Interesting facts about Emperor Nicholas I. Unborn Emperor

Part (Volume) 2

Chapter VII. Holy Alliance and Military Settlements

Army of Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich

Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich was a soldier in the full sense of the word. Until the age of 20, he was not intended to reign and received a purely military, drill, education. Military business was his favorite thing, his vocation. He loved him not as an amateur, but as a connoisseur. He considered the army to be his family. “There is no phrase-mongering here, no lies that you see everywhere,” he often said. “That’s why I feel so good between these people and that’s why my military rank will always be held in high esteem.” The Sovereign had a special affection for the engineering troops (34). The sappers paid the Sovereign the same and preserved the cult of his memory. For a long time after his death, already in the 70s, officers of the engineering troops continued to wear short mustaches and sideburns. Nicholas I was especially favored by the Life Guards Sapper Battalion, the first to rush to him on December 14. Handing this battalion in 1828 under the walls of Varna the St. George banner. The emperor wept. Loving the soldier, when he was the Grand Duke and commander of the Izmailovsky regiment, he tried not to show this feeling (Alexander I did not tolerate "popular bosses"), which is why at first he was not understood by the troops, which, as you know, took advantage of the Decembrists. Subsequently, already the King, he walked in the winter cold behind the coffin of a simple Private...

All his reign was a retribution for the mistakes of the previous one. The young Emperor received a heavy inheritance from his brother. The guard was seized with ferment, which was not slow to turn into open rebellion. The settled army murmured muffledly. Society sharply condemned the existing order. The peasantry was worried. A paper ruble was worth 25 kopecks in silver...

Under such conditions, the Decembrist uprising broke out. It had the most sad consequences for Russia and had the same influence on the policy of Nicholas I that the Pugachevshchina had on the policy of Catherine and that Karakozov's shot would subsequently have on the policy of Alexander II. It is difficult to say what would have happened to Russia if this uprising had succeeded. Headless, she would have plunged into chaos, before which the horrors of Pugachevism would have paled. Having caused a storm, the conspirators, of course, would no longer be able to cope with it. A wave of twenty-five million rebellious serf slaves and a million disobedient soldiers would have swept away everyone and everything, and the Decembrists of 1825 would very soon have suffered the fate prepared for the “Februaryists” of 1917. The buckshot on Senate Square alienated these horrors from Russia for almost a century.

Strictly condemning the Decembrists, who played with fire, we must, however, always keep in mind the conditions that gave rise to this revolt. Among the Decembrists there were scoundrels like the fanatical doctrinaire Pestel{35} who hid his soldiers "to teach them to hate their superiors"; scoundrels came across, like Prince Trubetskoy, who organized the uprising, framed his comrades for buckshot, and himself hid in the house of his son-in-law, the Austrian ambassador. However, among them were also the most honest people, like Ryleev, the last chicks of Petrov's nest, the last politically educated (though most of them went the wrong way) officers. They were convicted without trial, without observing any procedural and legal norms - at the complete arbitrariness of the members of the investigating commission, who sometimes pursued selfish goals (the scandal with the Chernyshevsky majorate). The well-connected prisoners were told in advance what they would be asked and what they had to answer. 32-year-old General Lopukhin{36} he was released “for youth”, and a 16-year-old junker boy, who was tried in the same category, was sent to the Siberian battalions. The excessively zealous advisers of the young Emperor made a terrible, irreparable mistake, creating an aura of martyrdom for the Decembrists. The entire political outlook of the Russian intelligentsia was based on the cult of the five hanged and hundreds of those exiled to the mines.

As a result of this event, the guard changed part of its officer corps. The rebellious troops (parts of the regiments of the Life Guards of the Moscow, Grenadier and Guards Crew) were sent to the Caucasus as part of the Consolidated Guards Regiment to atone for their guilt in the war with the Persians. In relation to the Sovereign to Muscovites and grenadiers, a chill was felt in his reign, as well as then under Alexander II . Only Mountain Dubnyak made the memory of Senate Square disappear forever. In the South, the unrest was, as we already know, especially strong among the commanders of the 2nd Army (VI and VII Corps) and in the III Corps of the 1st Army, where the Chernigov Infantry Regiment rebelled. All these troops, together with the guards, were soon sent to the Balkans and there they finally rehabilitated themselves in the eyes of the Sovereign.

* * *

The Polish campaign of 1831 showed the poor combat training of the settled troops (especially the cavalry). The “cholera riot” that accompanied it revealed the enormous demoralizing effect of military settlements on military spirit and discipline. Therefore, proceeding to the transformation of his army. Emperor Nicholas I decided to start with the removal of this ulcer.

Military reforms could be started only after the end of the important events of 1825-1831. At the end of 1831, all Polish national troops were abolished, and in 1832 military settlements were reorganized and renamed into arable soldier districts.

In 1833, a general transformation of the army was carried out. All 42 Chasseurs and 5 Carabinieri regiments were disbanded and 3 brigades of infantry divisions were abolished. Also abolished were 26 infantry regiments and all 3 naval ones. Instead of 33 infantry divisions with 194 regiments, 30 with 110 regiments (10 guards, 16 grenadiers, 84 army infantry), 27 divisions - in 4 regiments and a separate Caucasian Grenadier Brigade were left. 3 divisions (22nd, 23rd and 24th) consisted of line battalions. Formed 3rd guards division of 2 guards (Warsaw) and 2 grenadier (Kexholm and St. Petersburg) regiments. Instead of these latter, the Lithuanian Grenadier Brigade was transferred to the Grenadier Corps. Infantry divisions were in 2 brigades. They then invariably remained in the same regiments until the catastrophe of 1917 and the death of the old army. The divisions from the 1st to the 18th made up, in numerical order, 6 infantry corps of the 3rd division. The 19th, 20th and 21st formed the Caucasian Corps. The outlying divisions - the 22nd in Finland, the 23rd on the Orenburg line and the 24th in Siberia - were not included in the corps.

Large formations - regiments and brigades - were reduced by a third. The number of battalions, however, did not decrease: the battalions of the disbanded regiments were attached to the remaining ones, which had the effect of bringing these latter into 5- and 6-battalions. The states of the 6-battalion regiment are defined as 5359 people in peacetime and 6588 people in wartime. In order to preserve the name and traditions of the abolished chasseurs, it was ordered in the guards to keep the fourth regiments of divisions in the chasseur position, and in the army divisions the regiments of the second brigades were called “chasseurs”, while preserving, however, their names. For example, Kamchatka Jaeger. Podolsky, Zhytomyr, Mingrelian Jaeger regiments and so on. In the Life Guards regiments of Finland and Volyn, the "jäger step" remained forever.

The Guards and Grenadier Corps (both in 3 divisions) were subordinate to one commander in chief. This position was held until his death in 1849 by Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, then by General Ridiger{37} . I - IV Corps were called "active" and made up the 1st Army of General Paskevich (headquarters in Warsaw). V and VI are called "separate" - they reinforced, if necessary, the troops operating in the Caucasus and generally played the role of an all-army reserve. The 2nd Army was abolished.

In artillery, companies are called batteries. All in 12 guns. Each infantry division was assigned an artillery brigade of the same number. Artillery consisted of 28 foot brigades - 3 guards, 4 grenadiers (from the Caucasus), 21 field and 6 mounted. brigades - a total of 125 batteries with 1500 guns, not counting the Cossack artillery, siege parks and fortress artillery companies. The artillery divisions, one per corps, were retained. Guards artillery brigades were 3-battery (2 battery and 1 light battery), Grenadier and field - 4-battery (2 battery and 2 light), horse - in 2 batteries. In the guards infantry division there were 36 guns for 16 battalions, in the army division for 24 battalions 48 guns, that is, 2 guns per 1000 bayonets, which was very little. Cavalry artillery brigades were usually assigned one per corps. The Guards and the 2nd Cavalry Artillery Brigade were in double strength. The 22nd, 23rd and 24th Infantry Divisions did not have artillery brigades.

The cavalry underwent the same reform as the infantry. Of the 75 regular regiments, 55 were left. The squadrons of the disbanded regiments were attached to the remaining ones. Horsemen have been completely abolished.

From 4 lancers and 3 hussar divisions, 7 light cavalry divisions were formed, each with 2 lancers and 2 hussar regiments. All light regiments are assigned to 8 active and 2 reserve squadrons.

Guards cavalry consisted of 2 divisions - Cuirassier (former 1st) and Light. Two other cuirassier divisions remained settled in Little Russia. The cuirassier regiments were composed of 6 active and 1 reserve squadron.

The reorganization of most of the dragoon regiments into lungs, begun under Alexander I, continued in the first years of the new reign. In 1826, 8 dragoon regiments were converted into lancers and hussars, and only 2 out of 4 dragoon divisions were left. Of the 37 dragoon regiments that were in 1812, only 9 were left, counting Nizhny Novgorod in the Caucasus, which was not part of the divisions. During the transformation of the army in 1833, these 2 divisions made up the 11th reserve cavalry corps, which was given a special device and purpose. Emperor Nicholas decided to take advantage of the ability of the dragoons to dismount to organize a "dragoon corps" capable of operating both on horseback and on foot. All 8 regiments of the corps were part of 10 squadrons. 2 pikemen did not dismount, and 8 dragoons each formed a rifle platoon on foot. The division formed a company (in 2 platoons), and the entire dismounted regiment was equal to a battalion. A dismounted division formed a regiment, and the entire corps formed a brigade. The corps was a mass of 10,000 pikes and checkers on horseback, and 6,500 bayonets with 48 guns on foot. Pikemen were assigned to guard horsemen and cover the flanks.

This organization of dragoons existed throughout the reign of Nicholas I, but was not tested either in the Hungarian campaign or in the Eastern War, where the "dragoon corps" did not participate.

In 1856, during the reorganization of the cavalry, it was abolished: the presence of a mass of 10,000 horses in the immediate vicinity of the dismounted dragoon battalions and the line of fire was considered risky.

The entire regular cavalry thus amounted to 13 divisions and 1 separate Guards brigade (Warsaw), consolidated into 4 corps (Guards and I - III cavalry). A total of 10 guards, 8 cuirassiers, 9 dragoons, 14 lancers and 14 hussars. The Cossack regiments were brought into the composition of 6 hundreds (instead of 5, and the Don regiments, which until then were named after colonels, received numbers).

In general, the reform of 1833 is characterized by an increase in the combat composition of infantry and cavalry regiments by reducing their number. At the same time, the same picture was repeated that in the 80s of the 18th century, with the increased formation of grenadiers and chasseurs by Potemkin, and in 1810, when third brigades were converted to chasseurs, namely: a number of old, honored regiments suffered. When the horsemen were disbanded, for example, the Chernigov regiment, founded under Tsar Alexei, and the first cavalier of St. George (with the Pavlograd hussar) in the Russian cavalry were abolished. With the abolition of the rangers, a number of old, distinguished regiments worthy of being its decoration disappeared from the infantry (such as the 13th, 14th, 42nd regiments). Peter's veterans were not spared - Perm, Vyatka, Vyborg, the hero Ishmael, glorified by Burtsev in the Caucasus, the Kherson grenadier was not spared ... The old regiments were still valued as little in our country as in the reign of Catherine. Since the end of the 30s, in this regard, however, a turning point has been outlined - and since 1838, the regiments, which have 100 years of existence, began to complain about the "jubilee" St. Andrew's ribbons on the banners. Banners with St. Andrew's (blue) anniversary ribbons complained only to the regiments of the guard. Army regiments received the scarlet ribbons of Alexander Nevsky. In 1842, the highest decree restored the seniority of the Erivan Carabinieri Regiment from 1642 (the Elected Butyrsky Regiment). However, it was not until the reign of Alexander II and especially Alexander III that the cult of the old regiments was given its proper place.

* * *

In the 1930s, instead of rangers, a new type of light infantry was introduced - riflemen. Back in 1829, the Finnish Rifle Battalion was formed, and in 1837, 2 rifle battalions were formed, and this laid the foundation for glorious battalions, then regiments with crimson piping. By the mid-40s, each corps had already formed a battalion of riflemen.

Particular attention was paid to the formation of line battalions - the main type of infantry on the outskirts. In 1829, all the garrison troops of the Caucasian Corps, the 23rd and 24th divisions of the Orenburg and Siberian Corps, and in 1835 the 22nd Infantry Division in Finland were converted to line battalions. At the end of the 1940s, there were 96 line battalions, reduced by 5 to 8 into brigades. 47 battalions in the Caucasus (18 Georgian, 16 Black Sea, 13 Caucasian), 22 Finnish, 16 Siberian (12 West Siberian and 4 East Siberian) and 11 Orenburg. In the Black Sea army before the Turkish war, a foot battalion was formed from horseless Cossacks - scouts. By the beginning of the Eastern War, there were already 6 plastun battalions.

In 1827, the Border Guard was established, initially consisting of 6 brigades (3600 ranks). By the end of the reign, its composition was brought up to 11 brigades with 11,000 ranks. The guard was subordinated to and at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance, and for a long time the highest command was given to civilian ranks. The chiefs of the customs districts enjoyed the rights of the chiefs of divisions, and the director of customs fees had the rights of a corps commander. This inconvenience was eliminated only in 1893 by the creation of the Border Guard Corps.

By the recruitment charter of 1831, the Russian Empire was divided into two bands - Eastern and Western. Sets were made alternately: a year later in each. Less than 7 recruits per 1000 revision souls were taken into “ordinary” sets, from 7 to 10 into “reinforced” sets, over 10 into “extraordinary” sets. less than 45,000 people, in "reinforced" from 45,000 to 65,000 people.

The term of service in 1834 was reduced from 25 years to 20 (in the guard from 22 to 20), after which the soldiers were dismissed for 5 years on indefinite leave, from where they could be called up if necessary (that is, they were transferred to the reserve). Since 1839 they served only 19 years.

In 1842, all infantry regiments were ordered to be brought into a 4-battalion structure (with the exception of the regiments of the 19th, 20th and 21st divisions of the Caucasian Corps, which were part of 5 active battalions). The 5th and 6th battalions were named "reserve" and were kept in an extremely weak cadre (1 officer, 23 lower).

The codification of all the laws of the Russian Empire undertaken in 1832 to 1840 led to the publication in 1839 of the Code of Military Regulations - a collection of all laws and orders relating to the Russian armed forces. This Code (as well as the subsequent 1859) consisted of 5 parts:

I. On the formation of military institutions (Ministry of War, departments of troops, military educational institutions);

II. About service and awards;

III. Order to the troops (charters);

IV. On the preparation of supplies;

V. Charter military criminal.

In 1846, a new Regulation on the field command of the troops was drawn up (in the spirit of the previous Regulation of 1812).

Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich was an opponent of cruel corporal punishment{38} . In 1839, he abolished the fuchteli and limited the use of gauntlets to a number of unspoken orders, reducing the number of blows by a factor of three. It is strictly forbidden to carry out executions without a doctor. This latter had the right to prohibit the execution of the weak or stop it at any time. The former draconian provisions, however, continued to remain in the text for warning.

The transformations of the early 30s were reflected in the appearance of the army. In 1833, a new form of uniform was introduced, which, like the former, pursued only a ceremonial effect. The troops received single-breasted dark green uniforms, somewhat longer than the previous double-breasted ones with a colored chest, and blue-gray pantaloons (white left in the summer). In the cavalry - leggings of the same color. The hateful boots have been abolished, and high boots have been introduced into the infantry. Heavy and uncomfortable shakos with sultans were replaced by pointed helmets on the Prussian model. Helmets lasted in our army for 30 years - in them she did the Hungarian campaign and the beginning of the Eastern War. They were beautiful, but very uncomfortable on the campaign, and the troops, where they could, replaced them with caps, and in the Caucasus with hats adopted from the highlanders. Having adopted the helmet from the Prussians, we forgot to adopt their helmet cover{39} . The skin was shrinking from the heat, and the helmet was kept on the top of the head. The scaly belt always crumbled.

Since 1832, military ranks were allowed to wear mustaches and sideburns, until then prohibited in the infantry, with the obligation, however, for the lower ranks to be sure to make them black (in 1855, Alexander II ordered this to be done only when guarding and at parades, and in 1859 this last vestige of Gatchina cosmetics was abolished).

The sanitary condition of the troops was very poor. The equipment, which weighed 77 pounds, was heavy and uncomfortable; clothes are designed only for the parade and poorly protected from the weather; the drill was harsh and exhausting, and the quartering conditions of the troops - unsanitary - the barracks had a little more than a third, the majority, especially the cavalry, huddled up in the dirtiest places and villages of the Western Territory. Emperor Nicholas I sought at the beginning of his reign to build barracks for the entire army. However, the committee established by him found that a billion rubles was needed for this. The construction of the barracks had to be postponed for several decades. This work was completed only in the 90s under Alexander III. Morbidity and mortality were twice those of Western European armies and three times the corresponding ages of the civilian population. From 1841 to 1850, for example, the average annual morbidity was up to 70 percent of the staff, and mortality was up to 4 percent. A recruit who entered for 20 years thus had an 80 out of 100 chance of dying in the service, even without a war. Military infirmaries could accommodate only a third of the patients.

By the beginning of the Eastern War, the regular army reached an impressive figure on paper: 27,745 officers and 1,123,583 lower ranks. Emperor Nicholas, to whom only one pleasant report was reported for 30 years, sincerely believed in the perfection of the military system he had instituted. “I have a million bayonets,” he said, “I will order my minister - and there will be two, I will ask my people - there will be three.” Alas, on paper, a million actually gave barely half a million fighters ... The shortage in general against the states reached 20 percent, and the “millionth” figure included disabled people, cantonists, internal guard troops, a motley mosaic of local, garrison, guard teams ... In the field the fifth part of the troops were all kinds of non-combatants. The army could not be mobilized, the insignificant cadres of reserve units could not cope with the training of the called-up recruit mass. The militia, in no case, could be considered combat-ready. The chagrin of the Sovereign, who had been striving all his life for only one goal - the good of Russia, was immeasurable. He saw that all the enormous labors turned out to be useless, all thirty years of work was fruitless - and these torments broke his iron nature.

* * *

The largest organizational event of this reign was the transformation of "His Majesty's Retinue for the Quartermaster" into General base. Already in 1826, it was forbidden to let young officers into the suite directly from the corps. At the end of the Turkish War, a commission was appointed under the chairmanship of General Jomini to develop the staff of the General Staff and establish a higher military scientific institution. The work of this commission led to the development in 1832 of the staff of the General Staff (17 generals, 80 staff and 200 chief officers) and the establishment of the Imperial Military Academy, the first head of which was Jomini.

The Swiss military thinker reaped the fruits of the long-term and systematic work of Prince P. M. Volkonsky. The father of the Russian General Staff was Volkonsky - Jomini was only a "Swiss tutor", and one cannot say that he was a particularly successful tutor. He thought of the General Staff as a hermetically closed corporation, tightly isolated from the army. Army, troops - on their own. The General Staff is on its own. The columnists of Volkonsky knew and understood the troops - the academicians of Jomini turned into some kind of military institutes, completely unfamiliar with military capabilities and combatant life. Since that time, the separation of the General Staff from the troops began - the most severe blunder of the Russian military organization, which never managed to be corrected ... The transition from the General Staff to other departments and into service was impossible - for a long time even teaching in military educational institutions was considered inappropriate establishments. In other words, the General Staff began to exist only for the General Staff...

The Academy was a temple of abstract military science, and with the departure of Jomini it became a temple of military scholasticism. When Jomini retired in 1834, General Sukhozanet 1st was appointed head of the academy, who had been in this position throughout the reign of Nicholas I. Having a poor understanding of military science, he paid attention only to the combat unit, external improvement. General Schubert, Chief of the General Staff, who at the same time was the director of the military topographic depot, became in charge of the educational department and reduced all teaching to a one-sided passion for mathematical disciplines with almost complete disregard for strategy and tactics. The Academy began to produce excellent draftsmen, not bad astronomers, dashing riders, but very mediocre quartermasters.

The service of an officer of the General Staff was ungrateful. Production was only for vacancies opening in the "corporation" itself, and those were very rare. It was much more difficult to get the rank of general than in the ranks, especially since the officers of the General Staff of the regiments were not given. By promotion to major general, they could get a brigade, but this happened extremely rarely. In 1843, the officers of the General Staff were allowed to return to duty, but only for vacancies in the part where they had previously served. The usual end of a career here was the rank of colonel. All this resulted in a reduction in the number of candidates for the General Staff. The source of its replenishment began to dry up quickly - and in 1851, out of the entire millionth Russian army, only 7 officers expressed a desire to enter the academy!

This circumstance greatly alarmed the Sovereign, who showed a number of favors to the academy: the officers of the General Staff were given increased maintenance, promotion in the service, and the right to return to duty without any restrictions. A number of senior commanders were determined to be students of the academy, and its prestige immediately increased: from 1852 to 1856, despite the war, 35-40 people entered every year.

* * *

The most important military figure of the reign of Emperor Nicholas I was Field Marshal Paskevich, Count of Erivan, His Serene Highness Prince of Warsaw.

Paskevich enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the Emperor. For a quarter of a century - from the Polish campaign to the Eastern War inclusive - he was the complete master of the Russian armed forces.

Undoubtedly gifted, intelligent, ambitious and supremely domineering, Paskevich had the good fortune from his very youth to attract the attention of all the major military leaders of the great century and build himself a brilliant career. He covered himself with glory near Smolensk at the head of the 26th division, and after the war he received the 1st Guards Division, where he had subordinates of the Grand Dukes - Nikolai Pavlovich, commander of the 2nd brigade, and Mikhail Pavlovich, commander of the Petrovsky brigade. Emperor Nicholas called him his "father-commander" all his life - and the opinion of "Ivan Fedorovich" in his eyes was infallible.

For all his merits, Paskevich had very big shortcomings. His lust for power and despotic manner of dealing with subordinates made him a very unpleasant boss, especially since, always attributing all successes only to himself, he dumped all failures on his subordinates (a quality that was then repeated in another major military leader - Brusilov). Paskevich's military talents are indisputable, but overestimated by his contemporaries, who in their flattery to the all-powerful field marshal reached the most unworthy obsequiousness. In 1847, during the life of Nicholas I and at the peak of Paskevich's power, N. Ustryalov undertook a panegyric description of the reign. Describing the invasion of Transcaucasia by Abbas Mirza in 1826, Ustryalov did not hesitate to write: “Under the walls of Elisavetpol, he was met by the one whom fate destined to be in our time a threat to Russia’s enemies in Asia and Europe, a leader worthy of the Russian army, Paskevich met him there” .

Since the time of Potemkin, not a single military leader has been showered with the monarch's generosity to such an extent: he received the rank of Field Marshal, the Order of St. Persian indemnity). As a commander, he proved himself excellently in the Erivan campaign against the Persians, and especially in the Erzerum campaign against the Turks, both times having incomparable Caucasian troops and dashing Caucasian commanders. He arrived in Poland already “ready-made” after Dibich. The Hungarian campaign was carried out by him very mediocrely, and in the Eastern War, on the Danube, his generalship turned out to be completely untenable. As a young general, he was perfectly aware of the disorganizations of our military system, but when he became a field marshal, having received full power, he did nothing to correct these disorganizations. Paskevich gave nothing to the army, not a single positive organizational event is associated with his name. He by no means created a school of generals, but his influence on his subordinates was ultimately negative, thanks to his system of depersonalization.

Above Paskevich, another knight of St. George of the 1st degree should be placed - Count Zabalkansky. He did a lot of work on the creation of the General Staff and was mainly engaged in organizational and staff work (whereas Paskevich was a combat commander). Dibich{40} conducted only one campaign in its entirety - his Trans-Balkan campaign, but this campaign is brilliant in terms of the synthesis of the idea, the simplicity of the plan (sacrifice of the secondary to the main) and the decisiveness of the execution.

It should be noted the winner of Gergey - General Ridiger, whom contemporaries considered the best combat general of the entire army, and the hero of Transylvania, General Leaders{41} who discovered a bright military leadership talent. Both of these remarkable military leaders, however, did not take part in the Eastern War (a victim of the pride of the "father-commander") - and the fate of the army in the Crimea was entrusted to third-rate figures - Menshikov and Gorchakov.

Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, Commander-in-Chief of the Guards and Grenadiers, was a strict and extremely demanding boss in military service, having inherited his father's "Gatchina spirit" with particular force (the Sovereign had to restrain him all the time). At the same time, having a kind and sensitive heart, he met the needs of each of his subordinates, who constantly turned to him in difficult times. The Grand Duke showed special activity in the position of chief head of military educational institutions that he combined. In total, 14 cadet corps were opened during the reign of Nicholas I. Nicholas I was very fond of the cadets, who for their part adored him. When he visited the buildings, the cadets tore their gloves, scarves of the Sovereign as a keepsake, even tore off the buttons of his uniform, and kept these relics all their lives.

* * *

Gatchina traditions continued to be respected in full force. The Sovereign himself and both of his brothers were ardent supporters of the "front" and the Prussian drill. In 1843, the army was re-equipped with 6-line piston guns.{42} (instead of the previous 7-line flintlock model of 1811) excellent ballistic qualities for a smoothbore gun (they hit at 600 steps). In addition, rifled fittings were introduced into the infantry, however, in very limited quantities. Rifle battalions and selected riflemen in the infantry, 6 people per company, were armed with these rifles, which hit 1200 steps, which made up a regimental rifle team of 96 people (a complete analogy with the teams of Catherine's skirmishers - rangers). In general, for 40,000 smoothbore guns in the ranks of the corps, there were about 2,000 fittings, and this proportion (one fitting for 20 smoothbore guns) was preserved until the end of the Eastern War.

Only 6 rounds per year per person were still issued for shooting. In other regiments, even these ill-fated six cartridges were not shot from the commendable economy of gunpowder. The meaning of the army was seen not in war, but in parades, and the gun was looked at not as a weapon for shooting and thrusting, but primarily as a tool for grasping tricks. The ideal of the true “trucksmen” was to bring the unit to such a degree of perfection that the bayonets of the guns taken “on the shoulder” stuck out without hesitation, and the guns rang when performing tricks. To achieve this effect (which greatly touched the authorities), many commanders did not stop before damaging the weapon, ordering the screws to be loosened.

The basis of the training of troops was the so-called "linear doctrine", which brought innumerable harm to the Russian army. The purpose of this exercise was to accustom the troops to harmonious movements in mass. This was thought to be achieved by commanding the troops “along the lines” (hence the name of the entire system) exclusively by one team. During corps exercises, for example, the corps commander personally gave all the commands. The linear doctrine, having assumed the external forms of perpendicular tactics, however, poured into these forms the soul of the linear “Friedrichian” tactics, to which the grandchildren of the Kunersdorf victors had a completely irresistible, strange (explained, however, by Gatchina) attraction, despite the final bankruptcy of this tactic in 1806 near Jena-Auerstedt.

The combat training of troops during maneuvers was reduced to a spectacular offensive in long, deployed lines of several battalions marching in step, and all the concerns of commanders - from platoon to corps - were reduced to one, the most important thing: maintaining alignment. These marching lines were usually not covered by rifle chains (the loose formation, as we saw, was not asked at reviews). Even the troops could not stand the field service exercises. Usually the regiment deployed only half a company of riflemen in loose formation, and the arrows stood in pairs in the chain so that one gun always remained loaded.

All battle formations were a combination of two lines and a reserve. It was assumed that the deployed battalions of the 1st line attacked one by one, through the battalion, and stopped for firing, preparing with fire the success of the attack of the 2nd line, which followed non-stop in battalion columns (12 lines). The change of front, the change of lines - all this was based on the correct and orderly movement of those who were replacing and being replaced. These latter were assumed to be undisturbed (although then, it would seem, why should they be replaced?). The whole system was characterized by extreme rigidity of forms, their "template", ignoring fire (deep, massive constructions) and a great commitment to accurate digital data. The introduction of troops into battle piecemeal, in "packs", is legitimized by linear exercises and firmly instilled in all senior command instances.

Thus, on the parade grounds of the end of the Alexander and Nicholas eras, some kind of special “peaceful military” tactics was created, which had nothing in common with actual combat requirements. This system completely killed in the troops, and especially in the commanders, any sense of reality. Everything was built on fiction, starting with the “show attacks” of divisional and corps exercises and ending with the “show” of loading and the “show” of a single training shot. The methods that led the Prussian army to the catastrophe of 1806 were implanted many years later in the Russian army with a tenacity worthy of a better application. And only thanks to the incomparable qualities of a Russian officer and a Russian soldier, instead of the shame of Jena, we received the mournful glory of Sevastopol.

One by one, figures of the Napoleonic wars left the stage. Modestly went out "outright", having served their own, officers and soldiers - veterans of Borodin and Leipzig. Their places were taken by new people - the same Russian officers and soldiers, but who did not have the combat experience and combat dexterity of their predecessors and did not think about the war at all as the ultimate goal, did not prepare for it, did not consider the war with anyone at all possible after how we defeated the whole of Europe, led by Napoleon himself.

Only the Caucasian regiments preserved the real military spirit, the immortal Russian military traditions in full splendor. The rest of the army, little by little, forgot how to fight ...

It is difficult for today's conscripts to imagine that in the old days in Russia, the term of service was not one, not two, or even three years - it was for life. Leaving to serve, the soldier said goodbye to his home forever. How they were taken to the soldiers, who could not serve, how Peter I created the army - the answers to these questions can be found in our review.

How Peter I created the army

Before Peter I came to power, archers carried lifelong military service, passing it on by inheritance. There was such a thing as resignation, but it was quite difficult to retire. There were two options: either a diligent, impeccable service, or an available applicant for the place, who should have been looked for on his own.

Archers were well trained and were considered professionals. When there was peace, they lived quietly on the land, which they complained about for good service, worked as fire extinguishers, kept order in the territory, and performed some other duties. When the war began, the archers left their homes and were placed at the disposal of the military authorities; also, with a lack of military personnel, it was allowed to recruit additional people.

Peter I decided to create a regular army in Russia, using European standards. He issued a decree on recruitment duty, which allowed men to be called up for service not only at the time of the war, and which extended the duty to all classes.

Representatives of the peasantry and philistinism also went to the army, but out of a hundred men of these estates, only one was recruited. The peasant community chose the recruit, for the serfs the decision was made by the master. But the nobles were obliged to serve all without exception. True, they immediately became officers.

The population reacted to the new decree with caution, because being recruited meant that a man was leaving his home forever. A clear draft age was not established, most often men were taken in their prime, from 20 to 30 years old. The attitude to the recruiting system was also confirmed by constant shoots. It got to the point that a convoy was used to escort recruits to the assembly point. Recruits spent the nights shackled, and a tattoo in the form of a cross was knocked out on their palms.

Officers and soldiers who were captured by the enemy received compensation, the amount of which depended on the country. In the second half of the 18th century, compensations were abolished so that soldiers would not seek to surrender in order to receive money. Bonuses were paid not only for brave behavior in battle, but also for victory in general. For example, after the Battle of Poltava, Peter I ordered that all participants be rewarded.

Softening of conditions after the death of Peter I

Peter 1 took upon himself the solution of a very difficult task - the creation of a regular army capable of combat operations at any moment. The tsar took an active part in many matters, for example, he forbade the use of family and friendly ties, followed this, as well as the approval of officer appointments.

During the 18th century, conditions of service gradually became milder. Ordinary soldiers could rise to the rank of officers, while receiving a hereditary title of nobility. For the nobles, the term of military service was reduced to 25 years, and the right was given to one man from the family not to join the army. This happened after Peter I died. Catherine II freed the nobility from military service, but since it provided a good income, many nobles did not use this right.

It was possible to pay off the service by purchasing a recruit ticket for money or by finding another recruit to replace him. The clergy and merchants, as well as honorary citizens, were completely exempted from military service.

Life of retirees under Catherine II and Paul

After the abolition of lifelong service, a category of retirees appeared. The soldier had to adapt in the rear. In the time of Peter, those who had served were used as mentors for recruits or watchmen. The man received a salary and was in the army. If the soldier was too old or seriously injured, then he was sent to the monastery, Peter I even issued a decree obliging monasteries to have almshouses for soldiers.

During the reign of Catherine II, according to the Order of Public Charity, the state took care of the oldest soldiers, the soldiers' almshouses at the monasteries ceased to exist. Instead, the state received some money from the church. All disabled people (and at that time it was called not only a person with any kind of injury, but any retiree) received pensions. Under Paul, there were even disabled companies used to escort convicts, guard prisons, and guard outposts. In 1778, the first nursing home was opened, where retired soldiers, unable to live independently and receiving care for the rest of their lives, lived on a full board basis.

Soldiers' wives and their social status

Soldiers could marry, while serving, they had to get the permission of the chief for this. Soldiers' wives became free people, even if they were from serfs, and the sons of soldiers were transferred to the jurisdiction of the military department, and they necessarily received an education. For this there were regimental schools.

In the summer, the soldiers settled in field camps, when the cold season came, they moved to apartments. They were taken to stay by ordinary residents of villages and villages - a kind of apartment duty. Not all homeowners liked this state of affairs, because conflicts were quite frequent. From the middle of the 18th century, soldiers' settlements began to be created, that is, special areas for the soldier. Settlements were a kind of small towns, where there were infirmaries, churches, baths. Gradually, the soldiers moved to the barracks, which arose in large cities in the late 18th - early 19th centuries.

Appeals in the 19th century

During the 19th century, there was a gradual decrease in the service life: 20, 15 and 10 years. In 1874, recruitment was abolished and general conscription was introduced, with a service life of 6 years for the ground forces and 7 years for the navy. They were sent to serve according to the results of a lottery: conscripts pulled out notes with notes from a closed box, and those who did not get the marked ones were considered militiamen. They could be mobilized if necessary. The draft age is from 21 to 43 years. Representatives of all classes were called, except for the Cossacks and the clergy.

The call did not apply to the only sons in the family, grandchildren of infirm grandparents who had no other guardians, older brothers in orphan families and university professors. Students and peasants moving to new places received a respite. The territorial principle was used to recruit regiments, since it was believed that countrymen could better find a common language and be more united at a crucial moment.

• Appointment of an heir
• Ascension to the throne
• The theory of official nationality
• Third branch
• Censorship and new school regulations
• Laws, finance, industry and transport
• The peasant question and the position of the nobility
• Bureaucracy
• Foreign policy until the early 1850s
• Crimean War and the death of the emperor

1. Appointment of an heir

Aloysius Rockstuhl. Portrait of Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich. Miniature from the original 1806. 1869 Wikimedia Commons

In a nutshell: Nicholas was the third son of Paul I and was not supposed to inherit the throne. But of all the sons of Paul, only he had a son, and during the reign of Alexander I, the family decided that Nicholas should be the heir.

Nikolai Pavlovich was the third son of Emperor Paul I, and, generally speaking, he should not have reigned.

He was never prepared for this. Like most Grand Dukes, Nicholas received primarily a military education. In addition, he was fond of the natural sciences and engineering, he drew very well, but he was not interested in the humanities. Philosophy and political economy generally passed him by, and from history he knew only the biographies of great rulers and generals, but had no idea about causal relationships or historical processes. Therefore, from the point of view of education, he was poorly prepared for state activity.

In the family, from childhood, they did not take him too seriously: there was a huge age difference between Nikolai and his older brothers (he was 19 years older than him, Konstantin - 17), and he was not attracted to state affairs.

In the country, almost only the guards knew Nikolai (since in 1817 he became the chief inspector of the Corps of Engineers and the chief of the Life Guards of the Sapper Battalion, and in 1818 - the commander of the 2nd brigade of the 1st infantry division, which included several guards units ), and knew from a bad side. The fact is that the guard returned from the foreign campaigns of the Russian army, according to Nikolai himself, loose-mouthed, unaccustomed to drill training and having heard enough freedom-loving conversations, and he began to discipline her. Since he was a stern and very quick-tempered man, this resulted in two big scandals: first, before the formation, Nikolai insulted one of the guards captains, and then the general, the favorite of the guards, Karl Bistrom, before whom he eventually had to publicly apologize.

But none of the sons of Paul, except Nicholas, had sons. Alexander and Mikhail (the youngest of the brothers) had only girls, and even they died early, and Konstantin had no children at all - and even if they had, they could not inherit the throne, since in 1820 Konstantin entered into morganatic marriage Morganatic marriage- an unequal marriage, the children from which did not receive the right to inherit. with the Polish Countess Grudzinskaya. And in 1818, Nikolai had a son, Alexander, and this largely predetermined the further course of events.

Portrait of Grand Duchess Alexandra Feodorovna with her children - Grand Duke Alexander Nikolaevich and Grand Duchess Maria Nikolaevna. Painting by George Doe. 1826 State Hermitage / Wikimedia Commons

In 1819, Alexander I, in a conversation with Nikolai and his wife Alexandra Fedorov, said that not Konstantin, but Nikolai would be his successor. But in a way, Alexander himself still hoped that he would have a son, there was no special decree on this matter, and the change of heir to the throne remained a family secret.

Even after this conversation, nothing changed in Nikolai's life: he remained the same as he was a brigadier general and chief engineer of the Russian army; Alexander did not allow him to any state affairs.

2. Accession to the throne

In a nutshell: In 1825, after the unexpected death of Alexander I, an interregnum began in the country. Almost no one knew that Alexander called Nikolai Pavlovich's heir, and immediately after Alexander's death, many, including Nikolai himself, took the oath to Konstantin. Meanwhile, Constantine was not going to rule; Nicholas did not want to see the guards on the throne. As a result, the reign of Nicholas began on December 14 with a rebellion and the shedding of blood of subjects.

In 1825, Alexander I suddenly died in Taganrog. In St. Petersburg, only members of the imperial family knew that the throne would be inherited not by Constantine, but by Nicholas. Both the leadership of the guard and the governor-general of St. Petersburg, Mikhail Milo-radovich, did not like Nicholas and wanted to see Constantine on the throne: he was their comrade-in-arms, with whom they went through the Napoleonic wars and foreign campaigns, and they considered him more inclined to reforms (this did not correspond to reality: Constantine both externally and internally looked like his father Paul, and therefore it was not worth expecting changes from him).

As a result, Nicholas swore allegiance to Constantine. The family did not understand this at all. Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna reproached her son: “What did you do, Nikolai? Don't you know that there is an act that declares you heir?" Such an act actually existed. August 16, 1823 Alexander I, which stated that, since the emperor does not have a direct male heir, and Konstantin Pavlovich expressed a desire to renounce his rights to the throne (Constantine wrote about this to Alexander I in a letter back in early 1822), the successor - No one announces Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich. This manifesto was not made public: it existed in four copies, which were stored in sealed envelopes in the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin, the Holy Synod, the State Council and the Senate. On the envelope from the Assumption Cathedral, Alexander wrote that the envelope should be opened immediately after his death., but was kept secret, and Nikolai did not know its exact content, since no one had familiarized him with it in advance. In addition, this act had no legal force, because, according to the current Pavlovian law on succession to the throne, power could only be transferred from father to son or from brother to brother next in seniority. In order to make Nicholas heir, Alexander had to return the law on succession to the throne adopted by Peter I (according to which the reigning monarch had the right to appoint any successor to himself), but he did not.

Constantine himself was at that time in Warsaw (he was the commander-in-chief of the Polish armies and the de facto viceroy of the emperor in the kingdom of Poland) and flatly refused both to take the throne (he was afraid that in this case he would be killed like his father), and officially , according to the existing form, renounce him.

Silver ruble with the image of Constantine I. 1825 State Hermitage

Negotiations between St. Petersburg and Warsaw lasted about two weeks, during which there were two emperors in Russia - and at the same time not a single one. Busts of Konstantin have already begun to appear in institutions, and several copies of the ruble with his image have been printed.

Nicholas found himself in a very difficult situation, given how he was treated in the guard, but in the end he decided to declare himself heir to the throne. But since they had already sworn allegiance to Konstantin, now a re-swearing was to take place, and this had never happened in the history of Russia. From the point of view of even not so much the nobles as the guards soldiers, this was completely incomprehensible: one soldier said that gentlemen officers can re-swear if they have two honors, but I, he said, have one honor, and, having sworn in once, I'm not going to swear a second time. In addition, two weeks of interregnum gave the opportunity to gather their forces.

Upon learning of the impending rebellion, Nicholas decided to declare himself emperor and take the oath on December 14. On the same day, the Decembrists withdrew the Guards units from the barracks to Senate Square - in order to allegedly protect the rights of Konstantin, from whom Nicholas takes the throne.

Through parliamentarians, Nikolai tried to persuade the rebels to disperse to the barracks, promising to pretend that nothing had happened, but they did not disperse. It was towards evening, in the dark the situation could develop unpredictably, and the performance had to be stopped. This decision was very difficult for Nikolai: firstly, when giving the order to open fire, he did not know whether his artillery soldiers would obey and how other regiments would react to it; secondly, in this way he ascended the throne, having shed the blood of his subjects - among other things, it was completely incomprehensible how they would look at this in Europe. Nevertheless, in the end, he gave the order to shoot the rebels with cannons. The square was swept away by several volleys. Nikolai himself did not look at this - he galloped off to the Winter Palace, to his family.

Nicholas I in front of the formation of the Life Guards of the Sapper Battalion in the courtyard of the Winter Palace on December 14, 1825. Painting by Vasily Maksutov. 1861 State Hermitage Museum

For Nicholas, this was a difficult test, which left a very strong imprint on his entire reign. He considered what had happened to be God's providence - and decided that he was called by the Lord to fight the revolutionary infection not only in his own country, but in Europe in general: he considered the Decembrist conspiracy to be part of a pan-European one.

3. The theory of official nationality

In a nutshell: The basis of the Russian state ideology under Nicholas I was the theory of official nationality, formulated by the Minister of National Education Uvarov. Uvarov believed that Russia, having joined the family of European peoples only in the 18th century, was too young a country to cope with the problems and diseases that struck other European states in the 19th century. ve-ke, so now it was necessary to delay her development for a while until she matured. To educate society, he formulated a triad, which, in his opinion, described the most important elements of the "folk spirit" - "Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality." Nicholas I perceived this triad as universal, not temporary.

If in the second half of the 18th century many European monarchs, including Catherine II, were guided by the ideas of the Enlightenment (and the enlightened absolutism that grew on its basis), then by the 1820s, both in Europe and in Russia, the philosophy of the Enlightenment disappointed many. Ideas formulated by Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schelling, Georg Hegel and other authors began to come to the fore, later called German classical philosophy. The French Enlightenment spoke about the fact that there is one road to progress, laid out by laws, human reason and enlightenment, and all the peoples who follow it will eventually come to prosperity. The German classics came to the conclusion that there is no single road: each country has its own road, which is led by a higher spirit, or higher mind. Knowledge about what kind of road this is (that is, what is the “spirit of the people”, its “historical beginnings”), is revealed not to an individual people, but to a family of peoples connected by a single root. Since all European peoples come from the same root of Greco-Roman antiquity, these truths are revealed to them; these are "historical peoples".

By the beginning of the reign of Nicholas, Russia found itself in a rather difficult situation. On the one hand, the ideas of the Enlightenment, on the basis of which government policy and reform projects were previously built, led to the failed reforms of Alexander I and the Decembrist uprising. On the other hand, within the framework of German classical philosophy, Russia turned out to be a “non-historical people”, since it did not have any Greco-Roman roots - which meant that, despite its thousand-year history, it all the same, destined to live on the side of the historical road.

Russian public figures managed to propose a solution, including the Minister of Public Education Sergei Uvarov, who, being a man of Alexander's time and a Westerner, shared the main provisions of German classical philosophy. He believed that until the 18th century, Russia was indeed a non-historical country, but, starting with Peter I, it joins the European family of peoples and thereby enters the general historical road. Thus, Russia turned out to be a “young” country, which by leaps and bounds is catching up with the European states that have gone ahead.

Portrait of Count Sergei Uvarov. Painting by Wilhelm August Golicke. 1833 State Historical Museum / Wikimedia Commons

In the early 1830s, looking at the next Belgian revolution Belgian revolution(1830) - an uprising of the southern (mostly Catholic) provinces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands against the dominant northern (Protestant), which led to the emergence of the Belgian kingdom. And, Uvarov decided that if Russia follows the European path, then it will inevitably have to face European problems. And since she is not yet ready to overcome them in her youth, now it is necessary to make sure that Russia does not step onto this disastrous path until it is able to resist the disease. Therefore, Uvarov considered the first task of the Ministry of Education to be “freezing Russia”: that is, not to completely stop its development, but to delay it for a while, until the Russians learned some guidelines that would allow them to avoid “bloody anxieties” in the future.

To this end, in 1832-1834, Uvarov formulated the so-called theory of official nationality. The theory was based on the triad “Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality” (a paraphrase of the military slogan “For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland” that took shape at the beginning of the 19th century), that is, three concepts in which, as he believed, lies the basis of the “folk spirit ".

According to Uvarov, the diseases of Western society arose from the fact that European Christianity split into Catholicism and Protestantism: there is too much rational, individualistic, divisive people in Protestantism, and Catholicism, being too doctrinaire, cannot resist revolutionary ideas. The only tradition that has managed to remain faithful to true Christianity and ensure the unity of the people is Russian Orthodoxy.

It is clear that autocracy is the only form of government that can slowly and carefully manage the development of Russia, keeping it from fatal mistakes, especially since the Russian people have in any case not known any other form of government except monarchy. Therefore, autocracy is at the center of the formula: on the one hand, it is supported by the authority of the Orthodox Church, and, on the other hand, by the traditions of the people.

But what is nationality, Uvarov deliberately did not explain. He himself believed that if this concept was left ambiguous, a variety of social forces could unite on its basis - the authorities and the enlightened elite would be able to find the best solution to modern problems in folk traditions. Interestingly, if for Uvarov the concept of “nationality” in no way meant the participation of the people in the very administration of the state, then the Slavophiles, who generally accepted the formula he proposed, placed the emphasis differently: emphasizing the word "narodnost", they began to say that if Orthodoxy and autocracy do not meet the people's aspirations, then they must change. Therefore, it was the Slavophils, and not the Westerners, who very soon became the main enemies for the Winter Palace: the Westerners fought on another field - no one understood them anyway. The same forces that accepted the "theory of official nationality", but undertook to interpret it differently, were perceived as much more dangerous..

But if Uvarov himself considered this triad temporary, then Nicholas I perceived it as universal, since it was capacious, understandable and fully consistent with his ideas about how the empire that fell into his hands should develop.

4. Third branch

In a nutshell: The main instrument with which Nicholas I had to control everything that happened in different strata of society was the Third Branch of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery.

So, Nicholas I was on the throne, being absolutely convinced that autocracy is the only form of government that can lead Russia to development and avoid shocks. The last years of his elder brother's reign seemed to him too flabby and unintelligible; the administration of the state, from his point of view, was loose, and therefore he first of all needed to take all matters into his own hands.

To do this, the emperor needed a tool that would allow him to know exactly how the country lives and control everything that happens in it. Such an instrument, a kind of eyes and hands of the monarch, was His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery - and first of all its Third Department, which was headed by the cavalry general, a participant in the war of 1812, Alexander Benckendorff.

Portrait of Alexander Benckendorff. Painting by George Doe. 1822 State Hermitage

Initially, only 16 people worked in the Third Department, and by the end of the reign of Nicholas, their number did not increase much. This small number of people did many things. They controlled the work of state institutions, places of exile and imprisonment; conducted cases related to official and the most dangerous criminal offenses (which included forgery of state documents and counterfeiting); were engaged in charity work (mainly among the families of killed or maimed officers); observed the moods in all strata of society; they censored literature and journalism and followed everyone who could be suspected of unreliability, including Old Believers and foreigners. To do this, the Third Division was given a corps of gendarmes, who prepared reports (and very truthful) to the emperor about the mood of minds in different classes and about the state of affairs in the provinces. The third branch was also a kind of secret police, whose main task was to combat "subversive activities" (which was understood quite broadly). We do not know the exact number of secret agents, since their lists never existed, but the fear that existed in society that the Third Division sees, hears and knows everything, suggests that there were quite a lot of them.

5. Censorship and new school regulations

In a nutshell: In order to educate subjects of reliability and loyalty to the throne, Nicholas I significantly increased censorship, made it difficult for children from unprivileged classes to enter universities and severely limited university freedoms.

Another important activity of Nicholas was the education of subjects of loyalty and loyalty to the throne.

For this, the emperor immediately took it. In 1826, a new censorship charter was adopted, which is called "cast iron": it contained 230 prohibitory articles, and it turned out to be very difficult to follow it, because it was not clear what, in principle, could now be written about. Therefore, two years later, a new censorship statute was adopted - this time quite liberal, but it soon began to acquire explanations and additions, and as a result, from a very decent one, it turned into a document that once again forbade too many things for journalists and writers.

If initially censorship was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Education and the Supreme Censorship Committee added by Nicholas (which included the ministers of public education, internal and foreign affairs), then over time, all ministries, the Holy Synod, the Free Economic Society received censorship rights , as well as the Second and Third offices of the Chancellery. Each author had to take into account all the comments that the censors from all these organizations wished to make. The third branch, in addition to other things, began to censor all the plays intended for staging on the stage: a special one had been known since the 18th century.

School teacher. Painting by Andrey Popov. 1854 State Tretyakov Gallery

In order to educate a new generation of Russians in the late 1820s and early 1830s, the statutes of the lower and secondary schools were adopted. The system created under Alexander I was preserved: one-class parish and three-class district schools continued to exist, in which children of unprivileged classes could study, as well as gymnasiums that prepared students for admission to universities. But if earlier it was possible to enter the gymnasium from the district school, now the connection between them was broken and it was forbidden to accept serf children in the gymnasium. Thus, education became even more class-based: admission to universities was difficult for non-noble children, and in principle closed for serfs. The children of the nobility were ordered to study in Russia until the age of eighteen - otherwise they were forbidden to enter the civil service.

Later, Nicholas also took up the universities: their autonomy was limited and much stricter procedures were introduced; the number of students who could study at one time at each university was limited to three hundred. True, several branch institutes were opened at the same time (Technological, Mining, Agricultural, Forestry and Technological School in Moscow), where graduates of district schools could enter. At that time, this was quite a lot, and yet by the end of the reign of Nicholas I, 2,900 students studied in all Russian universities - about the same number at that time were in Leipzig University alone.

6. Laws, finance, industry and transport

In a nutshell: Under Ni-ko-lai I, the government did a lot of useful things: the legislation was systematized, the financial system was reformed, and the transport revolution was carried out. In addition, industry was developing in Russia with the support of the government.

Since, until 1825, Nikolai Pavlovich was not allowed to govern the state, he ascended the throne without his own political team and without sufficient preparation to develop his own program of action. Paradoxical as it may seem, he borrowed a lot - at least at first - from the Decembrists. The fact is that during the investigation they talked a lot and frankly about Russian troubles and offered their own solutions to pressing problems. By order of Nikolai, Alexander Borovkov, secretary of the investigative commission, compiled a set of recommendations from their testimony. It was a most interesting document, in which all the problems of the state were sorted out by points: “Laws”, “Trade”, “Administration system” and so on. Until 1830-1831, both Nicholas I himself and the chairman of the State Council, Viktor Kochubey, constantly used this document.

Nicholas I awards Speransky for compiling a code of laws. Painting by Alexei Kivshenko. 1880 DIOMEDIA

One of the tasks formulated by the Decembrists, which Nicholas I tried to solve at the very beginning of his reign, was the systematization of legislation. The fact is that by 1825 the only set of Russian laws remained the Cathedral Code of 1649. All laws adopted later (including a huge body of laws from the times of Peter I and Catherine II) were published in scattered multi-volume publications of the Senate and were stored in archives of various departments. Moreover, many laws have disappeared altogether - about 70% have survived, and the rest have disappeared due to various circumstances, such as fires or careless storage. It was absolutely impossible to use all this in real court proceedings; laws had to be collected and streamlined. This was entrusted to the Second Department of the Imperial Chancellery, which was formally led by the jurist Mikhail Balugyansky, and in fact by Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky, assistant to Alexander I, ideologist and inspirer of his reforms. As a result, a huge amount of work was done in just three years, and in 1830 Speransky reported to the monarch that 45 volumes of the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire were ready. Two years later, 15 volumes of the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire were prepared: laws that were later repealed were removed from the Complete Collection, and contradictions and repetitions were eliminated. This was also not enough: Speransky suggested creating new codes of laws, but the emperor said that he would leave this to his heir.

In 1839-1841, the Minister of Finance Yegor Kankrin carried out a very important financial reform. The fact is that there were no firmly established relationships between different money that circulated in Russia: silver rubles, paper banknotes, as well as gold and copper coins, plus coins minted in Europe called “efimki” exchanged for each other. ha at rather arbitrary rates, the number of which reached six. In addition, by the 1830s, the value of banknotes had fallen sharply. Kankrin recognized the silver ruble as the main monetary unit and rigidly tied banknotes to it: now 1 silver ruble could be obtained for exactly 3 rubles 50 kopecks in banknotes. The population rushed to buy silver, and in the end, bank notes were completely replaced by new credit notes, partially backed by silver. Thus, a fairly stable monetary circulation was established in Russia.

Under Nicholas, the number of industrial enterprises increased significantly. Of course, this was connected not so much with the actions of the government, but with the industrial revolution that had begun, but without the permission of the government in Russia, in any case, it was impossible to open a factory, plant, or workshop. Under Nicholas, 18% of enterprises were equipped with steam engines - and it was they who produced almost half of all industrial output. In addition, during this period, the first (albeit very vague) laws appeared that regulated the relations between workers and entrepreneurs. Russia also became the first country in the world to adopt a decree on the formation of joint-stock companies.

Railway employees at Tver station. From the album "Views of the Nikolaev railway". Between 1855 and 1864

Railroad bridge. From the album "Views of the Nikolaev railway". Between 1855 and 1864 DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University

Bologoe station. From the album "Views of the Nikolaev railway". Between 1855 and 1864 DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University

Wagons on the tracks. From the album "Views of the Nikolaev railway". Between 1855 and 1864 DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University

Station Khimka. From the album "Views of the Nikolaev railway". Between 1855 and 1864 DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University

Depot. From the album "Views of the Nikolaev railway". Between 1855 and 1864 DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University

Finally, Nicholas I actually made a transport revolution in Russia. Since he tried to control everything that was happening, he was forced to constantly travel around the country, and thanks to this, the highways (which began to be laid under Alexander I) began to take shape in the road network. In addition, it was through the efforts of Nicholas that the first railways in Russia were built. To do this, the emperor had to overcome serious resistance: Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, Kankrin, and many others were against the new mode of transport for Russia. They feared that all forests would burn in the furnaces of steam locomotives, that in winter the rails would be covered with ice and trains would not be able to take even small rises, that the railway would lead to an increase in vagrancy - and, finally, would undermine the very social foundations of the empire, since the nobles , merchants and peasants will travel, albeit in different wagons, but in the same train. Nevertheless, in 1837, a movement from St. Petersburg to Tsarskoe Selo was opened, and in 1851 Nikolai arrived by train from St. Petersburg to Moscow - for the celebrations in honor of the 25th anniversary of his coronation.

7. The peasant question and the position of the nobility

In a nutshell: The position of the nobility and peasantry was extremely difficult: the landlords were ruined, discontent was ripening among the peasantry, serfdom hindered the development of the economy. Nicholas I understood this and tried to take measures, but he did not dare to abolish serfdom.

Like his predecessors, Nicholas I was seriously concerned about the state of the two main pillars of the throne and the main Russian social forces - the nobility and the peasantry. The position of both was extremely difficult. The third department annually issued reports that began with reports of landlords killed during the year, refusals to go to corvée, felling of landowners' forests, complaints from peasants against landowners - and, most importantly, rumors spreading about the will, which made the situation explosive. Nikolay (like his predecessors, by the way) saw that the problem was becoming more and more acute, and he understood that if a social explosion is possible in Russia at all, it would be a peasant one, not an urban one. At the same time, in the 1830s, two-thirds of the estates of the nobility were mortgaged: the landowners went bankrupt, and this proved that Russian agricultural production could no longer be based on their farms. Finally, serfdom hindered the development of industry, trade and other sectors of the economy. On the other hand, Nicholas was afraid of the discontent of the nobles, and in general he was not sure that the one-time abolition of serfdom would be useful to Russia at that moment.

Peasant family before dinner. Painting by Fyodor Solntsev. 1824 State Tretyakov Gallery / DIOMEDIA

From 1826 to 1849, nine secret committees worked on peasant affairs and more than 550 various decrees were adopted regarding the relationship of landlords and nobles - for example, it was forbidden to sell peasants without land, and peasants from estates put up for auction were allowed to before the end of the auction to be redeemed at will. Nikolay could not abolish serfdom, but, firstly, by making such decisions, the Winter Palace pushed society to discuss an acute problem, and secondly, the secret committees collected a lot of material that came in handy later, in the second half of the 1850s, when the Winter Palace moved to a specific discussion of the abolition of serfdom.

In order to slow down the ruin of the nobles, in 1845 Nikolai allowed the creation of majorates - that is, indivisible estates that were transferred only to the eldest son, and were not split up between heirs. But by 1861, only 17 of them were introduced, and this situation did not save: in Russia, the majority of landowners remained small landowners, that is, they owned 16-18 serfs.

In addition, he tried to slow the erosion of the old well-born nobility by issuing a decree according to which hereditary nobility could be obtained by rising to the fifth grade of the Table of Ranks, and not the eighth, as before. Getting hereditary nobility has become much more difficult.

8. Bureaucracy

In a nutshell: The desire of Nicholas I to keep the entire government of the country in his own hands led to the fact that the administration was formalized, the number of officials increased and the society was forbidden to evaluate the work of officials. As a result, the entire management system stalled, and the scale of treasury theft and bribery became enormous.

Portrait of Emperor Nicholas I. Painting by Horace Vernet. 1830s Wikimedia Commons

So, Nicholas I tried to do everything necessary to gradually, without shocks, lead society to prosperity with his own hands. Since he perceived the state as a family, where the emperor is the father of the nation, senior officials and officers are older relatives, and all the rest are foolish children who need constant supervision, he was not ready to accept any help from society at all. . The management was to be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the emperor and his ministers, who acted through officials who impeccably fulfill the monarch's will. This led to the formalization of the government of the country and a sharp increase in the number of officials; The movement of papers became the basis for managing the empire: orders went from top to bottom, reports from bottom to top. By the 1840s, the governor was signing about 270 documents a day and spending up to five hours doing it—even skimming through the papers.

The most serious mistake of Nicholas I was that he forbade society to evaluate the work of bureaucracy. No one, except for the immediate superiors, could not only criticize, but even praise the officials.

As a result, the bureaucracy itself became a powerful socio-political force, turned into a kind of third estate - and began to protect its own interests. Since the well-being of a bureaucrat depends on whether his superiors are pleased with him, wonderful reports went up from the very bottom, starting from the clerks: everything is fine, everything is done, the achievements are huge. With each step, these reports only became more radiant, and papers came up that had very little in common with reality. This led to the fact that the entire administration of the empire stalled: already in the early 1840s, the Minister of Justice reported to Nicholas I that 33 million cases had not been resolved in Russia, set out on at least 33 million sheets of paper. And, of course, the situation was developing in this way not only in justice.

Terrible embezzlement began in the country and. The loudest was the case of the Fund for the Disabled, from which 1,200,000 silver rubles were stolen in a few years; they brought 150,000 rubles to the chairman of one of the deanery councils to put them in a safe, but he took the money for himself and put newspapers in the safe; one county treasurer stole 80 thousand rubles, leaving a note that in this way he decided to reward himself for twenty years of impeccable service. And things like this happened all the time.

The emperor tried to personally monitor everything, adopted the most stringent laws and made the most detailed orders, but officials at absolutely all levels found ways to get around them.

9. Foreign policy until the early 1850s

In a nutshell: Until the beginning of the 1850s, the foreign policy of Nicholas I was quite successful: the government managed to protect the borders from Persians and Turks and prevent a revolution in Russia.

In foreign policy, Nicholas I had two main tasks. Firstly, he had to protect the borders of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus, in the Crimea and in Bessarabia from the most warlike neighbors, that is, the Persians and Turks. For this purpose, two wars were carried out - the Russian-Persian 1826-1828 In 1829, after the end of the Russian-Persian war, an attack was made on the Russian representative office in Tehran, during which all the employees of the embassy, ​​except for the secretary, were killed - including the plenipotentiary ambassador of Russia Alexander Griboyedov, who played a big role in the peace negotiations with the Shah, which ended in a favorable treaty for Russia. and Russian-Turkish 1828-1829, and both of them led to remarkable results: Russia not only strengthened the borders, but also significantly increased its influence in the Balkans. Moreover, for some time (albeit a short one - from 1833 to 1841), the Unkar-Iskelesi agreement was in force between Russia and Turkey, according to which the latter had to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits if necessary (that is, the passage from the Mediterranean Sea to Chernoye) for the warships of the opponents of Russia, which made the Black Sea, in fact, the inland sea of ​​Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

Battle of Boelesti on September 26, 1828. German engraving. 1828 Brown University Library

The second goal that Nicholas I set for himself was not to let the revolution pass through the European borders of the Russian Empire. In addition, since 1825, he considered it his sacred duty to fight the revolution in Europe. In 1830, the Russian emperor was ready to send an expedition to suppress the revolution in Belgium, but neither the army nor the treasury were ready for this, and the European powers did not support the intentions of the Winter Palace. In 1831, the Russian army severely suppressed; Poland became part of the Russian Empire, the Polish constitution was destroyed, and martial law was introduced on its territory, which remained until the end of the reign of Nicholas I. When France began again in 1848, which soon spread to other countries, Nicholas I was not on jokingly alarmed: he proposed to push the army to the French borders and thought about how to suppress the revolution in Prussia on his own. Finally, Franz Joseph, head of the Austrian imperial house, asked him for help against the rebels. Nicholas I understood that this event was not very beneficial for Russia, but he saw in the Hungarian revolutionaries “not only enemies of Austria, but enemies of world order and tranquility ... who must be exterminated for our own peace of mind”, and in 1849 the Russian the army joined the Austrian troops and saved the Austrian monarchy from disintegration. One way or another, the revolution never crossed the borders of the Russian Empire.

In parallel, since the time of Alexander I, Russia has been at war with the highlanders of the North Caucasus. This war went on with varying success and dragged on for many years.

In general, the foreign policy actions of the government during the reign of Nicholas I can be called rational: it made decisions based on the goals that it set for itself and the real opportunities that the country possessed.

10. Crimean War and the death of the emperor

In a nutshell: In the early 1850s, Nicholas I made a series of catastrophic miscalculations and went to war with the Ottoman Empire. England and France sided with Turkey, Russia began to suffer defeat. This exacerbated many internal problems. In 1855, when the situation was already very difficult, Nicholas I died unexpectedly, leaving his heir Alexander the country in an extremely difficult situation.

From the beginning of the 1850s, sobriety in assessing one's own strength in the Russian leadership suddenly disappeared. The emperor considered that the time had come to finally deal with the Ottoman Empire (which he called the “sick man of Europe”), dividing its “non-indigenous” possessions (the Balkans, Egypt, the Mediterranean islands) between Russia and other great powers -you, first of all Great Britain. And here Nikolai made several catastrophic miscalculations.

First, he offered Great Britain a deal: Russia, as a result of the division of the Ottoman Empire, would receive the Orthodox territories of the Balkans that remained under Turkish rule (that is, Moldavia, Wallachia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Macedonia), and Egypt and Crete would go to Great Britain. But for England, this proposal was completely unacceptable: the strengthening of Russia, which became possible with the capture of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, would be too dangerous for her, and the British agreed with the Sultan that they would receive Egypt and Crete for helping Turkey against Russia .

France was his second miscalculation. In 1851, it happened there, as a result of which President Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (Napoleon's nephew) became Emperor Napoleon III. Nicholas I decided that Napoleon was too busy with internal problems to intervene in the war, without thinking at all that the best way to strengthen power was to take part in a small victorious and just war (and the reputation of Russia, the "gendarme of Europe" , was extremely unattractive at that moment). Apart from other things, an alliance between France and England, old enemies, seemed completely impossible to Nicholas, and in this he again miscalculated.

Finally, the Russian emperor believed that Austria, out of gratitude for her help with Hungary, would take the side of Russia, or at least remain neutral. But the Habsburgs had their own interests in the Balkans, and a weak Turkey was more profitable for them than a strong Russia.

Siege of Sevastopol. Lithograph by Thomas Sinclair. 1855 DIOMEDIA

In June 1853, Russia sent troops to the Danube Principalities. In October, the Ottoman Empire officially declared war. At the beginning of 1854, France and Great Britain joined it (on the side of Turkey). The allies began actions in several directions at once, but most importantly, they forced Russia to withdraw its troops from the Danube principalities, after which the allied expeditionary force landed in the Crimea: its goal was to take Sevastopol, the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The siege of Sevastopol began in the autumn of 1854 and lasted almost a year.

The Crimean War showed all the problems associated with the control system built by Nicholas I: neither the supply of the army, nor the transport routes worked; The army was short of ammunition. In Sevastopol, the Russian army answered ten shots of the allies with one artillery shot - because there was no gunpowder. By the end of the Crimean War, only a few dozen guns remained in the Russian arsenals.

The military failures were followed by internal problems. Russia fell into an absolute diplomatic void: all the countries of Europe broke off diplomatic relations with it, except for the Vatican and the Kingdom of Naples, which meant the end of international trade, without which the Russian Empire could not exist. Public opinion in Russia began to change dramatically: many even conservative-minded people believed that defeat in the war would be more useful for Russia than victory, believing that it would not be Russia that would be defeated, but the Nikolaev regime.

In July 1854, the new Russian ambassador in Vienna, Alexander Gorchakov, found out under what conditions England and France were ready to conclude a truce with Russia and start negotiations, and advised the emperor to accept them. Nikolai hesitated, but in the autumn he was forced to agree. In early December, Austria joined the alliance of England and France. And in January 1855, Nicholas I caught a cold - and on February 18 he died unexpectedly.

Nicholas I on his deathbed. Drawing by Vladimir Gau. 1855 State Hermitage

Rumors of suicide began to spread in St. Petersburg: allegedly, the emperor demanded that his doctor give him poison. It is impossible to refute this version, but the evidence confirming it seems doubtful, especially since for a sincerely believing person, such as Nikolai Pavlovich undoubtedly was, suicide is a terrible sin. Rather, it was that the failures - both in the war and in the state as a whole - seriously undermined his health.

According to legend, talking before his death with his son Alexander, Nicholas I said: “I hand over my team to you, unfortunately, not in the order I wanted, leaving a lot of trouble and worries.” These troubles included not only the difficult and humiliating end of the Crimean War, but also the liberation of the Balkan peoples from the Ottoman Empire, the solution of the peasant question and many other problems that Alexander II had to deal with.

The Russian army personified for Nicholas II the greatness and power of the Empire, the inviolability and strength of Russia, which always aroused the most enthusiastic feelings in his soul.

I'll start with the memoirs of Anna Vyrubova (Taneeva), about the great influence of the army and navy on Nicholas II.
"The sovereign adored the army and navy; when he was the heir, he served in the Preobrazhensky and Hussar regiments and always recalled these years with delight. The sovereign said that a soldier is the best son of Russia. Her Majesty and the children equally shared their love for the troops, -" they all there were darlings, "according to them. Frequent parades, reviews and regimental holidays were the rest and joy of the Sovereign. Entering the Empress's room later, he beamed with pleasure and always repeated the same words -" it was splendid "[It was great. ( English)], almost never noticing any shortcomings.

I remember in my childhood the May parades on the Champ de Mars. We were taken to the palace of the Prince of Oldenburg, from whose windows we watched the parade. After the parade, to the delight of us children, the Sovereign and the entire Royal Family passed through the rooms of the palace, marching to breakfast.

Visiting meetings and talking with officers, the Sovereign said that he felt himself to be their comrade; one winter, he often dined in the regiments, which caused criticism, since he returned home late, at these dinners the officers did not drink wine in the presence of the Sovereign; at home, at dinner, the sovereign usually drank 2 glasses of port wine, which was placed in front of his device. The Emperor also liked to visit Krasnoye Selo.

In the Russian army, not to mention the fleet, they fed excellently: they gave meat that many peasants did not eat at home: if you slaughter a cow, you will be left without milk. And in the guards, especially in the Guards crew, they not only fed excellently and dressed better than the rest of the sailors, but the salary was bigger, and the barracks were cleaner and more spacious. One misfortune: in a different Russian lives Pushkin's old woman, for whom everything is not enough. And so, communicating with the nobility, some sailors forgot about the commandments of the Gospel, and began to envy the fact that some people live in palaces and mansions, eat on gold and silver, walk in velvet silks and sleep on downy featherbeds.

In the first decade of his reign, the sovereign, believing the reports of responsible persons, was sure that everything was going well in the Russian fleet. Therefore, the unsuccessful actions of our fleet in the Russo-Japanese War seemed absolutely amazing and incredible, starting with the treacherous attack of the Japanese fleet on our ships without declaring war, and ending with the tragic defeat of the Pacific Squadron in the Tsushima battle. The fault was our technical backwardness and unwillingness to believe in war.

The development of marine technology required a lot of effort and work, and the administrative part of our fleet lagged behind. Intelligence was put out of hand badly. New types of ships required skillful handling of complex mechanisms, which is achieved only by practice, i.e. constant swimming. Our ships, due to the observance of economy, sailed for 3-4 months. in year. In the remaining months, all our ships simply stood idle.

Few were aware of the fact that a significant proportion of the failures of the war fell on the Russian public, which forced the Sovereign to agree to send a diverse collection of dilapidated ships against the power of the modern Japanese fleet. A significant role was played by revolutionary propaganda, which sought to undermine patriotism and the will to fight. Some Russian circles even desired the defeat of the Motherland, so that there would be favorable conditions for a change of power. They also say that such meanness caused considerable surprise even in Western countries, accustomed to everything. In Tsushima, Russian sailors showed an example of rare heroism, when exhausted people went into battle, without any hope of success, but with almost complete certainty of imminent death.

Just at this dark time for the fleet, Nicholas II became close to the fleet. He began to visit ships more often, put on a naval uniform more often, often came to the cradle of the fleet - the naval corps and to shipyards. The purely negative attitude of Russian society towards the navy as an expensive and useless undertaking had an unfavorable effect on shipbuilding. The Ministry of Finance began to cut loans for the construction of ships, and only the will of the Monarch saved the situation and removed the obstacles. Only thanks to the constant support of the Sovereign, the Russian sailors did not completely lose heart, they understood the lessons of Tsushima and took advantage of them.

After the Russo-Japanese War, naval technology advanced rapidly. Given that the country actually ended up without a fleet. The fleet had to be rebuilt. The task was extremely difficult, more difficult than in the time of Peter I. Then they built wooden ships, there was more than enough forest. The modern fleet was built of steel, and we had few metallurgical plants, and there were almost no experienced workers at all. And besides, Peter I did not know any obstacles in his creative work, no one put a spoke in his wheels.
Fundraising committees were set up, and donations poured in from all over Russia. In a short time, 18 large destroyers were built. Russian ships began to sail again in foreign waters. The command staff of the fleet was quickly reorganized.

For the fulfillment of his will and plans, the Sovereign, with amazing foresight, chose just those whose activities were most suitable at that time to recreate the fleet. On one of these voyages, our ship ended up in a small Sicilian port, where an earthquake had just occurred .. Russian sailors quickly and harmoniously helped to cope with helping the Italian residents. Upon the return of the detachment, the emperor said: "You did in a few days what our diplomats could not do in years!" The sovereign spoke of a significant improvement with Italy after the assistance rendered by our sailors.


In the last years before the World War, the Sovereign, sensing the falsehood and intrigues of the court environment, the insincere, but often servile attitude of dignitaries, the hostility of members of the State Duma, sought the society of simple, combat officers. He guessed in them the true support of the state. He looked at the sailors of his yacht Shtandart and those with whom he often met as members of his family. Not embarrassed, feeling himself in a circle of faithful people, the sovereign joked and often showed humor.

D. Khodnev recalls: “On one of the days of July 19, our entire regiment was in the Alexandria, visiting the royal family. Is it possible to forget the words of the Tsar addressed to us: “... I am glad, gentlemen officers, to receive you at home easily; thank you for your unfailingly zealous and faithful service. I am sure that in the future the Finnish Life Guards Regiment will also serve me and the Motherland. Once again, ladies and gentlemen, thank you from the bottom of my heart! Thank you brothers!"
Is it possible to forget how the Empress herself poured tea, and how happy we were to receive a cup of tea from her hands ... Is it possible to forget with what tenderness and love the Sovereign looked at his son-Heir when he ran and frolicked with his sisters. How extraordinarily happy were the soldiers who were given the royal treat, whom the Sovereign walked around and graciously turned to us with various questions ... His Majesty deigned to ask us in detail about whether the scouts were provided with warm clothes, whether everyone had sheepskin coats and felt boots, whether there were skis How is it supposed to organize allowances and medical assistance? The Sovereign finished his conversation with us, affectionately wishing a happy journey: "Well, with God!"

"Nicholas II's concern for officers and soldiers manifested itself continuously. Often, having learned about the difficult financial situation of one of them, the Tsar provided assistance from his personal funds.

The personality of the Sovereign Emperor, as the Autocrat of the All-Russian, His continuous connection with the army and navy, as the Supreme Leader, formed the basis of the education of a soldier, sailor, cadet, midshipman and cadet. The emperor wore only a military uniform to raise the importance of military service to the state. All officers of the Imperial Russian army and navy always wore military uniforms, carrying edged weapons. This symbolized the state of uninterrupted presence of an officer in the service of the Tsar and the Fatherland.

The imperial army was a harmonious whole, resting on a solid foundation of 3 centuries of glory, fixed by history. The army was alien to politics, its ranks were not involved. But the army was not "politicalless": whatever the Tsar commands, we will do - that was its policy. "(from the memoirs of Colonel Shaiditsky)

This is how Colonel E Messner described the reasons for the enormous reverence of ordinary soldiers for the last Emperor in his memoirs. “In our vile time, when the expression “Cult of Personality” appeared and when such a “cult” really arose and arises, it may seem that an indignant colonel and a frightened captain, and that an officer of an academic course who fainted, and that the old colonel, shocked by the contemplation of the Tsar his young adjutant was watching at Tiraspol, and that the soldiers of the fourth platoons of batteries, who imagined that they were undersized, saw the Sovereign through the backs of the tall first platoon, that all these were adherents of the personality cult. NO! Between the personality cult and the veneration of the king, the difference is the same, as between the fashionable cult of the "Unknown Soldier" and the age-old veneration of the great heroes-commanders. Looking at the Emperor, everyone saw in him 170 million Russia, the homeland from Libau to Vladivostok. Without deifying, everyone saw in him - in the words of a Caucasian song - an earthly god Russia, the power of Russia, its greatness, its glory... Such was the attitude of the officer towards each of the predecessors of Nikolai Alexandrovich.

But to the earthly-divine veneration of Nikolai Alexandrovich, there was also added a special love that arose when contemplating him, at least during instant communication with him, love that was awakened by the obvious, tangible properties of this kindest of the Tsars of Russia - his gracious smile, his gentle eyes, his holy soul.

He continues: “The officer’s consciousness that the Emperor is the Sovereign Father was also expressed in the fact that we did not condemn him for problems in the army and for the fact that sometimes there were worse problems. So the officer did not blame the Tsar for the lack of military technical equipment troops, for the beggarly officer salary, for the sadistic ferocity of General Sandetsky (commander of the troops of the Kazan Military District) They blamed this general, they blamed other generals by name, under the collective name "bosses", but the reproach of the officer did not rise to the Tsar, because we understood the impotence of the Autocrat against the system that gave birth to frivolous (if not worse) Sukhomlins, ignorant Brusilovs, self-conscious Sandetskys. "//Materials taken from the book of Nicholas II in memoirs and testimonies.-M.: Veche, 2008.-352p.

In Soviet historiography Emperor Nicholas I portrayed exclusively in negative colors. The strangler of freedoms, the gendarme of Europe, the man who destroyed Pushkin and so on - such was the portrait of a man who had headed Russia for three decades.

It could not have been otherwise: Nicholas I suppressed the uprising of the Decembrists revered in the USSR, which already ruled out the possibility of his positive assessment.

It’s not that Soviet historians were lying, it’s just that the image of the emperor was correctly drawn from only one side. In life, everything was much more difficult.

third son Paul I was born on July 6 (according to the new style), 1796, a few months before his father's accession to the throne. Unlike older brothers Alexandra And Constantine, Nikolai did not have time to get under the care of his grandmother, Catherine the Great although she had such plans.

Little Nicholas was too far in line for the throne for anyone to seriously consider preparing him for the role of emperor. The boy's nanny became Charlotte Lieven, and in 1800 Emperor Paul assigned to his son General Matvey Lamzdorf with the prescription: “Just don’t make a rake out of my son.”

General Matvey Lamzdorf. Source: Public Domain

"Victim" of General Lamzdorf

Matvey Ivanovich Lamzdorf, an executive servant, was least of all suited for pedagogical work. Nikolai and his younger brother Mikhail were taken into the grip of the strictest discipline. The guardian-general believed that the best means for proper education was drill and the suppression of any liberties. Much of what Nikolai's contemporaries will not like very much was the result of Lamzdorf's activities.

The coup of 1801, which ended in the death of his father, Nikolai remembered very vaguely, which he honestly admitted in his memoirs. At that time, the future emperor did not think about the fight between his father and brother for power, but about his beloved wooden horse.

The rigid discipline of Lamzdorf had the opposite effect - Nikolai sabotaged home schooling, as a result of which he had serious gaps in the humanities. But Nicholas was well versed in military affairs and in fortification.

Nikolai Pavlovich knew how to critically approach himself - already in adulthood, when the prospect of taking the Russian throne became real, he tried to educate himself. It turned out, frankly, not very well. The English Queen Victoria, after twenty years of the reign of Nicholas, gave him the following characterization: "His mind is not processed, his upbringing was careless."

Subsequently, Nicholas with all care will approach the issue of educating his own sons, so that they do not end up in his position.

Sudden heir to the throne

During the Patriotic War and subsequent foreign campaigns, Nikolai rushed to the front, but Alexander I kept his younger brother away from the battlefield. Instead of military glory at this time, he found a bride - a young daughter of the King of Prussia Princess Charlotte.

In July 1817, Charlotte of Prussia, who became Orthodox Alexandra Feodorovna, married Grand Duke Nikolai Pavlovich. The young were happy and did not dream of the throne.

Nicholas I and Alexandra Feodorovna. Source: commons.wikimedia.org

In 1820, Emperor Alexander summoned Nicholas and announced that from now on he would become heir to the throne. The emperor was childless, Konstantin Pavlovich renounced his rights to the throne, as he was divorced and also had no children.

It is unlikely that Nikolai was flirting when he admitted in his notes that at that moment he became really scared: “My wife and I were left in a position that I can only liken to that feeling that, I believe, will amaze a person walking calmly along a pleasant road, dotted with flowers and from which the most pleasant views open up everywhere, when suddenly an abyss opens up under his feet, into which an irresistible force plunges him, not allowing him to retreat or return.

Nicholas did not prepare for the role of the monarch and did not want it for himself, but accepted this fate with the humility of a soldier, which General Lamzdorf hammered into him in his childhood.

"I am the emperor, but at what cost!"

The question of the heir hung in the air - information about the abdication of Constantine was not disclosed, and in 1825, when Alexander died, uncertainty arose that threatened with grave consequences. Officials and the military began to take an oath to Konstantin, the mint began printing rubles with his image. Nicholas, trying to resolve the situation, urged his brother to come to St. Petersburg from Warsaw, where he was the governor of the Kingdom of Poland.

The Decembrist uprising shocked Nicholas. The rebellion of representatives of noble and honored noble families seemed to him an unthinkable and out of the ordinary event.

Nikolai, who himself almost died when he met with the rebels right on the St. Petersburg street, was not delighted with the forceful liquidation of the performance. “I am an emperor, but at what cost, my God! At the cost of the blood of my subjects,” he wrote to his brother Konstantin.

In the Soviet period, Emperor Nicholas was presented as a kind of bloody maniac, who enthusiastically enjoyed the massacre of the rebels. In fact, nothing like that - the monarch approached traitors as condescendingly as possible. According to the current laws, for an attempt on the person of the sovereign, quartering was supposed, for participation in such a conspiracy - hanging.

As a result, Nicholas completely ruled out quartering, and only the five most active initiators of the uprising were sent to the gallows. But the liberal circles of Russian society considered this a terrible atrocity.

Emperor Nicholas I on Senate Square on December 14, 1825. Source: Public Domain

Administrator on the throne

Nicholas I carefully studied the documents of the Decembrists, especially those related to the analysis of the situation in the country. He saw pain points that required change, and in particular the problem of serfdom.

But he considered radical and revolutionary steps in this area harmful and dangerous.

The main way to solve problems, Nikolai considered the centralization of power, building its rigid vertical, administration of all sectors of the country's life.

The heyday of the bureaucracy of the times of the Russian Empire fell precisely on the reign of Nicholas I. Russian writers did not spare ironically colors for the depiction of Nicholas Russia, which turned into one large state office.

To carry out the tasks of political investigation in July 1826, a permanent body was created - the Third Branch of the Personal Office - a secret service with significant powers. "Third branch", which was headed by Count Alexander Benckendorff, became one of the symbols of the reign of Nicholas I.

The emperor loved the army, but saw the guarantee of its power not in timely rearmament and modernization, but in the establishment of strict discipline. Under Nicholas, most often they began to punish by “running through the ranks” - the offender was carried through the ranks of hundreds of soldiers, each of whom struck the punished with a stick. Such punishment, in fact, was a sophisticated form of the death penalty. For addiction to this type of punishment, the emperor received the nickname Nikolai Palkin.

Under Nicholas I, work was carried out to systematize Russian law and the Code of Laws of the Russian Empire was created.

Through the ranks, drawing by Geoffroy, 1845. Source: Public Domain

How Russia first got off the “raw material needle”

Almost throughout his reign, the emperor was engaged in solving the "peasant question". A ban was introduced to exile peasants to hard labor, to sell them one by one and without land, the peasants received the right to redeem themselves from the estates being sold. The “Decree on obligated peasants” and other measures of the tsarist government made it possible under Nicholas I to reduce the proportion of serfs from almost 60 percent of the population to 45 percent. The problem as a whole was far from being solved, but progress was obvious.

The management reform of the state village was carried out, which made it possible to improve the situation of state peasants and, at the same time, increase state revenues.

Nicholas I accepted a country that was 100 percent a raw power. The industrial revolution in Europe practically did not affect it. During the three decades of the reign of Nikolai Pavlovich, the output per worker in Russian industry has tripled.

The volume of output of cotton products in Russia increased 30 times, and the volume of engineering products - 33 times.

The share of the urban population under Nicholas I doubled and exceeded 9 percent.

"Only you and I do not steal"

Under Nicholas I, the construction of railways of an all-Russian scale began. We also owe him a wider railway gauge compared to the European one, which remains to this day. The monarch believed that the unification of Russia was not needed, because it was not worth creating amenities for a potential aggressor in terms of delivering troops to Russian territory.

Success, however, could not allow Russia to catch up with the leading European countries in terms of development. The vertical of power created by Nikolai, while solving certain problems, simultaneously hampered many promising undertakings.

And, of course, the emperor also faced such a phenomenon as corruption. Nikolai made regular audits the norm, and mercilessly sent stealing officials to court. By the end of his reign, the number of convicted officials was measured in the thousands every year. But, despite the rigidity of the monarch, the situation did not improve.

“In Russia, only you and I don’t steal,” Nikolai said with bitter irony to the heir to the throne, the future emperor Alexander II.

Nicholas I at construction work. 1853