy. Comrade Stalin demanded the abolition of the sabotage instructions of the All-Russian General Staff and the restoration of clear class selection into the army, as required by the decree on the organization of the Red Army. Comrade Stalin revealed shortcomings in the system of leadership of troops at the front on the part of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Commander-in-Chief, pointed out the wrong approach to reserves, the weak work of rear organizations, etc. His conclusions and proposals, which were of great fundamental importance and concerned not only the Third Army, were adopted and extended to the entire Red Army.

From the small Perm experience, Comrade Stalin drew conclusions that had the most beneficial impact on the combat work of the entire Red Army on the Eastern Front.

In January 1919, the rest of the armies of the eastern front went on the offensive against Kolchak, especially successfully developing the attack on the right flank, where we captured Uralsk. But thanks to the support of the Entente and the active policy of the bourgeois-landowner counter-revolution, the White armies during the first months of 1919 grew significantly in numbers and became so strong that by the spring they were able to again launch a decisive offensive against the Land of the Soviets.

In the spring of 1919, the Entente carried out its first campaign against Soviet Russia.

“This campaign was combined, because it assumed a joint attack by Kolchak, Denikin, Poland and Yudenich and mixed Anglo-Russian detachments in Turkestan and Arkhangelsk.” (Stalin, New Entente campaign against Russia, Pravda No. 111, 1920).

The main blow was to be delivered by Kolchak. Denikin, Yudenich and the troops operating from Arkhangelsk launched an auxiliary strike, and the armies of Denikin and Kolchak were to unite in Saratov for a further joint attack on Moscow. It was also planned, as at the end of 1918, to unite the right flank of Kolchak’s army with the troops advancing from Arkhangelsk to the south in the Kotlas-Vyatka region. Yudenich moved to Petrograd. The troops of White Poland, through active operations along our western border, were supposed to chain the forces of the Red Army to the western front. The same task was set for the White Guard troops operating in Central Asia (in Turkestan).

As Comrade Stalin pointed out in one of his articles, “the goal of the campaign was formulated in the report of Guchkov (a prominent White Guard - S.R.) to Denikin: “Strangle Bolshevism with one blow, depriving it of its main vital centers - Moscow and Petrograd.” The plan for the campaign was sketched out in a letter from Denikin to Kolchak, intercepted by us together with the Grishin-Almazov headquarters in the spring of 1919.

“The main thing is not to stop at the Volga,” Denikin wrote to Kolchak, “but to strike further at the heart of Bolshevism, at Moscow. I hope to meet you in Saratov... The Poles will do their job, as for Yudenich, he is ready and will not hesitate to attack Petrograd..." (Stalin, On the martial law in the south, Pravda No. 293, 1919).

Kolchak, with the support of capitalists and landowners, but mainly with funds from the Entente, managed to put together a huge army of approximately 300 thousand soldiers. Of these, he concentrated about half on our eastern front. The number of Denikin's armed forces was also approximately 200 thousand people, of which there were 60–70 thousand fighters at the front. Yudenich had about 7 thousand soldiers on the Petrograd front.

The Red Army, numbering about 1,400 thousand people by March 1, 1919, was able to deploy about 450 thousand soldiers on all fronts, of which about 110 thousand soldiers on the eastern front and about 90 thousand soldiers on the southern front.

It was not by chance that March was chosen by the Entente for the offensive. The fact is that the food situation in cities during this period became especially aggravated. The liberation of Ukraine and part of the Volga region, where large reserves of grain were located, did not significantly improve matters due to transport devastation. The railways were in a dilapidated state, and even healthy steam locomotives could not operate at full load due to the lack of fuel - coal and oil.

The first campaign of the Entente, just as it was in the summer of 1918, was accompanied by the organization of kulak uprisings in the rear of the Red Army. Lenin at the Eighth Party Congress (March 1919) emphasized that “in the uprisings that have already begun to sweep through agricultural Russia in waves, a general plan is clearly visible, and this plan is clearly connected with the military plan of the White Guards, who decided on a general offensive in March and the organization of a series of uprisings » (Lenin, vol. XXIV, p. 139).

The Veshensky uprising, the civil war on the Don in 1919, are covered very well in the 3rd book “Quiet Don” by Sholokhov. This uprising of the Cossacks in the rear of the Red armies weakened our southern front. The White Guards incited the uprising in every possible way, but the approach of the Whites, the correct policy of the party, and the measures taken by the command had a sobering effect on the Cossacks who were hesitant.

The turn of the middle peasants towards Soviet power, which was determined by the autumn of 1918, and the formation of a military-political alliance of the proletariat and the middle peasantry contributed to the fact that the kulak managed to draw a significantly smaller number of middle peasants into the kulak uprisings in the spring of 1919 than in 1918. But still some Some of the middle peasants still succumbed to the agitation of the kulaks. The reasons for this were twofold. On the one hand, the successes of the Red Army by the beginning of 1919 on the eastern and southern fronts, especially in Ukraine, created confidence among the peasantry that the danger of restoring landlord rule had passed. Therefore, the middle peasant became less willing to lend grain to the workers' state. The kulaks, moreover, in every possible way incited the middle peasant to hide grain in order to sell it at exorbitant prices to the bagman and speculator. On the other hand, when collecting bread in the countryside for food distribution, food detachments were not always able to distinguish and separate the middle peasant from the kulak. As Vladimir Ilyich pointed out, often the blows intended for the kulaks fell heavily on the middle peasantry.

But Lenin and the party noted these mistakes in order to correct them, in order to mobilize the working class and the working peasantry to fight against difficulties and overcome them. In this regard, the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress (in March 1919) on an alliance with the middle peasants were of enormous historical significance.

Lenin made a special report at the congress on work in the countryside, raising in his report with all his force the question of the inadmissibility of violence against the middle peasantry. “Don’t you dare command! This is the rule that we have set for ourselves,” said Ilyich to the applause of the entire congress ( Lenin, vol. XXIV, p. 168).

The central place in the report was given by Vladimir Ilyich to the task of establishing and ensuring an alliance of the working class with the middle peasantry. At the same time, Lenin emphasized the need to fully ensure the leading role of the working class in this union as the most important condition for the strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The decisions of the congress were of great importance for further consolidating the alliance of the working class with the middle peasantry and our victories in the civil war. The congress, in a special address to the entire party and the working class, focused the attention of all party members and all workers on the military situation of the republic.

“The enemies of Soviet power,” the address said, “are straining every effort to deal a decisive blow to the proletariat. Kolchak, Denikin, Petliurists and White Guards in the west were preparing a general offensive on all fronts for March. Their plan was to, simultaneously with the general offensive, raise a series of uprisings within the country, mainly in the immediate rear of the Red Army... Taking advantage of the difficult food situation is directly included in the immediate plan of all enemies of the proletariat. The Left Social Revolutionaries in their last speeches were a direct instrument of the general plan of the tsarist generals - Denikin and Kolchak. Some of the Mensheviks just as zealously act as agents of the White Guard.” The appeal called on all party and Soviet organizations to “immediately mobilize their forces and be ready to respond with a merciless blow to any attempt to use the difficult months to disrupt the state building of the proletariat.”

The VIII Congress summed up the results of more than a year of work on military development. These results were reflected both in the special resolution of the congress on the military issue, and in the party program (in the military field) adopted by the congress. The congress gave a decisive rebuff to everyone who in one form or another opposed the party’s military policy. The most important tasks of the party in the military issue at that time boiled down to the need to put an end to partisanship, create a regular Red Army with iron military discipline based on the class consciousness of the fighters, and widely involve old military specialists in the work of building the armed forces of the proletarian state. The resolution on this issue was defended at the congress by Lenin and Stalin. They were opposed by supporters of maintaining elements of partisanship in the Red Army and refusing to use military specialists. Excerpts from Comrade Stalin's speech on the military issue give a comprehensive idea of ​​the essence of the disputes at the Eighth Party Congress. In this speech, the views and proposals of the military opposition, defended by V. Smirnov, who later, like Trotsky, descended into open counter-revolution, were subjected to merciless criticism and exposure. Comrade Stalin opposed them - these proposals - with a clear Leninist program - a list of main tasks in the field of military development.

“All the questions raised here,” Comrade Stalin said at the congress, “come down to one thing: to be or not to have a strictly disciplined army in Russia. The whole question is this. Six months ago or 8 months ago we had a new army, after the collapse of the old , tsarist, - a volunteer, poorly organized army, with collective management and command, not obeying orders. This was the period when the offensive on the part of the Entente was more or less clear. The composition of the army was mainly, if not exclusively, workers due to the lack of discipline. , due to the lack of harmony of this volunteer army, due to the fact that orders were not carried out, due to disorganization in the administration of the army, we suffered defeats, went so far as to take Kazan from us, and Krasnov was advancing from the south... The facts said that the volunteer army, poorly organized and a disciplined army, does not stand up to criticism that we, the Soviet Republic, will not be able to defend our republic if we do not create another army, a regular army, imbued with the spirit of discipline, with a well-organized political department, able and capable of standing on its feet and marching at the first order on the enemy.

...The question is whether the conscious discipline, the one that we had, whether good or bad, during the period of volunteering, should be consciously supplemented with iron discipline. I must say that those elements, non-workers, who make up the majority of our army - peasants, they will not fight for socialism, they will not. They don't want to fight voluntarily. A number of facts on all fronts point to this. A whole series of riots in the rear, at the fronts, a whole series of excesses at the fronts show that the non-proletarian elements who make up the majority of our army do not want to fight voluntarily for communism. Hence our task is to force these elements to fight, to follow the proletariat, not only in the rear, but also at the fronts, to force them to fight imperialism and, in this process of rallying the armed peasantry around the proletarians, to complete the construction of a real regular army, the only one capable of defending the country. That's the question.

…Either we create a real workers’ and peasants’, predominantly peasant, strictly disciplined army and defend the republic, or we are lost.

...The project presented by Comrade Smirnov has, makes all attempts, hidden, admittedly not very clear, but clear to me, all attempts to undermine discipline, to give relief to the peasant elements, to prevent them from being chained into a single disciplined mass." (Stalin, On the Opposition, pp. 668–669).

The program of the military opposition was wrong. But among the military oppositionists there were excellent workers, seasoned Bolshevik revolutionaries, the direct builders of the Red Army and its commanders, without whom it was impossible to do at the front. Being all the time in a front-line situation, they directly experienced the dire consequences of the erroneous leadership of the Red Army on the part of the central military apparatus and Trotsky, who headed it. Comrade Voroshilov, in his report “15 Years of the Red Army,” indicated: “The majority of military delegates, who arrived from numerous fronts, sharply raised before the Party Congress the question of the leadership of the construction and combat operations of the Red Army on the part of the RVS and Trotsky... The military delegates almost unanimously agreed that that the Red Army of that time was not yet organized as a regular army, that the work of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic in the field of organizational creativity was going very badly. The delegates reported on how locally, with the help of party committees, relying on the workers, we had to hastily put together military units and, without any preliminary preparation, throw them to plug a breakthrough or to reinforce our battle-weary units. They complained that there were no reinforcements from the center, etc. They noted that the RVSR misinterpreted the role of military experts, which gave rise to local friction and betrayal by a number of former officers. There was strong dissatisfaction with Trotsky for his callous, hostile attitude towards the old Bolsheviks, who were at the fronts and endured all the hardships of battle on their backs. Already by this time, Trotsky was trying to shoot a number of the most responsible military communist front-line soldiers, and only the intervention of the Central Committee and the resistance provided by front-line workers prevented the death of a number of people.”

It is clear that Lenin and Stalin were very attentive to the statements and speeches of direct workers on the ground - front-line soldiers, many of whom they knew and appreciated very well. That is why the congress, which gave a decisive rebuff to representatives of the military opposition who opposed the party line on the military issue, in particular against the widespread use of military specialists, simultaneously hit Trotsky hard (who, as Comrade Voroshilov aptly pointed out in the above-mentioned report, preferred to stay in “front” to the troubles that awaited him at the congress) and his like-minded people, who, contrary to the party line, “replaced the party leadership of the army with the uncontrolled power of specialists, thereby giving the worst of them the opportunity to betray us” (Pravda editorial No. 35, February 5, 1931) .

In addition to the main documents on the military issue (the military section of the party program and a special resolution), the congress adopted another small resolution, essentially directed directly against Trotsky.

“The Eighth Congress of the RCP,” this resolution read, “instructs the Party Central Committee to take immediate measures:

1) to reorganize the field headquarters with the establishment of closer connections with the fronts and their direct leadership;

2) to regulate the work of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic;

3) to streamline the work of the All-Russian Main Headquarters in connection with defects in its activities (formation, publication of charters, etc.) and the need to strengthen party representation in the All-Russian Main Headquarters;

4) to convene periodic meetings of responsible party workers of the front...".

The work of the congress coincided with the deployment of the first campaign of the Entente against us. In March, Kolchak went on the offensive with three armies - northern (on the right flank), western (in the center) and southern (on the left flank). Despite the fact that the central direction was the most important for Kolchak, because if successful, it would have led him to a junction with Denikin and the shortest route to Moscow, Kolchak’s strongest army was the right flank. Here the pressure from England was felt, which insisted on uniting Kolchak’s army with the northern interventionist troops, since it was especially interested in the northern region with its rich forests, which were so necessary for the British. Of no less importance was the fact that the interventionists from the north intended to capture Moscow by the closest route (Arkhangelsk - Vologda). By mid-April, Kolchak's northern army was detained by Red troops east of Glazov. The greatest successes were achieved by the western Kolchak army, which advanced from Ufa to Chistopol (east of Kazan) and Buguruslan. Simbirsk and Samara faced the threat of being captured by the Whites.

During the same period, Denikin began to show more active activity in the south. Having gained a foothold in the North Caucasus, he transferred his main forces to the Don region and Donbass. Having captured Lugansk and the eastern part of Donbass, he began to prepare an offensive to the north and northeast to connect with Kolchak. At the height of the fighting on the eastern and southern fronts, on May 14, the troops of General Yudenich went on the offensive against Petrograd. In May, the Whites occupied Yamburg, Gdov and Pskov. In the rear of the VII Red Army, which fought against them, as a result of the betrayal of a number of old officers who were in the ranks of the Red Army and went back to the side of the whites, the counter-revolutionaries captured one of the largest forts on the shore of the Gulf of Finland, “Red Hill”, and the neighboring fort, “Grey Horse”. On the western front, the Polish army, fulfilling its assigned part of the general plan for the campaign against the Soviet Republic, also went on the offensive and by mid-April captured the Vilno-Lida-Baranovichi front, threatening the capital of the Byelorussian SSR, Minsk. Soviet Russia again, as in the summer of 1918, found itself in a ring of fire. Only on the Ukrainian front did the Red armies defeat the Petliurists and approach the borders of Western Ukraine.

In such a situation, the most important thing for the Red Army was the correct decision on the direction of the main blow of our armed forces against the enemies.

Some military workers proposed recognizing the Ukrainian front as the main one as the closest to Europe, strengthening it at the expense of other fronts, and shifting all attention to direct military support for the revolution in Europe, in particular in Soviet Hungary. In making this proposal, they proceeded from the Trotskyist position that without the victory of the proletarian revolution in Europe, Soviet power in Russia would still not be able to maintain itself.

Comrade Antonov-Ovseenko, who commanded the Ukrainian front in the spring of 1919, himself admits that “the highest Ukrainian command saw bright prospects for promoting the world revolution, and therefore it was too easy to divert its attention from tasks that were far from being resolved on the southern front. He was also characterized by an overestimation of our forces on the southern front and an underestimation of the forces of the volunteer army." (Antonov-Ovseenko, Notes on the Civil War, vol. III, p. 215).

“We dreamed of lending a hand to the rapidly revolutionizing West,” he emphasizes in another place. These sentiments, generally quite healthy if they were based on the interests of the world proletarian revolution that had already begun, in the specific situation of those days were harmful sentiments. They were fueled by disbelief in the possibility of the victory of socialism in Soviet Russia, a lack of understanding that on any front the defense of the Land of Soviets as the basis of the world revolution is the best help and support for the revolution in Europe, and the resulting denial of the international significance of our civil war, in particular the struggle in the East and southern fronts. And from here came an underestimation of the importance of the eastern and southern fronts, since only a revolution in the West could, in the opinion of some military workers in Ukraine, save the Soviet Republic.

It is clear that the proposal to shift the center of gravity to the Ukrainian front to the detriment of the southern and especially eastern fronts was an adventure that threatened the death of Soviet Russia and the defeat of the world revolution.

Thus, in the spring of 1919, on the Ukrainian front there was a revival of the “left” - the communist and Trotskyist sentiments of 1918 (the Brest period). Moreover, these anti-party sentiments were also reflected in general political issues. In particular, some of the leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic (Rakovsky and others) distorted Lenin’s directives on national and land issues. They denied the right of Ukrainians to self-determination; Instead of distributing landowners' lands between the poorest and middle peasants, state farms were intensively planted, all this creating great difficulties in strengthening Soviet power in Ukraine. It is clear that, just like in 1918, the party gave a merciless rebuff to all such sentiments and actions.

The Bolshevik Party, led by Lenin, in all its activities proceeded primarily from the interests of the world proletarian revolution, from the interests of the international proletariat. And the interests and fate of the world proletarian revolution depended primarily on whether it would be possible to defend Soviet Russia from the onslaught of Entente imperialism. The defense of the proletarian state was (and is) of enormous international importance, because the Land of Soviets was (and is) a stronghold, a center of the world revolution.

In the situation that developed in the spring of 1919, the interests of the socialist revolution first of all required repelling the Entente campaign and defending Soviet Russia.

That is why the party rejected the war plans of some Ukrainian workers. Having set a double task for the Red Army in Ukraine: “to concentrate the main efforts of the Ukrainian troops on the Donetsk and Bukovina directions towards Chernivtsi,” Lenin in a special telegram (dated April 22, 1919) emphasized that “of the two main tasks, the first is the most important and the most urgent is to help Donbass; the second task is to establish a strong connection via railways with Soviet Hungary.”

It was impossible to move large forces to help Hungary before the liberation of Donbass, before the defeat of Kolchak and Denikin, since this would make it easier for Kolchak and Denikin to go on the offensive against the Red Army. And indeed, very soon (in May) the kulak uprising of Grigoriev in the rear of the Ukrainian Red Army, and then the advance of Denikin, forced the Soviet troops to strain all their strength to fight the internal counter-revolution. True, Grigoriev’s uprising was literally liquidated in a few weeks by the troops of the Kharkov Military District under the leadership of Comrade Voroshilov. But the situation on the other fronts of the Soviet Republic continued to remain extremely tense.

M. In Frunze.

In the spring of 1919, of all the fronts, the party recognized the eastern front as the most important. The party mobilized and sent all its forces to the eastern front to defeat Kolchak.

On April 11, 1919, the Party Central Committee approved the theses proposed by Lenin on the situation on the eastern front. Pointing out that “Kolchak’s victories on the eastern front create an extremely formidable danger for the Soviet Republic,” the Central Committee put forward to all party organizations the tasks of ensuring the mobilization announced on April 10, the total mobilization of communists in the front line, intensifying agitation among those being mobilized and the Red Army, the creation of committees to assist the Red Army, involvement of peasant youth from non-agricultural areas in the Red Army and food detachments. “In relation to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the party line,” the theses said, “is as follows: those who help Kolchak, consciously or unconsciously, will be imprisoned.”

“We must exert all our strength, deploy revolutionary energy, and Kolchak will be quickly defeated. The Volga, the Urals, Siberia can and must be defended and conquered,” was the main idea of ​​the Central Committee’s directive to the working class and the entire party.

Under the slogan “everyone to fight Kolchak,” the party mobilizes communists, workers and toiling peasants of Soviet Russia to help the eastern front. During April–May, the party sent about 10 thousand communists to the eastern front. The planned general mobilization (in 9 provinces) was carried out as soon as possible. It gave about 35 thousand new fighters, of which about 27 thousand were workers, who formed the main backbone of the Red Army. Additionally, a widespread mobilization of all workers born in 1890–1892 was carried out. She gave about 70 thousand more people. Finally, about 25 thousand were mobilized from each volost of 10–20 fighters - poor and middle peasants.

Back at the end of 1918, in order to coordinate all the work in the rear with the needs of the front, for the general management of the matter of defense both at the front and in the rear, the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense was created. It was headed by Lenin. As the head of the highest defense body, Vladimir Ilyich directly directed and was in charge of all work on organizing assistance to the eastern front. From transferring reinforcements and equipment to supplying fighters with bast shoes, from organizing underground Bolshevik cells in Kolchak’s rear to sending gifts to fighters, from helping their families to supplying units with newspapers and leaflets - Ilyich was in charge of this and much more, monitoring everything, pushing, reminding, who needs to be pressed, who needs to be encouraged.

The measures taken by the party quickly improved the situation at the front. And already at the end of April, the southern group of the eastern front (from the I, IV, V and Turkestan red armies) under the command of the old Bolshevik, militant revolutionary Comrade Frunze and member of the Revolutionary Military Council, Comrade Kuibyshev, launched a victorious counter-offensive.

The defeat of Kolchak is one of the most important moments of the civil war. You just need to be transported to the situation of those days to fully understand the significance of the April-May strike on Kolchak (as well as the subsequent October-November strike on Denikin).

V. V. Kuibyshev.

In fact, behind Kolchak stood world imperialism with its banks and major industry; behind Kolchak there was an immense territory: the Far Eastern region, all of Siberia, the Urals; Kolchak had an army of several hundred thousand people, successfully moving west, towards Moscow (it was no coincidence that the White command was going to rename the “Western” army into the “Moscow”); Kolchak's rear was provided by a 200,000-strong army of interventionists. The attack on Soviet Russia was carried out concentrically, from all sides. And suddenly, unexpectedly of course only for the imperialists, the most important link in the chain - Kolchak - is knocked out.

The plan for the defeat of Kolchak was developed and implemented under the general leadership of Lenin. Directly led the armies intended to counterattack Kolchak, as we already know, Comrade Frunze. The main idea of ​​the plan was as follows: to defeat the White armies, throw them beyond the Urals, eliminating the possibility of uniting with Denikin’s forces, and then, relying on the Urals with its industry, revolutionary proletariat and peasantry, throw the defeated White armies at the bayonets and pitchforks of the Siberian partisans.

G. Guy.

Since it was necessary to eliminate the possibility of connecting Kolchak’s and Denikin’s troops near the Volga, in the Samara region, where the forces of Kolchak’s middle (western) army were being sent, the Reds’ task was reduced primarily to striking at these white troops that had moved forward, and at the same time to striking not at the front, but from the flank and precisely from the south to the northeast, in order to really cut off the eastern counter-revolution from the southern.

Comrade Frunze, who received at his disposal four armies with a total number of 55–60 thousand fighters (against 80–85 thousand whites) on a front stretching up to 800 km, decides to assemble a fist (strike group) in the Buzuluk area for an attack on Ufa. He has no free forces at his disposal. The main command sends a few reinforcements, addressing them mainly to the V Army (the left flank army of the southern group). What should I do? And Comrade Frunze is going to expose such important directions of his front as Orenburg and Ural. He calls on the workers of these cities to take upon themselves their defense. And from these areas he removes and sends such strong units as the 25th Division under the command of the legendary hero V.I. Chapaev to Buzuluk (About Chapaev, the fight against the Whites on the eastern front, see. Furmanov, Chapaev.), like the Kashirin cavalry brigade, two brigades of the 31st division.

Thanks to these decisive measures, the strength of the strike group is planned to be almost 24 thousand fighters. The principle of concentrating the main number of forces in the most important direction is carried out by Comrade Frunze steadily. He is already preparing to begin implementing the plan, but then the front command intervenes and transfers almost half of the strike group (about 10 thousand soldiers) to the V Army. In fact, the strike group (commanded by the late G.V. Zinoviev) numbered 12 thousand people when it went on the offensive.

To facilitate its actions by better securing its right flank and diverting the enemy's attention, Comrade Frunze orders the 1st Army to liquidate the 4th White Corps. This operation was successfully completed by the 1st Army (commander Comrade Gai) from April 22 to 26. In addition to ensuring the actions of the strike group, this operation provided an opportunity to test the stability of the Whites. It turned out, as our party had foreseen, that the mobilization of peasants into the White Army greatly weakened it. Entire units, having killed officers, came over to our side and joined the ranks of the Red Army. With all the greater confidence in victory, Comrade Frunze began to implement the main plan.

Since the strike force was halved, he reduced the scope of its strike. The first stage of the operation is a strike to the north, to Buguruslan. In battles from April 28 to May 4, the 6th Corps was defeated, the White 3rd Corps was thoroughly battered, and Buguruslan was captured. The 73rd brigade of the 25th division, led by Comrade Kutyakov, especially distinguished itself in battles.

I. S. Kutyakov

After the first success, Comrade Frunze intends to turn the strike group (it received the name of the Turkestan Army, since the command of this army was placed at the head of the group) to the east. But the front command intervenes again. The difficulties on the left flank of the V Army make him so nervous that he requires Comrade Frunze to send a strike group not to the east, but to the northwest to help the V Army, i.e. literally in the opposite direction from the one envisaged by the so-called plan. Frunze. We have to obey. But by fulfilling the task of the Comfront, Comrade Frunze nevertheless ensures the possibility of carrying out his plan. In battles from May 5 to 13, units of the Turkestan and V armies defeated the 2nd White Corps and captured Bugulma. Now the opportunity finally opens up to turn east to Ufa, and then to the Urals. But the command of the eastern front, which did not realize the essence of the plan to defeat Kolchak, and was distrustful of Comrade Frunze’s plan, tried here, too, on the eve of the decisive blow, to change the direction of action of the southern group. In fact, the group is disbanded - the V Army is withdrawn from it. Then the Turkestan army is asked to turn north again, to the Kama, to the aid of the Second Red Army. With great difficulty, Comrade Frunze achieves the opportunity to carry out his plan, which in essence was the party’s plan, because it completely followed from its directives and ensured the implementation of its tasks. In the battles from May 14 to 17 in the Belebey direction, Kappel’s corps, the best part of the Whites, was liquidated. Ahead is the path to the Belaya River, to Ufa, where the defeated units hastily retreat, thereby causing the retreat of the rest of the (neighboring) armies of Kolchak. It would seem that the most important task of the Reds now is the march to the Urals.

The communists go to the defense of Petrograd.

But the frontline command hesitates and looks around. As a result, the red armies are marking time or moving at a slow pace. The news of this reaches Ilyich. He immediately intervenes in the matter. On May 29, he sent the following telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front: “If we do not conquer the Urals before winter, then I consider the death of the revolution inevitable; exert all your strength, closely monitor the situation, mobilize the entire front-line population, monitor political work... You are responsible for ensuring that the units do not begin to disintegrate and the mood does not fall.” Only after Ilyich’s intervention did the red armies go on the offensive again.

At the height of the fighting on the eastern front, Denikin’s right-flank army - the Caucasian one - moved to Tsaritsyn, and his left-flank army - through the Donbass to Ukraine, in order to subsequently move to Moscow. But Denikin’s White Army failed to unite with the Kolchakites - it was stopped by our troops on the line of the Seim - Liski - Balashov River.

Due to the rapid advance of Yudenich's troops, the defense of Petrograd acquired exceptionally great importance.

In the rear of the VII Red Army, which defended it, as a result of the betrayal of a group of old officers who were in the ranks of the Red Army and went over back to the side of the whites, the counter-revolutionaries, as already mentioned, captured (June 13) one of the largest forts on the shores of the Gulf of Finland, “Red Hill” and nearby Fort Gray Horse. The Soviet government and the party could not allow the fall of the first city of the revolution.

The Central Committee of the Party addressed all party organizations with a letter in which it emphasized that “Soviet Russia cannot give up Petrograd even for the shortest time.” “St. Petersburg workers,” the letter continued, “sparing no effort, they gave tens of thousands of soldiers to all fronts. Now all of Soviet Russia must come to the aid of Petrograd. The Central Committee invites the St. Petersburg organizations to mobilize every single worker and all responsible party workers in the Petrograd, Novgorod, Pskov, Tver, Olonetsk, Severodvinsk, Vologda (these two provinces in addition to those they should give to the eastern front), Cherepovets and Vitebsk provinces, all send those mobilized by resolution of the party committees and trade unions to help Petrograd as soon as possible. Every hour is precious. Petrograd must have the number of armed forces necessary to defend it from all attacks."

To organize the defense of Petrograd, the Party Central Committee sends Comrade Stalin. Here is what Comrade Voroshilov says about his role in the defense of St. Petersburg:

“Within three weeks, Comrade Stalin manages to create a turning point. The laxity and confusion of the units are quickly eliminated, the headquarters are pulled up, mobilizations of St. Petersburg workers and communists are carried out one after another, enemies and traitors are mercilessly destroyed.

Comrade Stalin also supervised the operational work of the military command. This is what he telegraphs to Comrade Lenin:

“Following the “Red Hill”, the “Grey Horse” was eliminated, their guns are in perfect order, there is a fast... (inaudible) ... of all fronts and fortresses. Marine experts claim that the capture of the “Krasnaya Gorka” from the sea overturns all marine science. All I can do is mourn so-called science. The rapid capture of Gorka is explained by the most blatant interference on the part of me and civilians in general in operational matters, which went as far as canceling orders by sea and land and imposing their own. I consider it my duty to state that I will continue to act in this way, despite all my reverence for science. Stalin."

After 6 days, Comrade Stalin reports to Lenin:

“The turning point in our units has begun. During the week we did not have a single case of partial or group defections. Deserters are returning by the thousands. Runs from the enemy camp to our camp became more frequent. Over the course of a week, 400 people came running to us, most with weapons. Our offensive began yesterday afternoon. Although the promised reinforcements had not yet been received, it was impossible to stand further on the same line on which we stopped - it was too close to St. Petersburg. So far the offensive has been successful, the Whites are fleeing, and today we have occupied the Kernovo-Voronine-Slepino-Kaskovo line. We took prisoners, 2 or more guns, machine guns, and cartridges. The enemy ships do not appear, apparently they are afraid of the “Red Hill”, which is now completely ours. Urgently send 2 million rounds of ammunition at my disposal for the 6th Division..."

These two telegrams give a complete picture of the enormous creative work that Comrade Stalin did in eliminating the extremely dangerous situation created near Red Peter." (Voroshilov, Stalin and the Red Army).

The sailors of the Baltic Fleet fought selflessly both on land and at sea. Due to the lack of coal, the operational capabilities of our ships were very limited, which the English fleet took advantage of more than once. Nevertheless, our submarines and destroyers disabled many enemy ships - among them one of the best English submarines L-55 (sank on June 4, 1919). Already in 1931, this boat was recovered by our divers and, after repair, was included in the naval forces of the Baltic Sea.

By the beginning of June, the armies of the eastern front approached the banks of the Kama and Belaya rivers. Kolchak's armies intended to gain a foothold here, relying on the Ural ridge. At this point, Trotsky, influenced by the advance of Denikin’s armies to the north and northwest, demanded that the armies of the eastern front stop on the line of the Belaya River (near Ufa) and that several divisions from the east be transferred to the southern front. Trotsky's proposal was contrary to Lenin's directive of May 29, cited above, in which he proposed not to weaken the offensive to the east. Trotsky’s “concern” for the southern front to the detriment of the eastern front was explained, again, as was observed among some workers of the Ukrainian front, by the denial of the international significance of our civil war, the denial of the decisive importance of the defense of Soviet Russia in any sector for the cause of the world proletarian revolution. Regardless of anything, Trotsky proposed to pay maximum attention to the offensive towards the borders of Western Europe, without a revolution in which, in his opinion, the Soviet republics would still not be able to hold out. A further attack on Kolchak, in Trotsky’s opinion, moved the forces of the Red Army away from the western borders of the Soviet state. On the contrary, a strike on Denikin, if successful, would again bring large forces of the Red Army to Ukraine, bringing them closer to the borders of Western Europe.

Meanwhile, it was absolutely obvious that it was impossible to “leave the Urals with its factories, with its railway network in Kolchak’s hands, where he could easily recover, gather his fist and again find himself near the Volga - he must first drive Kolchak beyond the Ural ridge, into the Siberian steppes , and only after that start transferring forces to the south" (Stalin, On the opposition, p. 110).

Stopping the victorious offensive against Kolchak would have lowered the fighting spirit of the Red Army units. Moreover, in this case, the Red Army would have lost the support of tens of thousands of Ural workers and Siberian peasant partisans, who, under the leadership of the party, did not stop fighting the Kolchakites and were preparing to take on their bayonets, spears and pitchforks the defeated and thrown back White Guards by the Red Army.

Even during the spring offensive of Kolchak, uprisings of workers and peasants under the leadership of underground Bolshevik organizations unfolded in his rear. One of the first uprisings - the Kustanai - in March - April 1919, although it was suppressed by Kolchak’s troops with exceptional cruelty (the number of victims is up to 18 thousand people!), but it played a role: the Whites were forced to withdraw large numbers from the front at the height of their offensive strength.

Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev and Chief of Staff P.P. Lebedev.

Of even greater importance were the uprisings and partisan struggle in the rear of Kolchak’s armies in the second half of 1919, carried out in accordance with the decisions of the II Conference of underground party organizations in Siberia and under the leadership of the Siberian Bureau of the Party Central Committee. In turn, the Siberian Bureau of the Party Central Committee coordinated its activities with the plans of the command of the eastern front, and later the V Army. On July 19, the Central Committee of the Party adopted a special resolution on Siberian partisan detachments. This decree invited disparate detachments to unite, move to centralized command, and establish closer ties with underground party organizations. Workers on the Eastern Front were asked to establish close contacts with the partisans and coordinate the actions of the Red Army with the actions of the partisans.

This resolution played a decisive role in the development and intensification of the partisan movement in Siberia. In Western Siberia, along the Altai Railway, detachments of Mamontov (in Slavgorod district) and Gromov (in Kamensky district) operated with 3-4 thousand fighters each. Altai partisans played a huge role in the capture of Barnaul and Semipalatinsk.

In the Yenisei province, outstanding assistance to units of the Red Army was provided by partisan detachments of comrades. V. G. Yakovenko, P. E. Shchetinkina and A. D. Kravchenko. Cheremkhovo workers who rebelled on December 19, Minyarsk, Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk workers, railway workers - all of them, with their selfless struggle for the power of the soviets, accelerated the liquidation of the Kolchak regime.

It was this support of the Ural and Siberian workers and peasants, more than anything else, that made it possible ultimately, after the final defeat of Kolchak, to withdraw part of the troops from the eastern front and transfer them to the southern front. This could have been done all the more easily since, with access to Siberia, the eastern front was reduced in its length from north to south to 400 kilometers, and the further it went, the more - as against 1,200 kilometers at the beginning of our counterattack.

If the Red Army’s offensive against Kolchak was suspended, as Trotsky proposed, Kolchak would be able to recover, would be able to drown the partisan movement in blood and would move on Moscow with new forces.

Based on this, the Central Committee rejected Trotsky’s plan as a plan that threatened Soviet Russia with dire consequences, and removed Trotsky himself from participation in the affairs of the Eastern Front. At the same time, the Central Committee replaced the supporter of Trotsky's plan - the then commander-in-chief Vatsetis - with the new commander-in-chief S.S. Kamenev and demanded a continuation of the offensive against Kolchak. The defeat of Kolchak that soon followed completely confirmed the correctness of the line of the Central Committee of the Party, the correctness of Lenin’s demands.

In the struggle for the Urals in the Ufa, Zlatoust and Chelyabinsk operations, as well as in previous operations and battles, the armies of the eastern front showed exceptional steadfastness and heroism. Communists, commanders from junior to division and army commanders, inspired tired soldiers with their personal example.

In the battles for Ufa, when crossing the Belaya River, there was such a case. The Ivanovo-Voznesensky regiment crossed to the enemy shore, pushed back the whites, but, having fired all the cartridges, was forced to gain a foothold while awaiting reinforcements. The enemy took advantage of this. “And so,” says a participant in this battle, the late proletarian writer Dmitry Furmanov, “when, instead of demonstrative attacks, the enemy launched a real broad offensive, the chains shook, the fighters could not stand it, they retreated. The commander and commissar stop the fighters. They gallop along the flanks, shouting In order for the retreating to stop, they quickly explained that there was nowhere to run anyway - there was a river behind them, it was impossible to transport them, that they had to stand up, gain a foothold, they had to accept the attack. And the wavering fighters lingered and stopped retreating. At this time, several horsemen galloped up to the chains. , they jumped to the ground. This is Frunze, with him the head of the army’s political department, Trallin, and several close people... He ran forward with a rifle: “Hurray, forward!”

All those who were close recognized him. With the speed of lightning the news rushed through the chains. The fighters were overcome with enthusiasm and rushed forward furiously. The moment was exceptional. They rarely fired, there was little ammunition, they rushed with bayonets towards the avalanches of the advancing enemy. And so great was the power of the heroic upsurge that the chains of the enemy now trembled, turned and ran... The turning point was completed, the situation was restored." (Dm. Furmanov; Chapaev).

In the battle near Ufa, the 25th, now Chapaevskaya, division selflessly fought with its glorious division commander in front. It was here, in the region of Krasny Yar - the village of Turbasly, that Kolchak’s shock officer and cadet units conducted a “psychic attack” on the Chapaevites from June 7 to 9, the same attack that was shown with such exciting skill in the film “Chapaev.”

The division emerged victorious from these battles. Soon after the capture of Ufa, the 25th Division was transferred to the southern Urals and here, in the battle near Lbischensk, on September 5 Chapaev died (drowned in the Ural River). One of the reasons for the success of the White Cossacks was the poorly organized security of the headquarters of the Chapaev division.

In many battles, the direct assistance of workers rebelling behind white lines, or the performances of partisans ensured the success of the Red Army. For example, “the battle for Chelyabinsk lasted several days and cost us 1,500 killed and wounded. The city passed from hand to hand. At the most critical moment, the Chelyabinsk workers came to the rescue, four hundred of them got into the fight. The appearance of these people in work blouses with rifles in their hands aroused enormous enthusiasm among the Red Army soldiers. What was important was not that 400 new soldiers came, but that the Red Army soldiers felt with all their being that the people were with them. And despite the fact that there were fewer of us and that there was so little ammunition that we had to go at the enemy with bayonets more than once without a single charge, the moral superiority decided the matter” (from the memoirs of a participant).

The heroism of the Red Army soldiers, workers and peasants, led by the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin, ensured the victory of the Red Army in the east. Kolchak was defeated, the Urals were liberated from the whites. The Red armies marched victoriously across the Siberian steppes. The first combined campaign of the Entente failed.